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Preface 
The dynamism within the American colonies in the fifty years or so before 
the outbreak of the crisis of the 1760s that was to lead to the Revolution 
has never been in doubt. Recent historical writing has amply demonstrated 
it. Population grew, new land was settled, economies expanded and diver-
sified, social structures became more complex, colonial assemhlies won more 
power and new political ideologies were formulated. By contrast, British 
imperial influence on the colonies has often been portrayed both as somewhat 
ineffectual in practice and as tradition-bound and unchanging in its aims, 
at least until the period of the Seven Years' War. This is the picture that 
emerges from the deservedly classic accounts of the imperial system written 
by Charles M. Andrews, George L. Beer and Lawrence Harper. They 
described how the institutions of trade regulation and constitutional super-
vision were devised in the later seventeenth century and pointed out the 
relative lack of institutional change before the 1750s. A number of recent 
scholars have, however, suggested that lack of institutional change does not 
necessarily mean that the imperial system was either static or ineffectual. It 
seemed to us that it would be valuable to devote an issue of this Journal to a 
reassessment of the imperial system before the revolution. 
The articles written at our invitation suggest a number of ways in which 
the 'imperial factor' was of real importance in colonial life and show that 
there was dynamism on the British side as well as in the colonies. The links 
that bound mother country and colonies together were much more varied 
than the formal channels of authority set up in the previous century. For 
instance, both Professor Steele and Professor Olson show how London's 
spectacular growth enabled London-based interests, commercial, religious 
and ethnic, to exercise a powerful influence in the colonies. They stress that 
colonial elites were generally more inclined to cooperate with British interests 
than to oppose them. Three contributors concentrate on the important 
consequences for the colonies of the increasing scale of imperial warfare. 
Dr. Pencak and Professor Greene expose the political and social strains 
produced by war; Professor Gwyn emphasises economic opportunity. 
Finally, Dr. Langford shows that English Whig doctrine was not inert. 
Ideological change took place on both sides of the Altantic, as the Americans 
were to discover in the 1760s. Although none of these scholars would deny 
that important changes in British attitudes to the colonies took place in the 
Grenville era, they make it clear that Anglo-American relations developed 
on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the eighteenth century. Braudel's 
famous phrase applies to this as to an earlier period, 'L'Amerique ne 
commande pas seul'. 
P.J.M. 
G.W. 
The Empire and Provincial Elites: An 
interpretation of some recent writings on the 
English Atlantic, 1675-1740 
by 
I. K. Steele 
Amid a fiery blaze, visible sixty miles at sea, 'Some gentlemen took care to 
preserve Her Majesties Picture that was in the Town-House'. 1 It was a small 
gallantry, to be expected of men of their rank in the Queen's dominions, but 
not quite what we have come to expect in Boston, Massachusetts in 1711. 
These gentlemen, like those who passed a New Hampshire law requiring all 
members of their House of Assembly to wear swords, 2 were among those who 
were turning colonies into English Atlantic provinces. Yet their story 
belongs too easily and too exclusively to American colonial rather than 
British imperial history. 
A whole certainly can be much less than its parts if the whole is the written 
history of the first British empire. Fifty years ago The Cambridge History of 
the British Empire was launched with a spacious and well-manned volume 
entitled The Old Empire from the Beginnings to 1783, 3 and the 'imperial 
school' of American colonial history was flourishing. Although two genera-
tions of scholars have revolutionised every aspect of this subject--including 
its boundaries-this has been accomplished with little deliberate interest in 
the history of the first British empire as a whole. 4 The habit of drawing Clio 
in national costume seems as ubiquitous as ever, and the empire is easily 
seen as an unusable past or a mild embarrassment to its successor states. 
The neglect of this subject owes even more to the fact that the new ways in 
history are specialised and comparative. Scholarly attention has been 
shifting from structures to functional units, from theory to practice, and 
from the general to the particular. These trends have meant that the first 
British empire has continued to attract less scholarly interest than have its 
successor states. 
A review of some recent literature from the perspective of the English 
Atlantic empire draws attention to several themes, and concentration upon 
the lifetime 1675 to 1740 brings 'provincial' themes into sharpest focus. 
By 1675 the English Atlantic political economy was well beyond the pioneer 
dispersal stage, and patterns of much subsequent development were already 
present. This was the lifetime between the founding of the Lords of Trade 
and the Cartagena expedition. It was the long lifetime between the founding 
of the Royal African Company and the Stono rebellion, or between the 
founding of the Royal Observatory and Harrison's solution to the problem 
of longitude. This was also the span between Wycherly's The Country Wife 
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and Thomson's Rule Britannia, and between the Atlantic mission of George 
Fox and that of George Whitefield. Despite the well-known centrifugal 
tendencies that operated in this period, colonial fathers could die in 1740 
without hearing a whisper of the coming of the American Revolution. In this 
provincial lifetime the integration, specialisation, and interdependence that 
grew in London's more immediate economic, social and political hinterlands5 
was carried to the Atlantic colonies with notable success. 
Most Englishmen lived in London's provinces, whether in rural England, 
provincial towns, or transatlantic colonies. The county, town, or colony was 
the context within which most of life was lived; 6 with the 'English nation' as 
a general boundary between friends and enemies and a metaphor for the 
public good. Compared to the lifetime before 1675, migration within England, 
between England and the colonies, or even between colonies, was less 
endemic7-with the notable exceptions of the city of London, the colony of 
Pennsylvania, and the forced migration of Africans to the New World 
colonies. English population grew very little, grain prices were modest and 
quite stable, and no crises of subsistence occurred there or in the colonies. 8 
In these respects, too, the comparisons with the previous lifetime are striking. 
The mortality crisis of the 1640s, the economic and political problems of 
the 1620s and 1640s, and what historians have called The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy, 'the storm over the gentry', or 'the general crisis of the seven-
teenth century',9 all point to the tensions and disruptions that prompted 
internal migration, migration to continental Europe, and a major early 
Stuart migration to the new world. Studies of county life in this earlier 
lifetime have confirmed the general picture, but have also documented the 
strength of provincial life, and its power to resist centralisation by early 
Stuart or Cromwellian government. 10 Social history, especially local studies 
of villages, cities, and counties, have challenged the historical assumptions 
of a unified England with outlying colonies. London's provinces existed in 
some variety on both sides of the Atlantic, and the new world provinces were 
not automatically different for being united to the metropolis by water 
rather than by land. 
Appreciation of the links between various aspects of life is one of the 
special challenges of historical study, and a tendency towards 'total history' 
has long been part of British imperial history.11 Yet a scholar's assumptions, 
research subjects, methods, and preoccupations all tend to emphasise one 
aspect, be it economic, or social, or political, and to regard the other two as 
subsidiary subjects if not dependent variables. This exploration of the 
provincial life of the English Atlantic is organised to focus, in turn, upon 
each of these aspects. 
The century after the restoration of Charles II has special attraction for 
economic historians concerned with the origins of industrial development 
and 'modernisation'. E. A. Wrigley's suggestive model, outlining the import-
ance of London's growth in England's economic unification,12 can usefully 
be extended to include the English Atlantic. If the agriculture, industry, and 
crafts of England were being transformed to respond to the phenomenal 
growth of the London market, the economic survival of the transatlantic 
provinces depended upon the development of marketable staples or related 
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activities. London was the major source of credit, the major market, the 
logical entrep6t, though this natural preference had to be reinforced by 
war, by trade legislation, and by colonial administration. Economic specialisa-
tion in the colonies presumed maritime access to markets, and also presumed 
sea-borne sources of most needed goods. Thus interdependence grew with 
specialisation and economies of scale: plantations were among the prototypes 
of industrial production, profitable but vulnerable elements in the emerging 
English Atlantic economy. 
Although the economic history of the English Atlantic has not been 
subjected to recent synthesis, 13 the field has been ably surveyed in the 
broader comparative studies by Ralph Davis and K. G. Davies. 14 The best 
short economic histories of pre-industrial England. including those by 
C. Wilson, L. A. Clarkson and D. C. Coleman, 15 are forced, by the recent 
riches of their field, to adopt a customs officer's perspective on the 'foreign 
plantations'. Studies of overseas trade and the shipping industry all assert 
the importance of the staple trades in the English re-export trade and in ship 
utilisation. 16 Yet the colonial staple trades are now likely to be seen primarily 
as sources of profit for London merchants and the English government, and 
are seldom credited with transforming England to anything like the degree 
claimed by some pamphleteers at the time and some historians since.17 
By 1675 those who had migrated to escape the Old World were succeeded 
or outnumbered by those who intended to reap the harvest of the New 
World. Effort to improve upon a rude sufficiency drew colonists into the 
English Atlantic market economy. 18 The wilderness may well have been a 
subsequent source of colonial uniqueness, but it was at the edge of the real 
development of these provinces. Access to sea-borne commerce was more 
advantageous to colonists than to most other Englishmen. 
Discovery and development of a marketable staple product was crucial 
to the shape of colonial societies, as H. A. Innis, M. H. Watkins, R. F. Neill, 
R. E. Baldwin, and D. C. North have emphasised. 19 Ironically, the first of 
the staples Innis studied, The Cod Fisheries, 20 could support contrasting 
economic and social structures in Newfoundland and New England. The 
English Newfoundland fishery remained West Country based into the 
eighteenth century, with international rivalry and fishing interests both 
helping to retard settlement on the island itself. C. Grant Head has emphasised 
the increased role of the 'wintering people' in the onshore fishery after the 
1730s, and the shift of West Country fishermen from the onshore fishery to 
the formerly French-dominated Banks fishery proper. 21 In contrast, New 
England fisheries supported local village life from the beginning, but could 
reach out to Canso or Newfoundland with minimal local commitments. As 
the most perishable and difficult staple to regulate, fish was not susceptible 
to the entrep6t market structure of other colonial staples. However much it 
might be prized as a nursery of seamen and a source of foreign earnings, the 
fishery remained a staple of limited fiscal potential and administrative 
interest. 22 
Like the Newfoundland fishery, the English fur trade could operate as an 
English-based extraction trade or as a colonial traffic supporting a major 
colonial town like Albany. E. E. Rich's institutional study is the basis for the 
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more recent work on the Hudson's Bay trade. 23 A. J. Ray and A. Rotstein 
have explored the price mechanisms and Indian perceptions of the trade, 24 
and G. Williams has documented the continuing lure of the North-West 
Passage through the eighteenth century. 25 Although the northern English 
approach to the fur trade generated little local development beyond the Bay 
factories, the New York fur trade was funnelled through the substantial town 
of Albany in the new world, and was free of monopoly in its English markets 
even after fur was 'enumerated' in 1722. The economics of the Albany fur 
trade have received attention recently, 26 though less than have other features 
of the life of the Indians who traded at Albany. 27 The fur trade and the fish 
trade have been the basis for a staple theory of economic growth, yet the 
range of possible economic structures, the limited ancillary trades, and the 
comparatively small scale of both trades make them poor examples of the 
English Atlantic staples. 
The sugar trade, that prize of English Atlantic commerce, has long been 
blessed with good economic historians. The foundation works of Richard 
Pares put him in a category by himself, 28 and the comprehensive volumes by 
Noel Deerr29 have also survived as major reference works, as has Frank 
Wesley Pitman's strangely-titled The Development of the British West Indies, 
1700-1763. 30 R. S. Dunn's scholarly and well written Sugar and Slai·es31 is 
a comprehensive study that includes a sound synthesis of the economic aspects 
of the rise of the planters in the later Stuart period. The economics of 
integration are more extensively traced in R. B. Sheridan's Sugar and Slavery. 
Sheridan divides West Indian economic historians into 'neo-Smithian' critics 
of the value of colonies and 'neo-Burkean' advocates of the conviction that 
empire paid.32 However strange it might seem to apply a neo-Burkean !able 
to a Marxist argument that English industrialisation owed much to the profits 
of the sugar trade, this debate goes on, with Sheridan as a self-proclaimed 
'neo-Burkean'. 33 But whatever the contentions on that issue, all are agreed 
that the sugar trade was the exemplar of imperial economic integration 
accomplished in the lifetime after the construction of the Navigation Acts 
and the agencies for their enforcement. The loss of the European re-export 
trade in sugar was a significant blow early in the eighteenth century, but 
the trade to England itself grew favourably. The sugar trade rested firmly 
on credit from the Royal African Company, London merchants, and affluent 
relatives. 34 Those colonists who could command the most metropolitan 
credit on the best terms (for land, slaves, and sugar equipment) won against 
their less cosmopolitan neighbours. 35 This capital and labour intensive trade 
was firmly bound to the metropolis. 
The shuttle of the English sugar fleets to and from the English islands was 
neither the beginning nor the end of the sugar trade. The loggers, fishermen 
and seamen of New England; the farmers, millers and merchants of New 
York and Pennsylvania; these were all linked to the trade in much lighter 
bondage than that of the African slaves. Richard Pares and Byron Fairchild 
have sketched aspects of the lumber and provisions trade to the English sugar 
islands. 36 The slave trade has had considerable treatment; 37 the Irish provision 
trade to the islands, 38 the molasses trade, and the rum trade from the 
islands have also had their historians. 39 Studies of the development of 
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merchant elites in Boston and Philadelphia40 suggest the important place of 
the West Indies trade in the creation of these dynasties. J. F. Shepherd and 
G. M. Walton, as well as D. C. North and R. P. Thomas, 41 have found that 
shipping promoted New England capital accumulation, and the Massachusetts 
shipowners have been studied intensively. 42 For North American merchants, 
the sugar colonies were a major avenue of profit, especially prized for bills 
of exchange on London: New England trade directly to England was in 
furs, skins, train oil, masts and naval stores, but these returns did not cover 
the cost of English and European goods imported from the metropolis. 43 
Before 1740 the English colonies did not have extensive trade beyond the 
empire, though there were beginnings that deserve more study than they have 
received. The trade in fish to Mediterranean Europe was a direct trade that 
could be profitable but was subject to heavy competition. The trade to the 
foreign West Indies was more lucrative, especially to the French islands. By 
the 1730s two new trades from North America to southern Europe were 
growing in importance. These were the rice trade from South Carolina, which 
stayed with English carriers by prescription even though the trade was 
direct, 44 and the grain trade, 45 which was destined to become a more 
important source of profits for New York and Philadelphia merchants. 
Despite these initiatives, which can easily be exaggerated by hindsight, the 
English empire was, to a noticeable extent, bound together by the needs and 
opportunities of the sugar trade during the provincial lifetime discussed 
here. 
Tobacco, the other great staple of the English Atlantic, generated less 
intercolonial trade than did sugar, but was responsible for more international 
traffic in Europe after re-export from Britain. J. M. Price has unravelled the 
complexities of the marketing of tobacco, initially in its connection with 
Russia, but most recently and masterfully in its links to the French tobacco 
monopoly. 46 The market crisis of the 1670s had accelerated the shift to slave 
labour and larger holdings, which in turn financed the rise of the gentlemen 
planters. As A. C. Land's research has suggested, the tobacco economy was 
financed on networks of local debt, much of it ultimately owed to English 
creditors.47 By 1740 the shift to Glasgow as the main British entrepot was a 
signal of changes in colonial tobacco marketing and credit arrangements. 
While the London-based agency system still prospered, this new element of 
consequence was changing the nature of the marketing of Chesapeake 
tobacco. 48 
The slaves, who grew much of the tobacco - and even more of the sugar 
and rice - have been the focus for much recent economic history of both 
slavery and the slave trade. 49 Eric Williams' ranging and provocative 
Capitalism and Slavery50 is still a legitimate starting point for recent debates 
on the origins of racist attitudes, 51 the rate of return in the slave trade and 
slavery, 52 and the abolition movement. 53 The Royal African Company, by 
K. G. Davies, is a thorough study of the monopoly company that flourished 
and failed under the last Stuarts. The African involvement in the slave trade 
was a significant omission in the Williams thesis, and this aspect of the trade 
has been illuminated by the works of I. A. Akinjogbin, P. D. Curtin, K. Y. 
Daaku, D. Forde, A. J. H. Latham, R. Law, M. Priestley, W. Rodney, and 
EMPIRE AND PROVINCIAL ELITES 7 
R. P. Thomas with R. N. Bean. 64 The scale of the forced migration of 
Africans to the new world has been carefully charted by Curtin55 and this 
black maritime trade has been surveyed by D. P. Mannix, M. Craton, and 
Bean. 56 London's dominance in the slave trade, as in the tobacco trade, 
would lessen before the middle of the eighteenth century, but Liverpool 
and colonial slavers were of little consequence in the lifetime before 1740.57 
English dominance in the English Atlantic slave trade served to reinforce 
the economic powers that integrated the colonial staple trade into a unified 
and interdependent economic unit. 
Whatever the motives of migrants, the initial economic development of 
colonies involved grafting these areas to existing economies by the production 
of marketable staples. It was natural that migrants turned to their own 
metropolis for needed goods and for the credit to acquire land, labour, and 
equipment to create returns which paid for imports. The trust that was 
necessary for business was easier to give to those who share the same family, 
the same religion, the same language and, when all else failed, the same 
laws. 
Yet such natural inclination did not dominate all colonial Englishmen. 
Dutch initiative in English colonial sugar development was a clear and early 
indication that Dutch credit, shipping, and processing industries offered 
English planters better terms than their own country could. In the third 
quarter of the seventeenth century English governments consistently and 
decisively used laws, wars, and elaborate enforcement agencies to exclude 
the Dutch from what were certainly not to be 'foreign plantations'. 
The rather futile debate over the primacy of merchant wealth or state 
power in the development of these economic policies has calmed. 58 C. D. 
Chandaman's The English Public Revenues, 1660-168859 documents the fiscal 
value of the customs revenues on tobacco and sugar, important income for 
Charles II and especially James II. Their drive for tighter control of the 
colonies can now be seen as efficient royal estate management. James II was 
the last king to control the customs revenues collected in England, revenues 
which financed expansion of his army. Pursuit of permanent colonial revenues 
was not so decisively checked after 1689, remaining an active political issue 
into the eighteenth century. 
The burdens of the Navigation Acts upon colonial development has been 
an enduring topic of research. Although bedevilled by the unfathomable 
dimensions of smuggling and illegal trade, 60 the attempt to measure the 
price of empire goes on. Computer-assisted research has added new dimen-
sions to this subject, yet the new methods have tended to confirm the classic 
assessments of L. A. Harper and 0. M. Dickerson, 61 that the costs of empire 
for North American white colonists were modest. 62 
Economics of development is a current concern which has drawn additional 
attention to the economic history of England and her colonies in the pre-
industrial period. Whether approached from the hypotheses of Watkins, 
W. W. Rostow, J. A. Ernst and M. Egnal, or North and Thomas, 63 the 
economic development of the English Atlantic in the period 1675 to 1740 did 
not seriously strain existing economic and political structures. The disruptions 
of war, the fiscal troubles of the 1730s, French colonial competition, and the 
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problems revealed by the Molasses Act were all strains, but not evidence 
that the structures were themselves economically inadequate. 
As relatively new economic ventures, the colonial trades were opportunities 
for practising new economic ideas. Commercial capitalism was less re-
strained by law and custom in these new areas, 64 and the social variety of the 
colonies adds to their interest for scholars studying cultural influences on 
economic activity. From an earlier academic concern with the connection 
between Protestantism and capitalism, recent attention has shifted to the 
secularising of economic virtue or revisions in the perceived relationship 
between the self and society. The general inquiries of S. Diamond and 
Richard D. Brown65 pose questions that are receiving intriguing answers in 
the works of C. B. MacPherson, J. E. Crowley, J. G. A. Pocock, A. 0. 
Hirschman and J. 0. Appleby. 66 
Urban studies are one of the new preoccupations of historians that 
promise insights for the economic history of the English Atlantic. The 
frontier was an influence favouring colonial uniqueness, but the towns and 
cities of the English Atlantic shared many problems and perspectives. Carl 
Bridenbaugh's Cities in the Wilderness67 was a herald for this new field. 
Despite the literature of the economic geographers, historians have seldom 
approached the analytical sophistication of J. M. Price's 'Economic Fum:tion 
and the Growth of American Port towns in the eighteenth century'. 68 The 
economic histories of important provincial ports in England set a high 
standard, illustrated by recent work on Bristol, Liverpool and particularly 
the studies of Exeter and Hull. 69 The leading towns of provincial America 
have also been studied, though economics is seldom the dominant theme. 
Studies of the economic development of the American seaboard town during 
rapid population growth (Philadelphia), slow growth (New York), and 
stagnation (Boston) would add to our understanding of development, 70 
especially if English ports in similar circumstances were studied for 
comparison. 
It was ships and shipping that laced together the ports of the English 
Atlantic. Studies of the shipbuilding and shipping industries have improved 
our descriptions of the merchant marine, 71 but much more can be done with 
surviving records. Although economic, political and social exchanges 
depended upon the communication facilities of the various trades, remarkably 
little has been done on the pace and pattern of the distribution of news in 
the English Atlantic. 72 Although Alan Pred 73 has demonstrated the 
importance of access to market news for the later growth of New York, 
nothing has been done to establish the routes of market news in the earlier 
period. 
Economic attraction of colonial specialisation and interdependence lured 
men in England and the colonies to pursue the integration of the English 
Atlantic in the lifetime after 1675. There were some colonial statutes that 
gave advantages to their own merchants and shipowners, and there were 
objections to imperial legislation and its enforcement, 74 but the building 
of the English Atlantic economy was not seriously challenged from within. 
The empire was the context within which the emerging colonial elites found 
the resources for their own advancement. 
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Social history of the English Atlantic during these years has, for a variety 
of reasons, received comparatively little direct attention. 75 When the 
'imperial school' of American colonial history prospered, social history was 
not fashionable, and the political economy of the English Atlantic empire 
easily became the whole of its history. 76 But a much more important reason 
why the empire is seen without social history is that much of the exciting 
social history of the last fifteen years has drawn attention to small com-
munities. These 'community studies', built on parish records, local censuses, 
court records and town records, have tended to atomise and specify. 77 What 
Namier did for English political history, the new wave of local studies has 
done for social history. Expansive assertions about life in 'England' or 
,America' are retreating before measured studies of regional differences and 
their transplant and adaptation to the new world, 78 and before careful 
specific comparisons on a world-wide basis. 79 In time, new general patterns 
can be expected to emerge from this detailed work, allowing better social 
description of larger social groupings. 
English population in the century after 1650 has been explored by scholars 
seeking the relationship between population growth and the onset of 
industrialisation. The years 1675-1730 are now seen as having very little 
population growth. 8° For the landed and monied elites, this demographic 
stability brought consolidation of estates, less political competition, a trade 
in the export of foodstuffs, and comparative social peace. Generally good 
harvests, 81 together with transportation improvements which minimised local 
shortages in an integrating English economy, 82 broke the traditional connec-
tion between poor harvests, increased death rates, and the redirection of 
capital resources into food and food production. 83 The onset of more rapid 
population increase in the 1730s marked the end of this hiatus, and there 
are some reasons for thinking that the changes in population were fairly 
independent of economic determinants, though bringing economic con-
sequences. 84 Understandably, the period 1675-1730 did not see much 
English emigration to the colonies. 
Colonial population growth patterns in the same period varied widely. 
In many colonies the recruiting of labour had been the main immediate 
concern in promoting migration. The result was a predominantly male 
population assembled in order to extract wealth, not to start a satellite 
community. The predominance of males among slaves, servants and masters 
limited the prospects of family formation and inhibited the emergence of 
genuine provincial, or creole, societies. The early Chesapeake colonies and 
the English West Indies were affected in this way, 85 though less so than were 
Newfoundland or Hudson Bay. If the sex ratios dictated that births and 
marriages would be fewer than deaths, the disease environment reinforced 
that tendency. 86 Most of the staple colonies were not demographically 
self-supporting in the seventeenth century, as the trade in slaves and servants 
illustrated, and the English Caribbean remained that way in the eighteenth 
century as well. 87 
The dramatic population growth rates usually attributed to colonial 
North America were neither universal nor immediate. Only those new 
colonies that attracted migrating families, 88 like the Puritan and Quaker 
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settlements, would grow quickly from within rather than from immigration. 89 
Founding families could accumulate and transmit property more effectively 
than most other frontiersmen, giving heirs additional opportunities. Quite 
naturally, economic stability and social stratification, or the foreclosing of 
opportunity, would come first to the demographically mature and econom-
ically limited New England colonies. The demography of the colonies varied 
greatly, particularly in the seventeenth century, and these differences had 
essential social and economic implications. Although the demography of the 
colonies differed from that of the communities from which the migrants 
came, the subsequent trends in colonial development, particularly in English 
North America, were towards sex ratios, age distributions, and marriage 
ages that were more like those in England than had been true at the founding 
of the colonies. 90 
Social mobility would appear to be one of the clearest contrasts between 
the older and newer sides of the English Atlantic. Alan Everitt and Lawrence 
Stone have explored aspects of elite recruitment in early modern England; 91 
Stone's work indicates that there were four routes to rapid social advance-
ment: marriage, the law, government office, and the colonies. The first three 
of these 'rapid' routes to the top of hierarchies presupposed the leisure and 
resources needed to gain considerable education, if only in manners. Were 
the Dick Whittingtons of I 675 to 1740 using the colonies as their route to 
social power in England? 
Sugar was the only colonial staple that generated profits sweet enough to 
allow the most successful to flee the unhealthy colonies and relocate in 
gentlemanly comfort, if not opulence. 92 Physical survival in the islands was 
one prerequisite for success, but since poor whites outnumbered rich ones, 
survival was not enough. Sugar was expensive to produce: a planter needed 
capital and credit, both to start and to build a plantation fortune. English 
sources of credit would favour the well-to-do, or those judged most likely 
to honour debts, understand business, and answer letters. Sugar made 
fortunes, but seldom for those who went out as indentured servants. Men who 
were illiterate were as unlikely to find fortunes in the sugar trade as they 
were in the law, government office, or the genteel marriage market. It is 
likely that there was more opportunity for a woman servant to make her 
fortune in the seventeenth-century colonial marriage mart, 93 but this was a 
chance that became remote in most colonies as demography changed. 
Other avenues of rapid social mobility in Restoration England could be 
pursued in the colonies as well, even if the colonies in themselves were a less 
than splendid social escalator. With the hard pioneering life over in most of 
the colonies, the religious leaders were increasingly joined by attorneys and 
doctors from England and Scotland who saw opportunities in migration. 94 
Expansion of government offices could, as in Lord Berkeley's Virginia or 
Joseph Dudley's Massachusetts, afford access to land and local power. 95 What 
has been called The Migratory Elite of the second British Empire, 96 had its 
precursors in the first. The migration of merchants into Massachusetts 
after 1650 represents another aspect of this process. 97 New migrants with 
capital, credit, royal or proprietary favour found opportunities in the 
colonies. The development of the newer colonies of the Jerseys and Pennsyl-
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vania provided a wider spectrum of mobility, though the advantages of the 
migrant of the 'middling sort' were substantial. While political developments 
in the north gave opportunity to new men in the later Stuart period, social 
developments in the Chesapeake gradually strengthened the locally-born 
elite. 98 The Carolina frontier offered most of its new white inhabitants a 
rude sufficiency, with the economic and political prizes going to the 
experienced and well-to-do West Indian planters. 99 It would be surprising if 
those with the most advantages did not gain most from the development of 
new areas, new products, and new markets in the 'provincial lifetime'. 
These same developments tended to limit the opportunities for indentured 
servants, who earlier could have hoped to become landowners and enjoy 
minor offices. The work of Russell Menard and Lorena Walsh on seventeenth-
century Maryland100 needs imitation wherever sources permit, but recent 
studies present a plausible picture of increasing stratification and lessening 
social mobility. 101 Again, as in other aspects of recent work in the area, 
colonial Englishmen's social existence is increasingly being seen as quite 
like life in the old world in many respects and colonial developments often 
served to lessen the differences as time went on. 
In ways that are associated with the ideas of Harold Innis and Marshall 
McLuhan, 102 the English Atlantic was a paper empire. From laws and 
instructions to governors, sea captains, or agents, from letters and newspapers, 
or even from mundane bills of lading, it is evident that the English Atlantic 
was a society that rewarded literacy. This 'literal' culture developed patterns 
of thought, styles of argument, and views of life that were quite different 
from the oral traditions that had been inherited and which continued to 
condition the minds of the illiterate members of the same society. 103 For 
some, literacy was a badge of reformed Christian civilisation, but for others, 
literacy was a prerequisite for participation in the economic, social and 
political leadership of the English Atlantic. Illiteracy was linked to depen-
dency, whether that of wife and children, or of the oral culture of Indians 
and African slaves. Anthropologist Robert Redfield has made a telling 
distinction between the 'Great Tradition' and the 'Little Tradition' as 
coexisting and competing perspectives within a society. 104 In the English 
Atlantic the Little Tradition was oral and local; the Great Tradition was 
literate and cosmopolitan. The successful provincial had some loyalty to 
each. 
Literacy has become of increasing concern to scholars of early modem 
England and America. Although the sources are less than ideal, the findings 
tend once again to reduce the presumed contrasts between English and 
colonial residents. It is difficult to measure literacy from the signing or 
marking of wills, but such is the nature of the best evidence about colonial 
literacy. An adult male literacy rate of about 60 per cent, and female literacy 
at about 35 per cent, is indicated for heads of households in colonial North 
America in 1660. Although this rate would not change much in Virginia in 
the next century, K. A. Lockridge has found that male literacy in New 
England rose dramatically to 70 per cent by 1710 and to 85 per cent by 1760. 
The implications of this finding need further study, but suggest that the 
correlation between status and literacy was not maintained amid declining 
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opportunity in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. 105· Fragmentary evidence 
on literacy elsewhere in English America suggests that white literacy rates 
were comparable to those of England, though slave illiteracy meant that the 
plantation colonies were notably less literate than England. It seems safe to 
assume that only a minority of the adults in England or America could read 
and write well enough to do so regularly. Whenever information was power, 
the written word was quicker, more accurate, more complete, exclusive, and 
it also allowed careful re-readings. In religion, in politics, in family life, and 
in business, the English Atlantic functioned primarly through, and for, the 
literate. 
Education transmits and preserves more than it innovates, and recent 
work on American provincial education has re-emphasised the continuities 
between England and America. 106 New England's strenuous efforts to 
extend literacy and piety now seem less a special reaction to the fears of 
barbarism among their children in a frontier society107 than a feature of 
Calvinist confidence in The Book. The public education laws of New 
England and of Scotland were established by visibly devout legislators, 
although the fruits of mass male literacy would come in less devout times. 
Education to preserve the faith, to preserve civility, and to transmit useful 
skills seems to have concerned colonials in varying degrees, in keeping with 
various traditions in Britain, but without any special fervour or neglect that 
was uniquely colonial. 
Provincial newspapers first emerged in the 1690s, bringing local inter-
pretations of events and cosmopolitan intrusions upon local life. 108 The 
Worcester Postman (1690) and the Stamford Mercury (1695) were the first two 
English provincial papers, but it is significant that the Edinburgh Gazette 
(1699) and the Boston News-Letter (1704) were next, preceding a flood of 
new English provincial papers during the next 15 years. The Boston News-
Letter was so thoroughly committed to delivering court and English news 
that it has been ignored by historians seeking 'American' culture. 109 Whatever 
official censorship was applied to this first North American newspaper, its 
300 subscribers110 bought their weekly allotment of metropolitan news 
because they wanted it. Perhaps there was no apology for a newspaper that 
was overwhelmingly reprinted from English papers because no apology 
was necessary. 111 
Books and their ideas are recognised as an English Atlantic trade of 
consequence, but the general subject has not received nearly the attention 
recently lavished on the transit of political ideas, 112 or upon the colonial 
production of books. 113 Colonial contribution to the Royal Society may 
have been marked by provincial deference and search for recognition in the 
metropolis, 114 but N. Fiering has demonstrated how colonial men of letters 
could keep abreast of new ideas from Europe. 115 The Charlestown Library 
Society boasted of cultural provincialism in its simple Latin motto, 'Et 
Artes trans mare currunt' .116 
Gentlemanly learning was firmly bound to 'home', but we cannot presume 
that the world of piety and practical knowledge was not also an English 
Atlantic one. Most visibly transatlantic, the Quaker community exchanged 
regular epistles and frequent visits of 'ministering Friends' who travelled 
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to share and strengthen the faith. 117 Although New World Puritanism 
participated in the theological wars of England more fully in the mid-
seventeenth century, religious links continued after the Restoration. 118 
Anglicanism was the English empire's official faith, and its place in the 
colonies tended to grow with the age of the settlements, with the conscious 
sponsorship of the government, and with the efforts of the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel. 119 The surge of revivalism with which this period 
ended was itself a transatlantic phenomenon, for George Whitefield and John 
Wesley could speak to both English and colonial religious sensitivities. 
London fashions were regarded with necessary ambivalence in all her 
provinces. Display of current fashions was a sign of London connections, 
perhaps advertising links with men of moment in the capital. The migrating 
elites updated colonial manners and fashions. This was not only true of 
royal or proprietary governors and their entourages: it was also true of 
what might be called the professions of pretence-the poorly regulated 
world of physicians, surgeons, advocates and attorneys. Fashion was a 
badge of gentility and civility that was worn in most inappropriate circum-
stances.120 Denunciation of such foppery could also be imported in either 
secular or religious guise, but the provincial ridicule of pretence revealed 
a defence mechanism of those who felt culturally inferior. 121 Such inferiority 
could naturally lead provincial Englishmen on either side of the Atlantic 
to denounce London's sins while imitating them, and to exalt in the clean 
and wholesome moral climate of their own communities while importing 
the latest cultural whimsy from London. Nor should it be surprising if the 
provincial well-to-do did more of the imitating and the rest of colonial 
society did more of the denouncing. 
Much of the recent social history of the period 1675-1740 has tended to 
qualify or contradict the easy assertions about how different the new world 
was from the old in fertility of its people, literacy, and even opportunity. 
This trend not only narrows the differences between colonial provinces and 
those on the home island, it suggests cultural continuity as a major value 
held by colonisers and their children. One of the general questions that 
emerges from such a sketch, and leads to a consideration of political culture, 
is 'How did the new elites elicit or impose social order in these relatively 
new communities?' 
Imperial and colonial politics were vehicles for local social control, and 
ones which served an emerging elite by assisting, confirming and defending 
their new social position. English Atlantic politics have long fascinated 
historians, and the effort lavished on this field has been inspected frequently 
by a generation of reviewers. 122 The mesmerising power of the American 
Revolution, which fractured a polity regardless of whatever else it did or did 
not do, ensures continuing attention to political subjects. Unfortunately, 
this concern can also make colonial grandfathers into veterans of their 
grandsons' revolution. Provincial ambivalence was as evident in politics as 
in social life, for politics invited both the integration of the empire and the 
integration of the colony to resist that metropolitan initiative, The king's 
name was more than a distant benediction of would-be local grandees, for 
he sent demanding messages and messengers as well. In discussing the 
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politics of integration, it is useful to notice some work concerning political 
institutions and ideas before considering the larger literature on political 
practice. 
The history of English political institutions received much scholarly 
attention early in this century,123 and recent studies of 'Anglo-American' 
politics have added comparatively little to that inheritance. The shift of 
attention has been a dramatic one. Institutional history that presumed more 
continuity than change was once written as a broad structural analysis of 
subjects such as royal governorships, the customs service, or the Board of 
Trade. 124 Recent studies tend to emphasise short term political changes as 
they affected institutions, resulting in more immediacy to particular historical 
situations and in more narrative structuring of monographs. 125 'Whig 
history' has been so effectively ousted that processes like the 'origins of 
cabinet government' or 'the rise of the colonial assemblies' can be seen 
primarily as the accidental institutional consequences of politics. 126 
Local political institutions affected political integration decisively, and 
those of provincial England contrasted sharply with those of the colonies. 
County political life had its managers, its lord-lieutenants, county courts 
and locally-oriented J.P.s, but efforts to insulate the counties from central 
control were hampered by political institutions. 127 Parliament was the major 
political vehicle through which to resist royal or executive centralisation: 
yet Parliament was itself a centralising, homogenising force. Incorporated 
towns and cities were in a slightly stronger position, with some political 
institutions and needs that brought them closer to the transatlantic colonies. 
A chartered town had courts, an elite that was less hereditary than in the 
county, and might have a significant population of immigrants and limited 
social deference. 
Charter and precedent were both usable in building the political institutions 
of the colonies into formal, and eventually formidable, protectors of local 
rights. Charters were not inviolate, but were rightly seen by royal servants 
as screening chartered and proprietary colonies from some of the centralising 
efforts of the royal administration. 128 Colonial assemblies, born under 
charter government but existing in all colonies by 1700, gradually became 
power centres which imitated the English House of Commons in resisting 
proprietors, governors, and eventually Parliament itself. 129 Strengthening of 
local assemblies was directed against executive power, but this process was 
also drawing power from the local level to the provincial, and can be seen as 
part of the consolidation of provincial elites. 130 
Colonial provinces may have had a usable institution for resisting royal 
initiative, but they also had a strong centralising office, that of governor. The 
monarch was not equal in all of his dominions. The colonial governor had a 
royal veto which lasted beyond 1707, when it was last used in England. The 
governor had the power to prorogue, recall, and dissolve colonial assemblies, 
a power which Parliament had weakened by 1690. In addition, the colonial 
governor had direct control over the judiciary in his colony. 131 English 
political institutions would undergo substantial changes in the lifetime after 
1675, but the existence of colonial assemblies ensured that colonial efforts 
to emulate English Whiggery produced different results. 
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In theory, as well as practice, the defence of English provincial autonomy 
depended upon limiting the power of the king and his ministers, even though 
Lockean formulations of the rights of the subject could serve Whig ministries 
as well as their opponents in Parliament and in the counties. 132 Whig 
aristocrats and oligarchs believed their battle cries about liberty as they 
attacked placemen, standing armies, and life revenues for the king. In the 
corridors of Whitehall or Westminister, or in the somewhat different atmos-
phere of the colonial assemblies, gentlemen, merchants, and slaveholders 
found Whiggery, including that of the more radical Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthman, 133 entirely appropriate in the struggle for power against 
the king's representatives. The English Atlantic of the early eighteenth 
century shared the developing Whig political theory. It became more wide-
spread in the colonies less because they were some inherently 'liberal 
fragment' 134 than because the emerging political community found this 
approach appealing and useful, particularly as it was shared by the dominant 
English political figures. 
The practice of politics in the English Atlantic has received a great deal 
more attention in the last twenty years than has the theory. The atomisation 
of English politics owes much to the work of L. B. Namier, the first major 
piece of which appeared (like the first of the Cambridge History of the British 
Empire) fifty years ago. 135 Namier's major impact on scholarship came after 
the second World War, when his approach influenced scholars in English 
and then American colonial studies. 136 The approach, which perceives 
politics as the idea-free art of gathering power for patronage, has appealed 
both to those historians who are suspicious of ideology and to those whose 
ideas lead them to emphasise the economic interpretation of political 
behaviour. Namier's approach was also supportive of the strong biographical 
tradition in the writing of English political history, and gave added signifi-
cance to local and county history as well. Namier's interpretation and method 
were developed to understand the generation after 1760, and it is the rather 
zealous application of this approach to Queen Anne's reign that has been 
very effectively challenged. 137 
Imperial politics of the English Atlantic between 1675 and 1740 exhibited 
phases, yet there were persisting forces of political integration throughout 
this period. The monarchy was a shared symbol of social and political 
order, lending its name to laws, charters and court proceedings. This 
symbolism had its uses in all the king's provinces, but was of particular 
concern in areas where social mobility was more common and deference was 
less so. The gentlemen merchants of incorporated towns like Hull or Leeds, 
for example, saw the charter and baronetcies as legitimising their social and 
political leadership in communities that included immigrants who had 
never touched their forelock to a merchant. The royal garrison at Hull 
might even supplement the night watch over property. 138 Local notables 
called courts into session in the king's name, but they rightly suspected the 
assizes139 as centralising legal power as effectively as did appeals to higher 
courts and the lawmaking power of Westminster. The crown was a stabilising 
symbol, but much of politics was aimed at exploiting that symbol while 
eroding the crown's real power. 
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The crown was not only the formal font of order, it was also at least the 
formal source of the political patronage that supported many English 
aristocrats, and the pretensions of officeholders on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Sophisticated political use of the offices in the gift of the crown was justly 
feared as a power to overcome all legislative resistance. 140 Transatlantic 
provinces were particularly subject to the integrating power of royal 
patronage. A new royal governor could bring trouble for the calculations 
and pretensions of the colonial elite. His power over a few appointments 
was less important than his nominations for council seats, his control of the 
magistracy, and his influence over land grants. Governorships were brief 
and the lobbying of colonials and their agents to oust, obtain, or keep 
governors was itself a system that bound colonial leadership to English 
politics. 141 
Whatever the structural bias of imperial political institutions, they 
operated in the real and unpredictable world of all politics. The active 
monarchical drive for order and control that marked the period 1675 to 1688 
was unique and formative. The crisis of 1688-9 was shared by the whole 
empire. The generation 1689-1714 saw several sharp shifts in political power. 
Then came the generation that achieved, and suffered, political stability. 
These phases are a simple framework within which some of the recent 
works of political historians can be viewed. 
The English crown was an unusually active agent of political integration 
between 1675 and 1688. From the fiscal, diplomatic and political rubble of 
the last Dutch war, a sobered Charles II and his more sober and industrious 
younger brother, James, began rebuilding the monarchy's position. Opposi-
tion to royal resurgence crystallised into Whiggery, developed new weapons 
in electoral management, but lost the long and bitter fight to exclude James 
from the succession. 142 Customs revenues on imported colonial staples were 
a significant part of the royal revenues that were independent of Parliament. 
Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia hurt that revenue, and prompted closer 
political management of the colonies. From 1675 the new Lords of Trade 
and Plantatations began an administrative centralisation, 143 and launched 
the careers of William Blathwayt and Edward Randolph, names synomymous 
with this centralisation for the next generation. 144 In 1685 James gained 
the monarchy and the life revenues which, in the prosperity of his brief 
years, yielded enough to allow him more freedom from Parliament. 145 
The Glorious Revolution was an admission of failure: the king's political 
opponents had failed to stop him by constitutional means. The result was 
an acceptence of unconstitutional means, and significant adjustments t0 
protect against recurrence, while insisting upon the preservative nature of 
the coup. 146 The colonial uprisings in the Dominion of New England and 
in Maryland have usually been seen as based upon local grievances, which 
seem sufficient causes. 147 What can easily be underestimated, as P. S. 
Haffenden indicates, 148 is that the Revolution was welcomed around the 
English Atlantic with few regrets and few Jacobites, indeed with something 
approaching unanimity. Apparently it mattered who was king of England: 
colonial revolutions occurred only where unofficial news of the royal changes 
arrived long before any official word reached the colonial executive. 149 In 
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general, the revolution showed the political unity of the empire much more 
than it revealed its diversity. 
War is an international test of the ability of a government to marshall 
resources. William brought a war against the powerful centralising French 
monarchy, and the war effort brought some of that state power which both 
the revolution and the war ostensibly opposed. Although there were political 
concessions to 'country' interests in the annual Parliaments, they were 
voting taxes for expanded government. The fiscal drain was from the North 
and West to the Southeast. from the landed to the manufacturing and 
service groups in the nation, and from the provinces to the metropolis. 150 
For the colonies, the war and its successor would bring more military 
responsibilities than resources for the governors, but would increase the 
roles of the governor and the commander of the naval station ships. 
Assemblies bargained for privileges, paper money issues, or other concessions 
in return for supply, but an echo of the processes at work in England could 
be heard in the colonies when they were, rather intermittently, roused to 
war. 151 Colonials fought the French and did so as provincial Englishmen. 
As with the English governments of these war years, governors had varied 
success in harnessing factions for the war effort. 152 The assemblies would 
emerge stronger, and the governors weaker, as was true in England, but the 
wars made colonial dependency on metropolitan warmaking and peacemaking 
painfully obvious. 153 
Peace brought a respite from the government drive to assemble resources, 
eased the tax burden, and promised fewer initiatives at the expense of 
provincial life, or at least meant that local elites could manage these initiatives. 
The Whig political triumph was reinforced by helping the Tories commit 
political suicide, and by reducing the size of the electorate and the frequency 
of elections. 154 While radical Whigs pursued the wars of ideas, the managers 
of the government focused upon patronage as the purpose of power. Frank 
acceptence of the enjoyment of office brought consequences that are perhaps 
easiest seen in the well-documented colonial administrations. The quality 
of Newcastle's governors was uneven, 155 but that is less surprising or un-
common than was the tendency for appointees to avoid initiatives that would 
be unpopular and to make compromises for personal peace or profit that 
permanently shrank the power of the governorship. Whatever power was 
not sacrificed that way was subject to more intense pressure from England. 
Patrons of the governor offered him candidates for those few offices that 
were still part of his direct patronage, offices he should have used to buy or 
keep political supporters from the local elite. The management of colonial 
politics had always reached to Whitehall: under Walpole and Newcastle the 
management of the House of Commons extended all the way to Jamaica and 
Virginia. 156 
Achieving 'political stability' in Walpole's England included what can 
still be called 'salutary neglect' of the colonies, if not political stability there 
as well. 157 'Robinocracy' was factious Whiggery, tainted Whiggery, but still 
seen to be Whig by all but a few. Yet no colonial governor could be a Whig 
in office, though every one of them had to be a Whig to get that office. If the 
colonial executive threat to the liberties of the local elite had not been real, 
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it would have been a most useful invention. The colonial assemblies were 
emulating the House of Commons of the recent past in defending 'country' 
values against the 'court'. This was not the road to independence, this was 
the political perspective of an emerging provincial elite anxious and able to 
consolidate their own power within the English Atlantic. 158 The triumph of 
the Whigs had been better institutionalised in the American and West 
Indian assemblies that it had been in England. 
It was no coincidence that the 'English nation' mattered most to the 
people who mattered most. Those with economic, social, and political ties 
beyond the local level would include the nobility, the gentry, and the 
prominent merchants who were the leaders of county, town, or colony. 
These elites had a fascinating ambivalence towards the metropolis. On the 
one hand, they were the men of substance who could defend their localities 
from metropolitan interference; on the other hand, they could gain personal 
advantage in serving the court or the 'nation' as agents of centralisation.159 
They could resist royal or parliamentary initiatives with Whig thunder 
against tyranny, while exercising local political and legal power that was 
legitimised by the king's name. They could denounce the London stock-
jobbers and goldsmiths while living on money borrowed in the metropolis 
for fashionable living, for land purchases, for industrial estate development, 
or even for lending to others in their locality. They could proclaim the moral 
superiority in the wholesome rural life while displaying their civility via the 
fashions of London. These paradoxical tensions, which were so cleverly 
exposed in later Stuart plays, 160 are enduring aspects of provincial life. 
Recent scholarship suggests that when John Oldmixon claimed 'I have no 
notion of any more difference between Old-England and New than between 
Lincolnshire and Somerset' 161 he was stretching a truth less than was once 
thought. The emergence of English provincial history has destroyed the 
equation of London and England at the same time as American colonial 
studies have been challenging notions of a unique America, or what David 
Hall has called 'American exceptionalism' .162 The links between what was 
happening in Stuart and Georgian England and the colonies were not a 
matter of parallels: the same processes of metropolitan integration were 
pulling at all London's provinces. 
Of the major aspects of life, the economic attractions of specialisation, 
interdependence and integration recommended themselves to those provin-
cials able to dominate the new staples of the colonies, or the older ones for 
the new English markets. The sea allowed colonial integration with little 
investment in roads or canals. At this provincial stage there was very little 
resistance, and obvious advantage to economic integration. 
Although peopled by many from London's nearer provinces, the colonies 
began as social gatherings most unlike home. Demographic, economic, and 
political development all contributed to the emergence of new world provinces 
that were much more like the old than the founders would have imagined or 
intended. Gentility and civility served social purposes amongst provincial 
elites throughout the empire, mattering even more in London's more 
immediate hinterland, where political independence had been effectively 
1 ost. In colonial society, the elites could profitably accept English gentility 
EMPIRE AND PROVINCIAL ELITES 19 
as a social insulator which distinguished themselves from other colonists, 
Indians and slaves. 
The fall of the colonial governors was, and was intended to be, a constitu-
tional replay of the fall of the Stuart monarchy. Colonial leaders maintained 
their local dominance through political institutions that served both to resist 
imperial initiatives and to integrate power within the colony itself. Success 
was not assured, and the generation of war after 1739 would upset the Whig 
empire in all of its parts, but colonial assemblies did represent a major source 
of power not available in the same way to English county and town elites. 
Colonial elites could serve themselves and call it serving the king or call it 
serving their electors. But they would have trouble claiming, as the slave or 
indentured servant might have done, (and as undergraduates continue to 
do), that 'The colonies exist for the benefit of the mother country'. Provincial 
elites were beneficiaries of empire. The ambiguity of being the vehicles of 
cosmopolitan influence and the defence against that influence did not 
produce great difficulties. The notion of 'stacking loyalties' has been used to 
good effect in other contexts, 163 but has been noticeably absent in explana-
tions of provincials in the first empire. Virginians, like men of Devon, could 
hold their local loyalty firmly and yet fight as Englishmen. When loyalties 
clashed, the local one might triumph, but local elites drew power from the 
unity of the English Atlantic. 
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The Board of Trade and London-American 
Interest Groups in the Eighteenth Century 
by 
Alison G. Olson 
The history of the eighteenth-century English Board of Trade has hardly 
been regarded as a success story by the historians who have written it. 
Created in 1696 to make recommendations on questions of imperial 
administration, nominate colonial officials to carry out their recommenda-
tions, and back up the provincial officials in office, the Board is commonly 
agreed to have failed at all its jobs. Either (by one set of accounts) power-
hungry ministers did it in by overriding or ignoring its recommendations, 
stripping it of its important nominations, and appointing second-raters to 
the Board itself or (by another set of accounts) the Board's heavy-handed 
mercantile approach and indolence in backing up the officials charged with 
implementing it brought on it the hostility of colonists and royal officials alike. 
In either case the question seems not to have been whether the Board failed, 
but why. 1 
Recent studies of administration in developing countries (as Great Britain 
certainly was in the eighteenth century) suggest that it might be time for at 
least a partial rehabilitation of the Board's reputation. They suggest, by 
comparison, that the Board was performing a function that has hitherto 
been little emphasized, namely the accommodation of various pre-modern 
and modern interest groups that were emerging in eighteenth-century 
England. 
The Board's establishment coincided in time with a period of rapid 
proliferation of London interest groups with American connections. There 
were three main types of these London-American groups, mercantile, 
ethnic, and ecclesiastic, each with its own political leverage, and since the 
Board was to specialize in mercantile and imperial problems the work 
of accommodating these London-American groups fell heavily upon it. In 
handling its work the Board sought their advice, often acceded to their 
demands, and built up a comfortable working relationship with each of 
them. 
One of the most serious problems of emerging nations is the handling of 
competing interests; domestic political stability depends upon their doing 
so effectively. 2 By the standards of developing nations Britain was remarkably 
successful in accommodating interest groups in the early eighteenth century, 
and the Board of Trade appears to have contributed substantially to its 
success. The years of greatest British success, 1700 to 1760, coincided with 
the period of the Board's greatest activity. In the later eighteenth century 
after 1760, British success was considerably more limited and interest groups 
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became increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. This period, in turn, 
was coincident with a period of declining activity and influence for the 
Board of Trade. 
Such an interpretation must begin with a definition of 'interest group'. 
Eighteenth-century writers like Edmund Burke identified increasingly 
differentiated interests within the governing community-a landed interest, 
a mercantile interest, a professional interest, and so on. But such broad, 
'fixed' categories bore little relation either to the way men acted or to the 
kinds of groups that lobbied at various levels of government. Recent writers 
have laid more stress on interest groups functioning outside the centres of 
political power but have not developed a commonly accepted definition. 
Recognising, therefore, that any definition will be arbitrary, we may suggest 
'a group that accepts the political system and attempts through bargaining 
with political authorities to improve its own position in it, operating from 
the borders of power, influencing but not directly making political decisions.' 
By this definition there were few transatlantic interests in existence before 
the Board's establishment in 1696: towns, guilds and chartered commercial 
companies had all functioned as interests in England but none (including 
the Hudson's Bay Company and the Royal African Company, surprisingly) 
was to develop American associations. 3 Among the groups that did come to 
be 'Anglo-American' as opposed to 'Anglo', a few dated back to the 1670s 
but in that early decade they lacked either American connections or an 
efficient lobbying organisation, or both. The Quaker Yearly Meeting, 
established in 1675, had by 1678 appointed a clerk to take down the heads 
of bills which might affect Quakers. Evidently the custom soon fell into 
abeyance, though after the settlement of Pennsylvania the meeting began 
regular correspondence with the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting on political 
as well as theological questions. 4 The Bishop of London had been given the 
administration of the Anglican church in the colonies in 1675, and began 
taking a fuller interest in them after 1689 when James Blair went to Virginia 
as the Bishop's first commissary, authorised to convene the local clergy and 
send back reports of their local grievances to the Bishop. 5 But by the early 
1690s Virginia represented the only colony to have such relations with the 
Anglican church in England. General Baptists began meeting regularly 
after 1686 but by the early 1690s had not yet concerned themselves with 
American issues. 6 In the thirty-six years between the restoration of Charles 
II in 1660 and the Board's establishment in 1696, the Privy Council had 
received petitions from three interest groups; between 1686 and 1696 the 
old Lords of Trade, predecessors of the Board of Trade, had received four 
petitions from what might be called English interest groups, but two were 
from the would-be organisers of companies that never formed and one was 
from the proprietors of New Jersey. 7 Indeed, by the time the Board was 
created only two groups, the French Committee of London, set up to aid 
Huguenot refugees (and on occasion to help them get to America), and 
the London merchants trading to Virginia, could truly be said to constitute 
organised Anglo-American interests. 8 
Within a few years of the Board's establishment, however, this was no 
longer true. By 1701 the Quakers had established a committee to lobby 
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members of Parliament, and by 1704 the London Meeting for Sufferings had 
begun corresponding regularly with yearly meetings in New England and 
the southern colonies as well as Philadelphia. 9 After 1701 the Anglican 
church began sending commissaries to every colony; and it also established 
the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to work with Anglican 
communities overseas, mainly in the northern mainland colonies. 10 The 
same year the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge was established, 
developing continental connections which led them to focus their attention 
on helping non-English communities in America.11 In 1702, also, after a 
false start ten years earlier, ministers of the Three Denominations in London 
(Baptist, Presbyterian, Congregational) began meeting; in their first few 
years they did little but present formal addresses to the king but by 17 I 5 
they were intermittently becoming more active. 12 In 1706 American Presby-
terians established a Presbytery in Pennsylvania and began corresponding 
with English Presbyterians as well as the General Assembly of Scotland.13 
Again in 1702, the Sephardic Jewish congregation at Bevis Marks established 
a Committee of Deputies to 'attend to the business of the nation which is 
before Parliament' .14 The Huguenot Society, with connections in the 
Threadneedle Street Church, initiated its correspondence with American 
churches between 1699 and 1702; 15 the Lutherans were slow to organise as 
an interest but the first Lutheran chaplain was appointed to the royal chapel 
early in Queen Anne's reign, establishing political influence for the Lutheran 
communities at court. 16 Finally, our first record of three mercantile coffee 
houses, the Pennsylvania, New England, and Carolina coffee houses, dates 
from 1702, and the New York Coffee House was probably established 
shortly before this. 17 By 1706 English coffee house leaders were in informal 
correspondence with merchant groups in Charleston, Philadelphia, New 
York City, and Boston. The cumulative growth of Anglo-American interests 
is suggested by the fact that the Board received fifty-one petitions from 
such groups before 1709. 
Though the actual circumstances surrounding the development of different 
groups varied, there were at least two general explanations for the develop-
ment of Anglo-American interests. One was the rapid growth of London 
towards the end of the seventeenth century. 18 Interest groups, before 1760, 
at least, represented local interests, not national ones. But Londoners soon 
demonstrated a remarkable (by eighteenth-century standards) ability to 
speak for men of similar interests in provinces of England and the empire. 
The London Meeting for Sufferings, the Dissenting Deputies in and about 
London, the organisation of French churches in London, the Bevis Marks 
Committee, the network of Lutheran chaplains around the court and the 
SPCK, were composed of Londoners, but their role as spokesmen for the 
interests of all their co-religionists was rarely challenged by local associations. 
Similarly the London merchants, though at times competitors with the 
outport merchants, were with few exceptions their spokesmen in national 
politics, at least on American issues. It is significant here that London 
merchants could speak for Charleston merchants in much the same way that 
they spoke for merchants in Bristol and Norwich; London church lobbyists 
could speak for New York or Philadelphia church groups in the same way 
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they spoke for church groups in the English provinces. The absence of 
national interests and the predominance of London over provincial interests 
in England and America allowed the Americans to fit easily into the pattern 
of English lobbying. 19 
Part of the importance of London lay simply in its proximity to the 
machinery of government. Londoners could respond more quickly than 
provincials to legislative or administrative threats, and they could be called 
upon more quickly for consultation. Part lay in the fact that Londoners 
developed a genuine acceptance of a pluralistic society long before the more 
homogeneous 'island communities' of the provinces were able to do so. 20 
But the largest part came from sheer numbers: interest groups in London 
were more likely than those in the provinces to have the numbers and wealth 
sufficient to produce surplus resources which could be used to help colleagues 
elsewhere. Rapid growth was not always an asset: the influx of thousands 
of French refugees into London after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
in 1685 (eighteen French churches were established in the 1690s alone) 
greatly complicated the work of the Huguenot committee, 21 and the influx 
of hundreds of Axkenzim Jews into an area of a few blocks in London in the 
same decade presented an enormous challenge to the leadership of the existing 
Sephardic community. 22 But at the worst, a rapid growth in numbers could 
force a community to tighten its organisation to distribute evenly the 
available resources, and at best, when newcomers were assimilated and 
employed, large communities could tap resources beyond the immediate 
needs of their members. London's congregations and non-English com-
munities supplied their provincial colleagues with bibles, books, even 
ministers; London's ethnic, ecclesiastical, and mercantile groups could use 
their surplus towards lobbying, supporting political agents, entertainment 
for politicians, legal fees, carriage fare, and the like. 
A more general reason for the emergence of interests was the establishment 
of the eighteenth-century 'political nation' if, again being arbitrary, we 
define 'political nation' as the elite who governed England in the aftermath 
of the Glorious Revolution. For an interest group to operate from the 
'borders of power' those borders must be defined, and it was in the reigns 
of William III and Anne that such a definition became possible (for England, 
though not for America). By Anne's death, or at least shortly afterwards, it 
is arguable, some people were clearly 'in' the political nation, others were 
quite clearly out, and others-members of political interest groups-were 
in a stable position on the borders. Dissenters were left on the borders of 
the political nation by the combination of the failure of ecclesiastical 
comprehension and the passage of the Toleration Act in 1689, a pair of 
events which defined dissenters out of the established church, and hence 
largely out of the political nation, but established their right to existence on 
the fringes of that nation. 23 Immigrants were left on the borders by a 
combination of a parliamentary act of 1712, which repealed a general 
Naturalization Act passed three years before, and the fact that they could 
obtain denisation from the King or Parliament, which allowed them to own 
land but not to participate actively in politics. 24 Lesser merchants were left 
out of the financial nation by a combination of two things, the establishment 
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of the national debt in 1696 (they could not subscribe) and the creation of 
London's financial directorate (the Bank, the Royal Assurance Company, 
the East India Company, and a number of other large mercantile companies 
either were created or consolidated their power in William's reign, and the 
lesser merchants were excluded from the directorships). They too, were on 
the fringes of power. 25 
The defining of the English political borders meant that interests no 
longer had hopes (as they had had from time to time in the Restoration) of 
being at the centre of power, but they also had no fears of being driven 
underground. No longer need they alternate, as the few existing Restoration 
interests had done, between wooing highly placed individuals in government 
and defensively protecting their people from these individuals by creating 
a state within a state. With a clearly defined position the London interests 
could devote themselves to systematic lobbying, helping colonial interests 
whose positions in the provinces were less weU defined. 26 
In the same period interest groups were developing in the American 
colonies. The growth of colonial stability in contrast with the violent 
challenges to colonial leadership in the 1670s and 1680s created an environ-
ment in which interest groups could also develop, though their position was 
often far less clear than the position of their English counterparts. Immigra-
tion from England and the continent and the commercial growth of the 
colonies produced concentrations of colonists with similar interests though 
except for the merchant communities these were as likely to be island 
communities outside the provincial capital as neighbourhoods within it, 
since the capitals were too small to develop the concentrations found in 
London. 
American interests were more vulnerable to local pressures and less 
capable of developing surplus resources than the interest groups in the 
imperial capitaL They were also, in the last decade of the seventeenth century, 
far more directly affected by decisions made in London than they had been 
at any time earlier. After the Glorious Revolution five colonies came newly 
under temporary or permanent royal control which meant among other 
things that their governors were royal appointees guided by instructions 
prepared in London. Moreover, between 1685 and 1696 all the mainland 
colonies that had not previously done so were henceforth required to send 
their laws to England for review. 27 Aware for the first time of the uses of 
London politics, American interest groups tumed to London interests to 
assist them in local politics. Religious groups sought the disallowance of 
provincial laws discriminating against them and the appointment of 
sympathetic colonial officials. Ethnic groups were more interested in getting 
good community land, exemption from provincial taxes, and easy naturaliza-
tion. Individually colonial planters and merchants sought the London 
merchants' help in obtaining patronage and the approval of private provincial 
acts; as groups they were interested in getting British support for things like 
building lighthouses or opening up continental trade, favourable British 
review of some paper money issues, and the disallowance of provincial tax 
laws that discriminated against their mercantile or agricultural interests. 28 
The Americans solicited English help rather hesitantly at first, uncertain 
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whether British interests would take colonial problems up as their own, 
uncertain also whether the cost-both in terms of money and in terms of the 
local stigma attached to appealing over the head of the provincial majority 
to an external authority--was worth it. They worked also by trial and error, 
on occasion sending laws too late for review, on .other occasions sending 
laws that had expired or writing of rumoured laws that were never on the 
books. 29 Nevertheless, after a shaky start the London-American connections 
developed rapidly in the two decades after the Glorious Revolution: London 
mercantile leaders sought political favours for their leading American 
correspondents to keep them happy, London church groups spread the 
faith by helping co-religionists in America, and non-English communities in 
London became convinced that the best way to prevent the periodic over-
taxing of their resources by inundations of unassimilated poor was to help 
fellow refugees settle directly in America. At least fourteen American 
interests, including Quakers in three colonies, Anglicans in two others, 
ethnic minorities in four provinces and merchant groups in three cities, 
sought help from their English counterparts in bringing matters before the 
British government in this period. Thus the Board was established in the 
very period that saw the rapid development of London-American interest 
cooperation. 
The Board's duties were loosely defined-'to inspect and examine into 
the general Trade of our said Kingdom and the several parts thereof', 'to 
consider of some proper methods for setting on worke and employing 
the Poore of our said Kingdome', and 'to inform yourselves of the present 
condition of the respective plantations'. 30 With these functions, especially 
the last, the Board might have come to work with interests on any number 
of issues. But it came in practice to have four particular functions which 
were useful to the North American lobbies. 
One such function was arranging the resettlement of non-English groups 
moving, sometimes via London, to America: the Board's negotiations with 
ship captains for reasonable transportation across the Atlantic and with 
governors and assemblies for assistance to refugees once they arrived were 
of vital concern to non-English communities in London. Another function 
was the nomination of members of the colonial councils, a subject of 
particular interest to members of the London mercantile communities who 
sought nominations as favours to colonial correspondents as a way of 
establishing the trust on which their pre-modern mercantile relationship 
depended. 
Far more important to most trans-Atlantic groups were two other 
functions. One was the drafting of instructions for colonial governors. 
Occasionally the great officers of state would interpose and alter guber-
natorial instructions in response to English pressure. After a request from 
Benjamin Avery, head of the Protestant Dissenting Deputies, the Duke of 
Newcastle looked into the 'instructions sent to Governor Shirley [of 
Massachusetts] and the difficulties which it is apprehended, they will occasion 
both to his Excellency and the province'. 31 But most of the instructions 
were drawn up by the Board of Trade, and these occasionally included 
specific instructions for the enactment of provincial laws. 
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As the second of its more important functions, the Board was empowered 
'to examine into and weigh such Acts of the Assemblies of the Plantations 
respectively as shall from time to time be sent or transmitted hither for our 
approbation' and 'to set down and represent as aforesaid the usefulness or 
mischief thereof to our Crown, and to our said Kingdom of England or 
to the Plantations themselves in case the same should be established for 
Lawes there'. (Officially the Board's function was only advisory, but the 
Privy Council normally followed its recommendation.) One of the principles 
behind the examination of provincial legislation was that, as stipulated in 
the various provincial charters, colonial laws could not be repugnant to 
the laws of England. This examination thus became in effect an antecedent 
of the modern judicial review, and the fact that it was handled in its early 
stages by the Board gave English interests a chance to work there to obtain 
the allowance or disallowance of laws affecting their American associates. 
The Board's main functions, then, were those of particular concern to the 
Anglo-American interests, and in handling the issues the Board was 
particularly responsive to their pressure. Since they often had a near 
monopoly of first-hand information on particular conditions in the colonies 
the Board sought them out when preparing its reports. When the Board 
wanted information about French Protestants who had landed at Jersey on 
their way to America, it consulted French ministers in London; 32 when it 
wanted information about the working of South Carolina's township law 
over the 1730s it consulted merchants trading to the colony;33 when it 
wanted to know to know how Connecticut's ecclesiastical establishment 
was treating Quakers in 1705 it consulted two delegates from the London 
Meeting for Sufferings. 34 
The Board sought more than information from the various interests; it 
sought the opinions of rank and file members on various questions. At 
times it sent someone out to poll them: leading merchants, colonial agents, 
or agents hired by the merchants themselves were asked to solicit the 
opinions of merchants as a group on questions like the placing of lighthouses 
or the timing of convoys. 35 Twice a week its meetings were opened to the 
public and agents were sent to provide the interest groups in advance with 
notices of hearings the rank and file might usefully attend. 36 Just how many 
people could squeeze in at any one meeting is not clear but in 171 I the 
active members of the Virginia 'Trade' decided to attend en masse, and 
though there were up to 175 of them, they anticipated no trouble getting 
in. 37 
There is also evidence that individual members of the Board consulted 
privately with interests on particular affairs: it would be surprising, in fact, 
if they had not. Members of the Board tended to be country gentlemen with 
little personal identification with any Anglo-American interest except the 
Anglican church. 38 (The Bishop of London was an ex-officio member of the 
Board but he attended only six meetings in the eighteenth century, and while 
leaders of various interests, like the merchant William Baker39 were 
occasionally considered for seats at the Board, the appointments never 
materialised.) Nevertheless, particular members did develop connections 
with particular interest groups-Martin Bladen with the Chesapeake 
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merchants in the 1740s, for example. 40 James Oswald with Glasgow tobacco 
merchants the following decade, 41 Viscount Dupplin with the Dissenters in 
the same period42-and these men served as informal channels between the 
interests and the Board. 
The Board thus made a point of consulting with interest groups; it also 
tended to follow their recommendations. In handling non-English migration 
to the colonies it followed closely the advice of non-English communities 
in London, working with them to arrange the departure of emigres from 
Europe, to regulate the living conditions aboard the ships on which they 
sailed, to instruct the governors to provide them tax free land for a decade 
after their arrival in the colonies, and to oversee their supplies for some 
times after they settled. On the nomination to colonial councillorships it is 
difficult to be sure how influential the merchants were, since merchants 
passed their nominations on through individual members of the Board (i.e. 
'Buchanan pr. Col Bladen')43 and the names of the merchants are not 
usually mentioned directly in the surviving lists of councillors and the men 
who nominated them. Probably merchant nominations accounted indirectly 
for 10-20 per cent of colonial coW1cillorships (the Bishop of London 
accounted for another 5 per cent). This did not seem a small percentage to 
contemporaries: governors, who thought such nominations essential to the 
power of the governorship, were outraged by it. 
It was in handling its two most important functions, however, the prepara-
tion of gubernatorial instructions and the review of provincial legislation, 
that the Board was most responsive to pressures from interest groups. 
Gubernatorial instructions were on occasion prepared explicitly to benefit 
particular interests. The Bishop of London helped to draft a Maryland act 
of 1700 establishing the Anglican church in that colony. The act was drawn 
up in London and transmitted to Maryland through the Governor's instruc-
tions. 44 Quaker pressure was responsible for Governor Hunter's instruction 
in 1709: 'You take care than an Act be passt in the General Assembly of your 
said Province to the like effect as that past here in the 7th and 8th years of his 
late Majesties reign Entituled an act that the Solemn affirmation and declara-
tion of the People called Quakers shall be accepted instead of an Oath in the 
usual form'. 45 A 1734 instruction to Governor Gooch of Virginia directed him 
to get a law passed to exempt German settlers from payment of parish taxes 
for a longer time than stipulated by previous law; the source of pressure for 
this instruction is clear enough. 46 An instruction to South Carolina's Governor 
regarding the setting aside money to create townships was in response to a 
representation from 'planters and merchants trading to South Carolina' .47 
It is difficult, in fact, to find examples of instructions requested by ethnic and 
religious groups being turned down, and there were only a few such cases 
regarding the merchants. 
The function on which the Board was most responsive to interest group 
pressure was the review of colonial legislation, partly because interest groups 
often had first-hand information about a particular law's 'usefulness or 
mischief' to a province, partly because most English laws were unclear when 
applied to a colonial situation. The Board could develop few principles and 
was forced instead to make a series of ad hoe decisions, for each of which 
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it relied on information from English interests about the way in which their 
American correspondents would be affected. The English Toleration Act, for 
example, was one of those acts to which colonial acts were supposed to 
conform: it exempted Dissenters from the legal penalties which the Test and 
Corporation Acts imposed upon them. But how did the law apply when a 
Dissenting church was actually the established church in a province? In 
colonies where the Church of England was 'tolerated' but not established, 
did toleration extend to Bishops? Faced with these and innumerable other 
questions about the Toleration Act, the Board interpreted the act differently 
from colony to colony, on various occasions consulting the Bishop of 
London and representatives of Dissenting interests. Similarly, colonial laws 
were to conform to the Navigation Acts and were not to prejudice the trade 
of the mother country. But what taxes could colonial assemblies levy without 
in some way prejudicing the trade of the mother country? Governor Hunter 
of New York complained that 'by clamours of merchants or those self-
interested, every sort of duty many be construed to affect the trade of Great 
Britain.' 48 Faced again with difficult interpretations, the Board turned to 
London merchants and agents of the colonial assemblies for advice. 
Thus the Board became extremely responsive to interests in the matter of 
legislative review. The Board's records mention specifically only two cases 
where non-English representatives were consulted on particular provincial 
legislation, 49 but it is difficult to find any provincial acts reviewed otherwise 
than non-English groups would have wanted. Governor Spotswood referred 
to the Board's deference to merchants in 1718 when he complained that the 
London merchants trading to Virginia might as well draw up their own 
version of a tobacco inspection act to be passed in the colony, 'otherwise 
there is no pleasing them'. 50 The governor's complaint was fair enough: the 
only occasions on which the merchants' views were disregarded were rare 
ones on which they were clearly ill informed or those that concerned local 
affairs on which the Board thought it was not proper to interfere. 51 Most 
striking of all was the churches' role in legislative review. In the first twenty 
years of the century five of the colonies passed laws severely limiting the 
rights of religious minorities, and all five saw them disallowed by the Board. 
Over the rest of the century five more discriminatory acts were passed and 
in each case the Board decided in favour of the minority. 
Not only was the Board responsive to interest group pressures; it was 
relatively more responsive to them than were other parts of the government 
-notably the ministers and parliament. Unlike the Board, ministers as a 
rule dealt only with the leaders of the interest groups and dealt with them 
only in person (one ill and elderly dissenter even felt obliged to apologise to 
the Duke of Newcastle for sending the Duke a letter he had dictated to his 
son rather than writing personally). 52 The net effect was probably to cream 
off the top of the interest groups from the rest of the membership. This was 
certainly true of Sampson Gideon, the highly placed London Jewish financier 
who left his Bevis Marks congregation; it was probably somewhat true of 
the Lutheran and Huguenot court chaplains, though they did make a point 
of preaching to London congregations on a regular basis. It is hard to say 
how much men like Samuel and Joseph Stennett maintained their closeness 
42 THE BRITISH ATLANTIC EMPIRE 
to their Baptist congregations after they became confidants of the Duke of 
Newcastle. Certainly they continued to earn the devotion and respect of 
fellow ministers. At the same time they seem to have been out of touch 
with the radical elements in their congregations from the mid-century on. 
One could go on to suggest doubts about Benjamin Avery, leader of the 
Dissenting Deputies, or even Micajah Perry, the Virginia tycoon of the 
1720s who seems to have drifted away from his mercantile community in 
the next two decades. Somewhere between a boss, a tribal leader, and simply 
the wealthy member of the group, many of the eighteenth-century group 
leaders were partially detachable from the rank and file for whom they spoke. 
Another problem the interests found in dealing with the great officers of 
state was that the kinds of demands which it was appropriate to make of 
ministers were less well defined than those that could be made of the Board of 
Trade. In working with ministers interest groups were likely to make some 
costly demands, demands that the ministers could not grant without antag-
onising substantial sections of the electorate. Dissenters demanded repeal of 
the Test and Corporation acts, foreigners demanded blanket naturalization 
laws, merchants sought to influence foreign policy or customs laws to their 
own advantage but to the considerable disadvantage of influential competitors. 
Restrained by political expediency from granting the interests' domestic 
demands, ministers were eager enough to encourage the Board of Trade to 
grant them 'cheaper' favours in America which were unlikely to arouse the 
ire of Englishmen: Englishmen were not reluctant to tolerate and encourage 
American interests, even if those interests were associated with their English 
rivals. Rarely was it necessary anyway to disoblige one English group in 
order to satisfy another on American questions because English lobbyists 
generally worked for removal of restrictions on their own associates but 
not for the imposition of restrictions on others. 
Thus ministers often denied the highest aspirations of English interests 
while relying on the Board of Trade to 'neutralise' the groups as best they 
could. They denied the Dissenting Deputies' demand for repeal of the Test 
and Corporation Acts while assuring them that they would not appoint an 
American bishop. 53 They may well have felt able to oppose the Virginia 
merchants in the tobacco excise crisis because they had shortly before 
sponsored a law making it easier for the merchants to collect their debts in 
Virginia and had followed their wishes in reviewing a Virginia law for 
amending the staple of tobacco. 54 (Indeed, the lesser merchants who sup-
posedly formed the backbone of London radicalism came hat-in-hand to the 
Board of Trade when American favours were at stake.) Similarly, while 
denying the non-English communities a general naturalization in England 
because there was too much local opposition, ministers did later pass such an 
act with the Board's support for non-English in the American colonies. 
If English interests found the Board more accessible than the officers of 
state, they also found it easier to work with than Parliament, for appealing 
to Parliament could require organisation on a scale which many interests 
were too small or too immature to equal. At the very least the difficulties in 
approaching ministers repeated themselves since parliamentary success on 
any issue required the support of the ministers or at least the assurance that 
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they were not hostile. Dissenters discovered this in 1716, for example, when 
they attempted unsuccessfully to force the ministers to repeal the occasional 
Conformity and Schism Acts. They re-learned the lesson in 1736 when they 
pressed Walpole for repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts and had to give 
up when he opposed them. 55 When Henry Pelham showed no enthusiasm 
for the establishment of an American bishopric in 1749 the Bishop of London 
had to back down on his campaign to get one. 56 When the London merchants 
responded to American complaints about their supposed inaction against the 
Townshend Acts by saying they could do nothing without the support of 
the ministry they passed on a well learned lesson. 57 
Even if ministers did not oppose them, interest groups found that it took 
far more resources and organisation to lobby Parliament than to lobby the 
Board. It was one thing to lobby Board members whose very appointment 
committed them to some interest in American affairs, but quite another 
thing to lobby several hundred members of Parliament who were largely 
indifferent to American affairs. It was necessary to establish committees to 
go over the voting records of M.P.s and call on those who might be 
sympathetic. 58 Merchants could call on M.P.s from London and the outports; 
dissenters could remind particular M.P.s of dissenting votes among their 
constituents. 59 When possible the committee had to publish pamphlets or 
broadsides and distribute them at M.P.s' homes or at the door of the House. 
Occasionally they resorted to log rolling (though this was not common until 
the middle of the century): the West India planter-merchant interest and the 
Irish linen interest once exchanged support on issues involving molasses and 
linen. Tobacco and wine merchants combined to seek the opening of French 
trade during Queen Anne's War. 60 But even the most considerable efforts 
might come to nothing and interests were driven back to seek pared down 
demands from the Board of Trade. 
The amount of interest group activity before the Board in any one period 
between 1700 and 1760 was determined by a number of things. The size of 
the interest groups was one ( other merchant groups were slower to develop 
numbers than the Virginians, while the Virginia group fell off in absolute 
numbers after the 1720s);61 the relationship of leaders to the rank and file 
was another (the Virginia group, again, was hurt in the 1740s by the financial 
crash of some of its leaders and by the preference of other potential leaders 
to work on their own rather than with the community). Another determinant, 
and a more important one, was the presence or absence of clusters of issues 
which required sustained group activity, issues centred around the printing 
of paper money, for example, or the provincial interpretation of the Tolera-
tion Act. Still another was the relationship of the provincial governors with 
local interests and the governors' vulnerability to attack in England. 
Particular groups waxed and waned over the decades: the Virginia 
merchants were quite active down to 1715, declined after that and were 
virtually dormant from the early 1730s to the mid-1750s; the New York 
merchants were particularly active from 1710 to the early 1730s and then 
declined, while South Carolina and Massachusetts merchants 'peaked' 
somewhat later. Ecclesiastical lobbies were particularly active in influencing 
judicial review down to the mid-1720s, then switched their emphasis to 
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influencing the appointment and supervision of colonial governors. Non-
English groups became active in the 1730s and l 740s. Whatever the group, 
the Board seems to have developed a comfortable working relationship 
with it at some occasion during the years before 1760. 
In the years after the accession of George III, however, several related 
developments began to alter the Board's working arrangements with the 
Anglo-American interests. After 1764 the Board considered no petitions from 
Anglo-American lobbies, heard little testimony, and indeed sought none, 
from traditional Anglo-American interests. Its reports rarely mentioned the 
opinions of such interests; it appears to have ignored them in its recommenda-
tions. In its reviews of colonial legislation the Board referred only to the 
opinions of the legal advisor as to the compatibility of the laws with relevant 
British legislation, never mentioning the views of affected interests as to 
their workability in America. Hitherto the Board and their legal advisors had 
made ad hoe decisions about the relevance of English statutes to colonial 
legislation, bowing on occasion to the wishes of interests involved; now the 
Earl of Shelburne, briefly president of the Board in 1763, prepared a formal 
'Table of Such English and British Statutes as are expressly or virtually 
extended to His Majestys Colonies in America'. 62 In such circumstances it 
is difficult to imagine that the Board could have been accommodating 
interest groups as it had done earlier in the century. 
Basically, the Board's function of balancing off interest groups seems to 
have been a victim of the ministerial instability of the 1760s in a number of 
related ways. As a result of the ministerial upheavals, the Board suffered 
rapid turnovers in its own leadrship, a lack of clarity in its relation with the 
Secretary of State, and ultimately a reduction in its powers, all of which 
were bound to affect its relationship with interest groups. Between 1730 and 
1760 the Board had had only three presidents, each one in office long enough 
to build up many connections with interests. Between 1761 and 1766 the 
Board had six, each in office for too short a time to build up such associations. 
After 1766 the Board was first dominated, then headed by Secretaries of 
State, and existed only as an office staff to them. Moreover the Board lost 
many of its powers over the decade, including the right to investigate 
colonial problems on its own initiative, and the right to receive memorials 
and petitions directly. 63 
One can make too much of these changes at the Board, however. The 
Presidents of the Board were replaced rapidly, but the rank and file member-
ship changed much more slowly, giving some possible continuity in interest 
group connections. Even as a unit of the staff of the Secretary of State 
there was nothing to prevent their considering American problems; even 
after 1766 they continued to review colonial legislation, and there was 
nothing to prevent their consulting interest groups on this as they had 
before or receiving petitions from interest groups through the Secretary of 
State. 
More important than changes in the powers of the Board were changes in 
the attitudes of the ministers which ultimately undercut the Board's relations 
with interest groups. In the early 1760s the core of Old Whigs who had 
dominated English politics since George I was dismissed from office by 
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George III. Their successors were men who represented not only a new 
generation of English politicians but also a new attitude to interest group 
politics. Many of the younger generation of politicians brought a new legalism 
to their politics, an interest in the consistent enforcement of law as an end in 
itself. A spin-off from the ideas of English legal reformers of the mid-
eighteenth century, the new legalism vastly restricted the discretion given 
the Board in its interpretation of the application of British and colonial 
laws. No longer could the interpretation of British statutes as a standard of 
colonial legislation be left flexible; no longer could colonial officials who 
winked at the laws but got along well with Anglo-American interests be 
encouraged in office. 64 
Moreover the retirement of the Old Whigs brought uncertainty on the 
part of their successors about whether the interests were more loyal to the 
government or to the Old Whigs themselves. With the exception of the 
Marquis of Rockingham's ministry, 1765-6, ministers who succeeded the 
Old Whigs in office did not share their concern to placate English interests; 
indeed it is doubtful that they understood the reasons for the Old Whigs' 
assumption that political stability depended in part on the successful 
accommodation of interest groups. 66 When Bute was Prime Minister, all the 
Baptist ministers responsible for distributing the Baptists' bounty were 
dismissed and no new ones hired because, as the Baptist leader Samuel 
Stennett wrote Newcastle, 'the Dissenters in general apprehend, they were 
honnored with your Grace's favor'. 66 George Grenville referred to 
Rockingham's administration as run by a club of merchants; Lord North 
advised the London merchants trading to America to return to their counting 
houses and leave matters to him. 67 Merchants did meet with members of 
Pitt's cabinet on the Paper Currency Act but little came of their efforts. Only 
the Rockingham administration worked regularly with the merchants, even 
offering a cabinet position to Sir William Baker, prominent New York 
merchant, utilising merchant support in the repeal of the Stamp Act, and 
drafting trade regulations with their cooperation. 68 
The interest groups for their part reacted with confusion to the separation 
of their traditional allies from the government. Hesitant to support a govern-
ment that was indifferent to them, they were even more hesitant to go into 
opposition with the Old Whigs who could offer them no rewards and who 
were, moreover, less in need than the government of the interests' strongest 
weapon, information. Their dilemma was further complicated by the rise of 
•agitational' interests around Wilkes at the end of the decade of the 1760s. 
Most members of the Anglo-American interests wanted nothing to do with 
Wilkes, despite his attraction for Americans. Only one-tenth of all the 
identifiable, politically minded American merchants, for example, signed a 
Wilkite petition late in 1775. But only one per cent signed the anti-Wilkite 
petition of 1769, suggesting that most of the American merchants wanted 
nothing to do with the Wilkite question on either side. 69 They 'did not meddle 
with politics' 70-i.e. political agitation, as one Virginia merchant told his 
American correspondents. Baptist and Dissenting Deputies seem to have 
supported the Old Whigs through the election of 1768; in 1773, unsupported 
by the ministry they mounted their first public drive, verging on the 
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agitational, for the abolition of compulsory subscription to the Articles of 
Religion. 
Thus the decline of the Board's capacity to placate English interest groups 
by American favours can be seen as part of a decline in the concern of 
successive ministries to use them for this purpose. Like the bounty for the 
Baptists, the Board was cut off because two decades of ministries were not 
aware of the need to appease Anglo-American interests. This was a part, and 
not such a small one, of the cause of the unrest in England and America 
after 1775. 
In its decline the Board was no longer able to serve the transatlantic 
interests as it had done before 1760, but in its heyday it had served them well. 
Retrospectively it emerges as an early example, if not indeed the earliest, of 
an institution sorely needed in any developing nation, namely, a clearing 
house for vital interest group demands. To the extent that it was, the Board 
made a useful-and hitherto unrecognised--contribution to the stability of 
eighteenth-century England and America. 71 
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Warfare and Political Change in Mid-
Eigh teenth-Century Massachusetts 
by 
William Pencak1 
'Join or Die.' So Benjamin Franklin warned his fellow American colonists 
shortly after the French and Indian War began in 1754. Beneath a diagram of 
a snake severed in thirteen pieces depicting the fragmented provinces of 
British North America, he lamented 'the extreme difficulty of bringing so 
many different governments and assemblies to agree in any speedy and 
effectual measures for our common defense and security, while our enemies 
have the very great advantage of being under one direction, with one council 
and one purse'. 2 Franklin's argument applied not only to the need for 
combination at this juncture among the mainland provinces. It articulated 
the particular case of a general truth: states hampered by internal bickering 
fail to mobilise their military resources effectively and rapidly find the1r 
domestic weaknesses compounded by impotence in foreign affairs. 
Franklin need only have turned to eighteenth-century Europe for proof of 
his statement. Successful states developed efficient means of collecting taxes, 
conscripting soldiers, and neutralising resistance to political centralisation. 
Only such techniques could forge the principal tool of national survival-a 
competitive military establishment. The sorry decline of Poland, Sweden, and 
the Ottoman Empire from their seventeenth-century glory can be attributed 
to the monarch's inability to check the autonomy of the nobility. On the 
other hand, Prussia and England overcame the handicap of relatively small 
populations by developing brutal but effective means of recruiting respectively 
the most powerful army and navy in Europe, and succeeded in integrating 
the landowning class into civil and military administration. France, Austria, 
and Russia represented the intermediate case oflarge nations which eliminated 
local privileges and opposition intermittently and imperfectly, but maintained 
major power status through sheer size and periodically strong rulers. Nations 
able to neutralise the institution eighteenth-century Americans associated 
with liberty-the legislative assembly-survived and increased in strength; 
states too tender of the corporate privileges of their subjects deteriorated 
or expired. 3 
Yet the American colonies neither joined nor died during the great mid-
century wars which finally eliminated the French menace. True, every main-
land province furnished troops and supplies for the common cause, However. 
this voluntary cooperation proved so ineffectual that in addition to provincial 
levies, Britain had to furnish regular regiments greater in number than the 
French-Canadian forces in order to bring the war to an end. Even after 
Wolfe defeated Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham, British troops had 
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to be summoned to deal with pockets of Indian resistance in Pennsylvania 
and South Carolina. Throughout the French and Indian War, British 
officers and administrators complained of soldiers who deserted or refused 
to fight outside their home colonies, merchants who traded with the enemy, 
and assemblies which incomprehensibly did not vote adequate supplies and 
quarters for the very troops which guaranteed their existence. Such resistance 
to a more centralised administration, understandable in terms of the 
eighteenth-century Whig ideology by which the colonists measured their 
freedom, appeared suicidal in the context of modern world history which 
has required nations to stand united or fall divided. Only the knowledge that 
eighty thousand French Canadians could never destroy them, coupled 
with the fact of assistance from the mother country, permitted the Americans 
the luxury of adhering to liberties rendered obsolete by the realities of 
European international politics. 4 
However, even if the North American colonies were united only minimally 
among themselves, it can be demonstrated convincingly that at least one 
province underwent, with respect to its internal government and administra-
tion, a transformation remarkably similar to the state-building process of the 
great European powers. Between the outbreak of King George's War inl 740 
and the signing of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the Massachusetts General 
Court roused itself from a quarter-century of lethargy and achieved feats of 
taxation and mobilisation which Frederick the Great might have envied. 
Under the tutelage of William Shirley, governor from 1741 to 1756, the 
Bay Colony changed from one of the most truculent provinces in the empire 
to the most cooperative. However, the province's mobilisation contained 
the seeds of its organisers' destruction: the suffering engendered convinced 
the people that both imperial and local leaders posed serious threats to their 
liberties and well-being. 
To effect this about-face, the very nature of Massachusetts' political 
system had to change. A legislature primarily concerned with obstructing 
Britain's plans to strengthen royal authority and with resolving disputes 
presented by towns and individuals became an active body which designed 
and implemented vast militllty campaigns. A potent faction devoted to the 
royal prerogative developed virtually ex nihi/o supplanting the influence of 
the previously dominant country faction which had convinced the assembly 
that any increase in the governor's power destroyed popular liberty. New 
systems of finance and public administration, and a new sense of mission 
emerged. For a quarter century, Massachusetts waged total war. 
Massachusetts' pre-eminence among the American colonies in fighting 
King George's (1740-1748) and the French and Indian (1754--63) wars is 
indisputable. In the latter conflict, the Bay Colony outspent Virginia, the 
second most zealous province, £818,000 sterling to £385,000 collectively, or 
£20 to £14 per adult male. Annual levies from 1755 to 1759 numbered 
approximately 7000 soldiers; 5000 men were mustered in 1760 and 3000 per 
year until 1763. Such an army for a province with approximately 50,000 adult 
males meant that war was being waged on a scale comparable to the great wars 
of modern times. 5 And in King George's War, Massachusetts had the field 
almost to itself. Aside from grudging and minimal support from New York, 
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the other New England colonies, and even Britain, the expedition which 
conquered Louisbourg in 1745 and the abortive Canada and Crown Point 
campaign of the following year were projected, manned, and supplied 
almost entirely by the Bay Colony. 6 
During King William's and Queen Anne's Wars, in 1690, 1706, 1709, and 
1711, Massachusetts had prepared massive but unsuccessful expeditions to 
eliminate French power in Canada. Following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, 
however, Massachusetts' government lost much of its energy. The province 
devoted itself to settling the recently won frontier, trying to solve the 
perplexing problem of a rapidly depreciating currency, and foiling the efforts 
of royal governors to increase their power at the expense of the lower house. 
Localism, ideological wrangling, stalemate, and stagnation best describe the 
politics of the interwar period. At this time 'the legislative agenda,' as 
Michael Zuckerman has noted, 'was substantially set by petitions from the 
towns and their inhabitants'. 7 The General Court functioned, as its name 
implies, primarily as a court, settling disputes that became too hot to handle 
on the town level, determining the ownership of frontier lands, granting 
licenses to sell liquor, and voting an annual budget of approximately £10,000 
sterling. Most of the money went to pay the salaries of the legislators, judges, 
and the handful of soldiers who garrisoned Boston's Castle William and a 
few outposts in Maine. During the legislative session of 1743-1744, for 
instance, the last year before the Louisbourg campaign, 307 resolves passed. 
General provincial business accounted for only 98, and most of these consisted 
of routine matters such as voting salaries for all provincial officials from the 
governor to the door-keeper, approving the accounts of the county treasurers, 
and passing on bills to entertain various dignitaries. Over two-thirds of the 
business consisted of ajudicating items of interest to particular towns and 
individuals. 8 
In addition to settling local problems, the three branches of the Court 
devoted much of their energy to defining the limits of their respective powers. 
Beginning in 1720, Governor Samuel Shute (1716-1723) insisted that he had a 
right to veto the assembly's choice of its speaker, especially when it selected 
the obnoxious Elisha Cooke, who had repeatedlS referred to Shute as a 'great 
blockhead' and once accosted him, while intoxicated and semi-dressed, late 
at night on a Boston street. The matter was only resolved in 1726 when the 
Privy Council forced the deputies to accept an Explanatory Charter which 
decided the case in Shute's favour. 9 
A similar dispute occurred when the home government saddled Shute's 
successor, Lieutenant-Governor William Dummer (1723-1728), with an 
instruction requiring the annual redemption of Massachusetts' paper 
currency-which derived its value by being redeemable for taxes in specified 
years-to forestall the inflation which had begun to affect British creditors. 
The house responded by refusing to vote any appropriations at all in 1727 
until Dummer caved in and violated his orders. Massachusetts managed to 
circumvent instructions reducing its money supply until 1741, when parlia-
mentary intransigence led to the abortive Land and Silver Bank schemes 
which nearly tore the province apart. 10 
The remaining two governors during the interwar years fared no better. 
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William Burnet (1728-1729) spent his entire year and three months in 
Massachusetts insisting that the assembly should permanently guarantee 
the executive a salary of at least £1000 sterling per year. Such an act would 
prevent the governor from pleasing his constituents at the expense of his 
superiors. This controversy dragged on until 1735. Burnet's successor 
Jonathan Belcher (1730-1741) finally worked out a compromise whereby 
the governor obtained an annually voted grant, but the house in turn 
promised that it would equal £1000 sterling and be voted at the beginning 
of each year's session, instead of at the end after the governor had approved 
all of the assembly's votes. 11 The last of these jurisdictional disputes occurred 
when Belcher had to persuade the house that all money appropriated for 
the treasury by the deputies be spent merely with the approval of the governor 
and council for each specific disbursement. The lower house refused to 
yield this right from 1730 to 1733, and responded to Belcher's demands by 
voting no money at all for nearly two years. As in the case of the Explanatory 
Charter, a sharp warning from the crown changed the deputies' minds. 12 
The nature of political conflict in peacetime Massachusetts must be 
defined if the changes produced by war are to be fully appreciated. As 
noted, the principal controversy centred on the division of powers within 
the General Court. When not handling local business, the assembly spent its 
time arguing with the governor and council. House Journals for the 1720s 
and 30s contain hundreds of pages of messages in which both sides based 
their arguments primarily on the province charter and English precedents, 
with the assembly claiming the powers of the House of Commons, derived 
from the charter clause guaranteeing all the rights of Englishmen. The 'Old 
Whig' appeal to the natural rights of man and the 'New Whig' attack on 
executive corruption were conspicuous by their absence. Ideological debate, 
while intense, utilised a common language and did not delve deeply into the 
relationship of society and government. Both sides confined themsehes 
largely to technical points of law. 
The composition of factions between Queen Anne's and King George's 
wars also contrasted markedly with future patterns. No effective prerogative 
party existed in the legislature, since on every disputed point the interests 
of Massachusetts and Britain clashed rather than coincided. For example, 
many of the house's denials of the governor's power over the speaker passed 
unanimously. The most favourable vote Burnet ever obtained on the 
permanent salary was a 54 to 18 rejection. Even this vote occurred on a 
watered-down proposition which guaranteed payment only for one 
particular executive's administration, and angered Burnet as much as the 
deputies. 13 In 1732, the assembly refused by 56 to 1 to supply the treasury 
unless it could control specific appropriations. True, the house reversed 
itself on this issue by 55-25 in 1733 under threat of the king's displeasure, 
just as it 'submitted to' (rather than 'accepted of') the Explanatory Charter 
by 48-32. 14 But such compliance clearly occurred under duress. Only 
Governor Belcher began to form a party loyal to himself and thereby 
successfully stifled the opposition from 1735 to 1739.15 This faction can 
hardly be considered a court party, however, since Belcher spent much of 
his energy persuading Britain not to insist on the question of the permanent 
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salary and to postpone redemption of the paper money supply. The governor 
had rather assumed leadership of the country faction. 
The popular faction's one-sided dominance during the interwar period is 
explained by the fact that leadership in the assembly was concentrated in a 
few powerful hands. If service on fifteen committees-which examination of 
the House Journals suggests is a plausible dividing line between political 
leaders and the rank-and-file-be taken to indicate prominence, only 27 of 
104 towns represented supplied any leader at all. If a deputy is counted once 
for every year he attained this position, seven towns provided 61 per cent of 
this select group. Boston headed the list with 32 per cent; with rare exceptions, 
all four of the capital's assemblymen appeared as leaders. Only Charlestown, 
Braintree, Ipswich, Salem, Northampton, and Roxbury supplied more than 
four per cent. Certain individuals (such as Speakers Edmund Quincy 
of Braintree and William Dudley of Roxbury) who served repeatedly account 
for the importance of these towns. 16 
Most of the leading political figures between 1713 and 1740 belonged to 
an extended kinship network, centred on Boston, which embraced the first 
families of Massachusetts. Even the few men who adhered to the unpopular 
governors' standards were related to their opponents. The famous Elisha 
Cooke, who founded the Boston Caucus in 1719 and led the popular party 
until his death in 1737, counted three of his brothers-in-law, Oliver Noyes, 
John Clarke, and William Paine, among his principal supporters in the house. 
But Clarke was also the brother-in-law of Cotton Mather, who consistently 
favoured the royal governor. Elizabeth Clarke, John's sister, was married 
to Elisha Hutchinson, that family's patriarch in the early eighteenth century. 
All the Hutchinsons except William, a Caucus supporter, favoured the 
prerogative. One of Cooke's uncles was Nathaniel Byfield, a brother-in-law 
of Governor Joseph Dudley (1702-1715) who turned against his kinsman's 
administration during its final years. If we go one step further, two of 
Dudley's three daughters had married sons of councillors Samuel Sewall and 
Wait Winthrop while their fathers were feuding violently with the governor. 17 
However violent the rhetoric of peacetime political conflict, it was tempered 
by the fact that all the participants belonged to an elite which both the 
populace and representatives entrusted with the government. 
Peacetime politics thus were plagued with superficial contention, but the 
system was essentially stable because administration was not expensive, 
government was stabilised through elite family participation and did not 
impinge on the lives of people except through request or mild taxation, and 
political issues rarely went beyond discussion of legislative prerogatives. But 
around 1740, two events shattered this political framework almost simul-
taneously: the currency crisis and the Great A wakening. Compelled by 
Britain to withdraw all except £30,000 of its £390,000 in circulation by 1741, 
two groups in Massachusetts tried to sidestep the order by creating private 
currencies-a Land Bank with province-wide support and a Silver Bank, 
favoured primarily by wealthy Boston merchants. The province overwhel. 
mingly supported the Land Bank. Only 11 of the 43 deputies who opposed 
the measure in 1740 were re-elected in 1741, whereas 33 of the 63 who 
supported it retained their seats. Opposed by Governor Belcher and both 
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British and Massachusetts merchants, the Bank was ultimately declared 
illegal by Parliament, which provoked its supporters to threaten violent 
revolution. The situation was defused because Belcher was removed at the 
height of the crisis (ironically enough, because the ministry had been 
misinformed by his political opponents that he actually favoured the Land 
Bank) and was replaced by Advocate General William Shirley, who managed 
to liquidate the Bank to the satisfaction of most parties. 18 
The Awakening revived popular interest in religion at the same time that 
the Bank stirred up general political concern. Towns and families throughout 
Massachusetts split between 'Old Lights' who defended the traditional 
religious establishment and 'New Lights' who favoured more emotional 
preaching, which was to be judged by popular appeal rather than mere 
competence. Other differences set off the New Lights as potential threats 
to social order: salvation came all at once to an utterly depraved soul 
rather than as the culmination of 'good works' and socially acceptable 
'preparation'. Itinerant ministers and preachers of different denominations 
were welcomed by the New Lights. These innovations clearly undermined 
the absolute position of each community's own established cleric. Young 
people, women, and the less well-to-do tended to support the Awakening. 
Also, three generations of high birth rates and low death rates had led to a 
substantial decline in economic opportunity in the province's older com-
munities. The Awakening provided those who were worth less in worldly 
terms with the means to assert their superiority over those more elevated 
than them in the traditional socio-economic structure. For instance, the 
Second Church of Boston, the Mathers' congregation, split in two: the 
wealthier and older members followed 'Old Light' Samuel Mather when 
he was ousted by the younger, less affluent majority. The coincidence of 
overcrowding, economic distress, and a religious revival with a demonstrable 
social basis suggests that Massachusetts was sitting on dynamite by the 
early 1740s.19 
That these social problems did not produce an explosion, it may be 
tentatively postulated, can be attributed to the outbreak of war between 
England and Spain in 1739 and England and France in 1744. The pressure of 
a common enemy redirected religious enthusiasm into another crusade, 
provided an outlet for young men with limited prospects, and brought 
ideological sparring within the General Court to an end for approximately 
two decades. Yet it can be argued that war did not so much solve these 
problems as mask them, since they re-emerged with even greater intensity 
in the 1760s. Furthermore, Anglo-American disagreement over the conduct 
of the war led to increasing popular discontent with Britain. 
Massachusetts' limited involvement in the war with Spain from 1739 set 
several patterns for the greater conflicts which followed. In 1740 Governor 
Belcher issued a call for volunteers to serve as support troops for a British 
fleet destined to attack Cartagena in the West Indies. The response, thanks 
to promises of liberal pay, bounties, and plunder, was overwhelming despite 
the almost total decimation of a similar New England expeditionary force 
in I 703. Belcher raised one thousand men instead of the six hundred requested; 
this produced some embarrassment when Britain only supplied arms for 
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the number originally planned. Surviving muster rolls indicate that young 
men from the long-settled towns of eastern Massachusetts supplied most 
of the enlistments. The campaign was a total fiasco and few of the men 
returned, but it set a precedent which held throughout the mid-century 
wars: Massachusetts raised most of its forces through bounties and the 
inducement of receiving military pay, room, and board. 20 
Warfare also helped to relieve the monetary crisis. As early as October 
1741, Governor Shirley had managed to persuade the ministry to revoke its 
instructions that all issues of paper money in excess of £30,000 must be 
approved by the Privy Council. When war with France broke out in 1744, all 
restrictions were waived for the duration of the conflict. Despite 'the extreme 
heavy burden' of which the General Court complained in 1748, Massachusetts 
financed the bulk of King George's War simply by rolling the presses: in 
1749, £1.9 million were extant and the currency's value had depreciated to 
one-tenth of sterling. 21 
Finally, the war fever caused New Lights and Old Lights to bury the 
hatchet between themselves. Beginning with the Louisbourg expedition of 
1745, Puritan millennial confidence revived for the first time since the 1630s 
and 40s. Conquest of the French and Indians was viewed as a prelude to the 
final triumph over the Anti-Christ (Popery), the universal spread of true 
religion, and the second coming of Christ. The millennium would come 
about as a capstone on the efforts of God's chosen people, rather than as 
a punishment for their declension and depravity as millenarians in the 
intervening century, such as Cotton and Increase Mather, had feared. 22 
The imperatives of war resolved political tensions between the governor 
and the legislature in addition to defusing potential social conflict. Through-
out the 1740s and 1750s, a powerful prerogative faction headed by Thomas 
Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver of Boston obtained nearly all the troops 
requested by Britain, successfully implemented a currency backed by specie 
in 1749, and prevented inflation throughout the French and Indian War by 
imposing heavy taxes to finance current expenditures. This faction first 
appeared in Bostonian politics in the late 1730s: following the death of Elisha 
Cooke in 1737, the town began to elect supporters as well as opponents of the 
governor to office for the first time in a quarter-century. Even though 
Hutchinson and Oliver sought to alter Boston's town meeting government to 
a self-selecting corporation, the town recognised their administrative com-
petence as the only alternative to the politics of the Caucus, which had wasted 
its energies quarrelling with governors while the town's economy and quality 
of life drastically declined. Composed of relatively young men, born mostly 
around 1710, the prerogative faction dominated provincial politics until it 
was dethroned during the revolutionary crisis. 23 
The rise of the prerogative faction coincided with a drastic change in the 
activities of the legislature. Attention shifted from resolving local problems to 
matters of defence. In 1745, 224 of the 324 resolves passed by the house 
involved provincial interests, an almost exact reversal of the ratio of general to 
local business of two years before. In 1757, at the height of the French and 
Indian War, the proportion was 202 bills to 94. Furthermore, the number of 
representatives involved in the house's committee work grew dramatically. 
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In the absence of a paid bureaucracy, and given the fact that many of the 
Massachusetts local justices and militia officers sat in the house, the activity 
of the so-called back-benchers had to increase as the legislature changed 
from an ideological forum and court of appeals to an organ of policy 
formation and public administration. Between 1740 and 1764, 70 per cent 
of all represented towns (86 out of 123) supplied deputies who sat on more 
than fifteen committees per year, as opposed to 26 per cent in peacetime. 
Boston's share declined to 15 per cent, and no other town had more than 
three per cent. The responsibility of power diffused itself throughout the 
province as effectively as government imposed itself on the general population. 
No longer could most political figures be cousins, uncles, and brothers-in-
law; even within Boston itself, apart from the Hutchinson-Oliver connection, 
few leading legislators of either faction were related. 24 
The prerogative's success in the provincial sphere can in part be explained 
by the reason that it dominated Boston. Governor Belcher's willingness to 
meet the old country faction more than half-way caused its members to 
dissipate their energy in a dispute between Belcher and Cooke which 
disenchanted many of the back-benchers in the assembly. Furthermore, 
as with solving Boston's economic problems, the task of running a war 
required the patience and attention to detail which the free-wheeling Cooke 
and his followers had never possessed. Negotiations with Indians and other 
colonies, preparation of endless accounts and muster-rolls, and supervision 
of supply shipments transformed leading politicians into full-time civil 
servants as well. Massachusetts willingly overlooked the prerogative's 
mistrust of popular government and conspicuous consumption in the face 
of local hardship in the light of the overwhelming necessity required by 
the great 'crusade'. 
Prerogative rule possessed even less savoury elements. Over three-quarters 
of the deputies held commissions either as justices of the peace, militia 
officers, or both. In addition to their pay, officers had the privilege of selling 
supplies to their troops. Especially recalcitrant opponents of the war could 
be removed from their posts by the governor with the council's consent. 
Governor Shirley and his supporters also used dubious parliamentary 
manoeuvres-warning that British displeasure and punitive measures 
would follow if the war were not fought with all possible vigour, holding 
the legislature in session until their opponents went home, and even 
expelling the country faction's most effective remaining leader-to get 
their way. Prerogative strength must be explained by a combination of 
consensus and coercion: to stress either unduly converts men like Hutchinson 
and Shirley into either villains or heroes, and leads to excessively partisan 
interpretations of provincial politics as either stable or conflict-ridden. 
The manner in which Britain's promised financial compensation for 
Massachusetts' Louisbourg expenditures became a prerogative tool to 
obtain additional troops and funds provides an excellent example of how 
the lower house could be persuaded to act in spite of its own best judgment. 
Having launched the expedition and plunged themselves £50,000 into debt, 
the deputies begged 'His Majesty's favor and compassion ... in relieving 
them from such part of the expenses and burden as to His wisdom should 
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seem reasonable.' Once the representatives put themselves in this position, 
Shirley could extort further grants of troops and money by threatening that 
if the war effort proceeded with insufficient vigour, Britain might think 
twice about paying for Louisbourg. When he proposed the reduction of 
Canada on 31 May 1746 Shirley warned that 'a wrong step in the affair will 
endanger our being disappointed in our expectations'. The following July 
the governor impressed men who had enlisted for frontier garrison duty 
into the expedition contrary to the vote of the house. When the representatives 
refused to pay them, he obtained a reversal of this decision by promising to 
explain to his superiors that he was obliged to pay them from drafts on the 
British treasury. The house again acquiesced rather than lose all chance of 
receiving the Louisbourg grant. 25 
Tension between Shirley and the assembly also arose over the posting of 
soldiers and the duration of their service. Troops who had volunteered or 
been impressed for one theatre of war were sometimes transferred to a less 
attractive post, or else enlisted to obtain a more favourable one. These 
practices necessitated additional impressments to fill the vacated commands. 
The house protested in vain that 'we have always looked upon the impressing 
of men even for the defence of their own inhabitants as a method to be 
made use of in cases of great necessity only'. A second difficulty occurred 
when the governor held provincial soldiers on garrison duty long after their 
enlistments had expired. Some men were kept at Annapolis in Nova Scotia 
from mid-1744 until January 1746, and the entire 3000..men Louisbourg 
contingent (of whom more than 900 died from exposure and disease) 
remained at Cape Breton from June 1745 until a long-awaited British 
garrison arrived in April 1746. The assembly complained that such 
extended service reduced 'due confidence in the promises of government'. 26 
Discouragement with Shirley's conduct of the war brought it to a halt 
sooner than he would have preferred. He failed to obtain a second expedition 
to Canada in 1747. When Louisbourg was returned to France by the Peace 
of 1748, the assembly commented 'it affords us a very melancholy reflection 
when we consider the extreme heavy burden brought upon the people of this 
province, and the small prospect there is of any good effect from it ... we 
have been the means of effectually bringing distress, if not ruin, upon 
ourselves'. 27 
In addition to side-stepping the legislature's wishes in mobilising forces, 
Shirley dealt harshly with opponents of his policies. Dr. William Douglass, 
the province's only European-trained physician, attacked the governor 
for permitting the impressment of sailors into the British navy, allowing 
sanitary conditions to deteriorate at Louisbourg, and authorising the 
issue of more paper money in eight years to finance his schemes than all his 
predecessors combined over the previous fifty. In a monumental Summary, 
Historical and Political . .. of North America, which he published serially in 
the Boston Gazette beginning in 1747, Douglass roundly attacked Shirley's 
military strategy and 'governors in general, who may by romantic (but in 
perquisites profitable) expenditions, depopulate the country'. Shirley 
instituted a libel suit for £10,000 on behalf of the British Admiral Charles 
Knowles, another target of Douglass' venom; Douglass answered with a 
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counter-suit and ultimately won £750 in damages against the absent admiral. 
Shirley also sued Samuel Waldo, the Boston merchant and land speculator 
to whom he owed his job, for £12,000. The governor blamed Waldo, 
commander of the aborted Canada expedition, for failing to keep adequate 
accounts and thereby denying Massachusetts compensation for its efforts 
from the British treasury. 28 Although Waldo too was ultimately acquitted, 
the governor's leading opponents could count on the threat of enormous 
and potentially ruinous lawsuits for their pains. 
After the war ended, Shirley and his supporters continued to use unsavoury 
tactics to persuade the assembly to adopt and maintain a specie currency. 
The Speaker of the House, Thomas Hutchinson, took the first step in this 
direction by convincing the assembly that compensation for Louisbourg 
would never be forthcoming unless the province pledged to use the money to 
sink its paper currency. However, once the money arrived, a specific plan 
for redeeming the outstanding bills only passed on 20 January 1749 by a vote 
of 40-37 after five weeks of debate. To effect this vote, Hutchinson waited 
until about one-quarter of the assembly had drifted away and ensured that 
James Allen, Shirley's principal antagonist who had accused him of trading 
with the enemy, would be expelled. 29 
Reaction to the new currency was overwhelmingly negative. Hutchinson 
lost the next Boston election to Samuel Waldo by a margin of almost three 
to one. His house burned down, mysteriously, and the fire companies 
refused to put out the blaze. 30 Allen published a list of the supporters of the 
currency plan: the next year, on 5 April 1750, the assembly responded by 
voting 46 to 33 to issue a new form of paper money. But once again, the 
hard money advocates had greater staying power. After the backcountry 
opponents of silver melted away, seven deputies were persuaded to change 
their minds and the new bills were rejected 31-28 on 20 April. In 1751 the 
house again voted an inflationary supply bill by 36-26. That year only the 
council's adamant refusal to concur ensured the survival of a stable 
currency. 31 
The ability of the prerogative faction to outlast and intimidate the majority 
of the representatives caused opposition spokesmen to adopt, for the first 
time, the Old and New Whig ideology with which the leaders of the Revolu-
tion ultimately justified their cause. Shirley's administration presented the 
novel phenomenon of a House of Representatives conducting an unpopular 
and costly war against the wishes not only of individuals but-as some of 
its messages and reversed votes made perfectly clear-against its own better 
judgment. It therefore became necessary for the country faction, for the 
first time, to detach itself from the assembly and go beyond the mere defence 
of the deputies' right to make their own laws. Once the assembly itself was 
conceived to be an instrument of oppression, an appeal to a higher standard 
was required which explained how the people's own representatives could 
betray their constituents. 
Whig ideology suited the Massachusetts situation perfectly. The Indepen-
dent Advertiser, America's first anti-war and protest newspaper was founded 
one month after the great anti-impressment riot of 17-20 November 1747 
by the twenty-five-year-old Samuel Adams, among others. 32 These opposition 
WARFARE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN MASSACHUSETTS 61 
writers cited John Locke to argue that a government which failed to protect 
the inhabitants' 'lives, liberties, and estates' by forcing them to fight against 
their wishes, impressing them into the navy, and taxing them oppressively 
could be opposed legitimately--even violently. Similarly, the New Whig 
ideas of William Trenchard and John Gordon were adapted to explain 
how only a morally and fiscally corrupted government would so betray 
its people, and that only an equally corrupted people would tolerate such 
oppression. The Advertiser blamed the war on representatives who had been 
corrupted by Sir Plume (Governor Shirley) and his 'prime minister' Alexander 
Windmill (Thomas Hutchinson) by being given military commissions, which 
paid officially from about £50 sterling per year for a captain to about £80 
for a colonel. These, however, also entitled them to supply and pay their 
men and thereby opened the door for padded accounts and illegal profits. 33 
Most of the complaints of corruption were directed against Shirley personally, 
who was alleged to have made an enormous sum of money by being granted 
the right to raise a royal regiment of colonials to garrison Louisbourg. 
New Whig ideology made sense in wartime because, unlike peacetime, 
real opportunities for making large sums of money in government service 
existed. 34 
There is little hint in The Independent Advertiser that the French and 
Indians were a real threat to Massachusetts: the 'Popish' refurbishing of 
King's Chapel by Shirley and the Boston Anglican community was a far 
greater menace. Colonists constantly denouced England as a den of iniquity 
and corruption instead. After the mother country gave Cape Breton back 
to France, 35 the most extreme critique of the war and its engineers occurred: 
Why is the security of the brave and virtuous ... given up to purchase 
some short-lived and precarious advantages for lazy-f[oo]ls and idle 
All[ie]s? The security was purchased with the blood of the former and 
sacrificed to the indolence of the latter. The first won it by bravery; 
the latter forfeited it by Tr[e]ach[e]ry and Cow[ar]dice. As if our 
Min[i]stry ... had determined to counteract the essential laws of 
equity, as much as possible, as they have done the rules of policy and 
prudence. 
Reaction to British and prerogative policies not only took verbal form: 
wartime crowds began to focus on political issues. Between the Glorious 
Revolution and the 1740s, political violence in Massachusetts was committed 
by individuals against individuals-a bomb thrown through Cotton Mather's 
window, a pot shot taken at Samuel Shute, an assault against Elisha Cooke 
-whereas crowds restricted themselves to remedying local emergencies 
which could not conveniently be handled in courts of law. For example, 
mobs tore down bawdyhouses and market stalls under construction in the 
1730s, and stopped ships trying to export food during shortages from 
sailing. A corrupt and brutal jailor found himself the target of a prison riot. 
Beginning in the 1740s, however, mobs for the first time directed themselves 
against imperial power and clashed with British rather than local authorities. 
The occasion was naval impressment: despite an Act of Parliament of 1707 
forbidding impressment in American waters without the consent of local 
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authorities, and in spite of Massachusetts' willingness to authorise the 
impressment of non-native seamen who happened to be in the province, 
British captains provoked hostility by their disregard for such points of law. 
Angered that their sailors deserted with local connivance, they sometimes 
simply impressed people indiscriminately and then sailed for the West 
lndies. In 1741, Captain James Scott seized over forty men and narrowly 
escaped with his life. A press gang killed two veterans of the Louisbourg 
campaign in 1745 for resisting efforts to seize them; in 1747 virtually the 
entire populace of Boston held many of the officers in Commodore Knowles' 
British fleet hostage pending the release of forty-six impressed men. Instead 
of negotiating Knowles threated to bombard Boston while a mob of several 
thousand people surrounded the governor's mansion and General Court 
to press their demands. The Independent Advertiser justified such violence 
as the legitimate response to lawless acts of nominally lawful authorities. 
Where the government could not protect its inhabitants, 'they have an 
undoubted right to use the powers [of self-defence] belonging to that state 
[of nature]'. Just before the paper closed down, it responded to critics of the 
Knowles Riot, 'that the sober sort, who dared to express a due sense of their 
injuries, were invidiously represented as a rude, low-lived mob'. 36 
The French and Indian War revived the same tendencies manifested in 
King George's War. The province was even more cooperative and self-
sacrificing, but the prerogative faction's efforts to coordinate provincial 
and imperial policy again provoked resentment against British officials. 
Taxes, which the province had considered heavy at under £10,000 sterling 
in the 1740s, rose to £60,000 sterling or more from 1756 to 1760 and remained 
at over £30,000 for the rest of the provincial period. 37 Protesting against 
the fact that most of this money was raised from land taxes, the rural 
majority in the assembly struck back at the Boston-based prerogative 
faction by passing the infamous Excise Tax of 1754 and a Stamp Tax in 
1755 (remarkably similar to the one Britain would later impose on the 
colonies) to shift the tax burden towards the urban communities. The new 
excise differed from the province's long-standing tax on liquor by taxing 
the consumption of spirits by individuals rather than the amount sold by 
retailers. To discover the quantity, the government appointed excise farmers 
who could then hire deputies to demand an account 'of all and every persons 
whomsoever in this government, of all the wine, rum, and brandy, and other 
distilled spirits expended by them ( on oath if required)'; a penalty of £10 
was established for false swearing. The prerogative faction and the Boston 
community joined forces (Boston was already paying 20 per cent of the 
taxes even though it had under 10 per cent of the population) to protest 
against this 'Total Eclipse of Liberty' and 'Monster of Monsters', as two 
pamphlets attacking the bill were entitled. Governor Shirley, who signed the 
bill under protest, himself took up the natural rights argument that had 
previously been used by pis opponents, criticising the tax as 'altogether 
unprecedented in the English governments' and 'inconsistent with the 
natural rights of every person in the community'. The country's revenge on 
the court faction was short-lived: the people of the province were so angered 
by the excise that only 19 of the 52 deputies who approved it were re-elected, 
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whereas 10 of the 17 who opposed it (they came from the Boston area, 
Salem, Marblehead, Plymouth, Maine) retained their seats. 38 
Taxes and economic difficulties during the French and Indian War rose 
to unprecedented heights. The legislature placed embargoes on exports of 
food which compelled farmers to sell provisions to British and American 
military commissaries at lower than usual prices; British commanders-in-
chief also prohibited colonial overseas shipping intermittently when they 
considered trading with the enemy to be excessive. These restrictions 
continued until 1763: Massachusetts' new governor Francis Bernard 
(1760-1769) joined the legislature and protested to General Jeffrey Amherst 
that 'this public spirited province can ill afford to lose the small trade 
remaining to it' and that in any event illegal trading simply did not exist in 
Massachusetts. Things became so bad in 1758 that sixteen leading Bostonian 
merchants, all of whom paid taxes of between £95 and £540 per year, 
threatened to leave the province and take their business elsewhere. Bernard 
later argued that British taxation was unjust because Massachusetts itself 
had spent 'an immense sum for such a small state, the burden of which has 
been grievously felt by all orders of men.' 39 Economic hardship drove a 
large number of people into bankruptcy. To combat this problem, in 1757 
the legislature passed the first major bill reforming the treatment of bankrupts 
in Massachusetts history. Instead of being forced to forfeit their entire 
estates and possibly go to debtors' prison, all persons who advertised bank-
ruptcy in the Boston newspapers, did not try to hide any of their wealth, 
and permitted their affairs to be investigated by commissioners could begin 
life with a clean slate. Insolvents able to pay at least half their debts could 
retain five per cent of their wealth up to £200; those able to pay two-thirds 
could keep 7½ per cent up to £250; anyone who could satisfy three-fourths 
of the claims against him was allowed ten per cent of his estate under £300. 
The reform was timely: joyous news of British victories were always 
tempered by lists of the financially distressed in the same issues of the 
province's journals. For instance, twenty-eight persons filed for bankruptcy 
the week Louisbourg was recaptured in 1758. As late as February 1765 the 
default of Nathaniel Appleton on £189,000 set off a chain reaction because 
his creditors in turn could not pay their debts. 40 
In addition to shouldering these burdens, Massachusetts had to bear with 
the arrogance of British commanders-in-chief who seemed determined to 
infringe provincial rights and sensibilities to the maximum while winning 
the war. Naval impressment continued, and Massachusetts again protested 
against this grievance in vain. 41 Britain and Massachusetts disagreed over 
the number, disposition, and ability of the provincial soldiers. Each year, 
the prerogative faction struggled long and hard to obtain the deputies' 
endorsement of the full number of troops requested by Britain. Even then, 
the assembly confined the troops to particular posts and enlisted them for 
limited periods of time which coincided poorly with military necessity. As 
Lord Loudoun, commander-in-chief during 1757 and 1758, complained at 
an intercolonial conference: 'The confining of your men to any particular 
service appears to me a preposterous measure. Our affairs are not in such a 
situation as to make it reasonable for any colony to be guided by its own 
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particular interest'. Other problems included soldiers sent to the frontier 
without arms; men enlisting and deserting several times to collect bounties; 
and officers and sutlers profiteering from the right to supply men with 
provisions. The province's insistence that impressment should only be used 
as a last resort ensured that each year's supply of men took several months 
to be mustered. Recruiting parties met with resistance in Boston and Marble--
head. Loudoun also wanted colonial troops to be led by British officers aad 
subjected to regular army discipline. His insistence that no provincial 
officer should rank higher than a British captain threatened local autonomy 
and insulted the province's military capability. 42 
When in camp, British officers frequently assigned colonials only the 
most onerous and demeaning work instead of committing them effectively to 
battle. General James Wolfe expressed the general British attitude: 'The 
Americans are in general the dirtiest, the most contemptible, cowardly 
dogs that you can conceive. There is no depending upon them in action. 
They fall down in their own dirt and desert by battalions, officers and all'. 43 
The most spectacular instance of Anglo-American animosity was the 
quartering dispute of December 1757 and January 1758. Massachusetts 
gladly offered to billet the troops for the winter, but Loudoun insisted that 
any legislative action was unnecessary because the British Quartering Act 
of 1694, which gave commanders such authority in England, applied to the 
colonies. The assembly could not see the reason for his indignation: 'We are 
really at a loss what steps to take to terminate this affair since His Lordship 
does not seem dissatisfied so much from the insufficiency of what we have 
done, as from the matter of its being done by a law of the province.' 
Loudoun, on the other hand, argued that if quartering were discretionary 
rather than automatic, 'my acquiesence under it would throw the whole 
continent into a turmoil, from South Carolina to Boston, and turn three-
quarters of the troops at once into the streets to perish'. At stake was 
whether the commander-in-chief could conduct the war independently of 
local interference. Loudoun complained that 'even if the town of Boston 
was attacked, it would not by their rule be in my power to march the troops 
to its relief'. He then threatened that if things were not settled he would 
'instantly order into Boston the three battalions from New York, Long 
Island, and Connecticut, and, if more are wanted, I have two in the Jerseys 
at hand besides those in Pennyslvania'. Loudoun also hinted that Britain 
would not think it reasonable to pay the colonies for their 'very extravagant' 
war expenses if they did not even provide lodging for the troops sent to 
protect them. 44 
While it lasted, the French and Indian War provoked less discontent than 
King George's: the country faction did not oppose any expeditions or the 
war itself this time, only the proportion to be shouldered by Massachusetts 
rather than by Britain. However, the peculiar manner in which the war ended 
led to increased political strife, both within Massachusetts and between 
Massachusetts and Britain, after hostilites were concluded. With respect to 
the New England colonies, the French menace ended forever when British 
forces raised the Union Jack over Quebec in 1759. But the war dragged on 
four more years, both in the West Indies and on the frontier of the middle 
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and southern colonies. Britain expected all the mainland colonies to contribute 
soldiers for frontier duty so that the more valuable redcoats could be sent 
to Europe or the islands. Thanks largely to persuasive speeches by 
Massachusetts' popular new governor Francis Bernard, the Bay Colony 
complied and supplied 3000 soldiers per year until 1763 and also sent 700 
men to the Ohio Valley in the wake of Pontiac's rebellion as late as 1764. 45 
Because the war ended in 1759 in the Northeast while elsewhere it continued 
until 1764, Massachusetts felt little urgency or need for further sacrifices, 
and yet she was still required to maintain embargoes, levy taxes, and raise 
troops. 
These difficulties were exacerbated by Britain's plans for imperial 
reorganisation which were implemented before the war's end. Despite the 
embargoes and taxes suffered by the Boston merchant community, British 
customs officials in Boston could not leave well enough alone and provoked 
the famous challenge to their general search warrants, the Writs of Assistance 
Case in 1761. The Sugar Act and Proclamation of 1763 were promulgated 
while Massachusetts still had several thousand men in service. 
The manner in which Parliament's promised reimbursement finally arrived 
did not help matters. Massachusetts always insisted that its exertions went 
far beyond those of the other colonies. As a result the province was entitled 
to special treatment. This was not forthcoming: Jasper Mauduit, the province 
agent in the early 1760s, did little to force the issue. He urged acquiescence 
with British policy: since the other colonies were content with requesting 
compensation for about half their wartime expenditures, Massachusetts 
would appear 'in a very disadvantageous light to present a petition to 
Parliament setting forth that we are content with nothing less than the 
whole of ours'. Massachusetts ultimately received only £390,000 out of 
some £818,000 spent. 46 
Internal strife also broke out while the war was ending. Religious contro-
versy between the province's Congregational establishment and a small but 
influential community of wealthy Anglicans began in 1761. The latter 
belonged mostly to wealthy Boston area families which had strongly 
supported and profited from the war. Charles Apthorp, a young Anglican 
cleric, established a 'mission' at Cambridge, causing many of the clergy to 
think that the long-feared Anglican bishopric was finally upon 
them. 47 In Maine, two land companies, the Kennibeck and the Waldo heirs, 
the former composed largely of future patriots, the latter of future loyalists, 
squabbled for control of vast tracts of land. 48 Western Massachusetts, 
which staunchly supported a maximum war effort, began to develop a sense 
of regional consciousness and in 1762 tried unsuccessfully to obtain its own 
college. 49 These disputes tended to coincide with divisions between the 
prerogative faction and its opponents: once war ended, regional, religious, 
and economic differences between the two factions began to take political 
form. 
The conclusion of war also brought the problem of underemployment 
and overcrowding to the fore again. Massachusetts had developed something 
approaching a European standing army. Youths from overcrowded towns 
and lower class men enlisted year after year under the command of an officer 
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class consisting of the province's leading men. 50 Battle deaths had also 
helped to alleviate population pressure. But beginning in 1765, the first 
year since 1754 Massachusetts and its fellow colonies did not muster forces 
for battle, the situation drastically changed. A postwar decline in overseas 
trade and the catastrophic drought of 1763-4 let loose an unprecedented 
wave of rootless persons throughout the province. 51 Boston's Warning 
Out records (which do not indicate who was forced to leave town, but only 
listed entering migrants who would then not be eligible for public relief if 
they became destitute) show that migration increased astronomically at 
precisely this time. Beginning in 1745, the first year systematic records were 
kept, and for the following two decades of war, migration to Boston was 
primarily female and mostly from Massachusetts. But in 1765, not only did 
the number expand greatly, but the migrants were mostly male, many men 
with families, and came from both Massachusetts and overseas. Eighty per 
cent of all male migrants to Boston from 1745-1773 arrived between 1765 
and 1773. Total migration rose each decade: 458 households (1745-1755); 
925 (1755-1765); 2479 (1765-1773). 52 The presence of so many additional 
single men in Boston undoubtedly swelled the size and added to the vigour 
of the Boston mob. Once again, during the revolution itself, in eastern 
Massachusetts long term military service was largely confined to young 
men who did not have sufficient wealth to pay taxes or were still dependent 
on their fathers. 53 But during the decade of 1765-1775, many men had 
nowhere to go except into the revolutionary movement. 
The most notable political effect of the ending of the war was the swift 
demise of the prerogative faction. By 1766, its leading members were purged 
from the council seats some of them had held for decades. Its strength 
dwindled quickly from approximately half the house in 1765 to almost zero 
by 1768. Massachusetts would tolerate the leadership of a Thomas Hutchin-
son during wartime when administrative skills and capacity for hard work 
were of the utmost importance. Sacrifices in the interest of the common 
cause were tolerable, and even Hutchinson and his cohorts protested against 
such enormities as naval impressment and the quartering act. Once war 
ended, however, restrictions on Massachusetts' trade, tighter and possibly 
corrupt enforcement of customs regulations, and taxation by Britain rather 
than the province itself all appeared to undermine the prerogative's 
contention that Anglo-American interests were compatible. 
The faction which had dominated Massachusetts for a quarter-century 
was swept away with remarkable ease between 1761 and 1768 largely because 
it had a distorted conception both of itself and of Massachusetts politics. 
Although most of its leaders were initially Bostonians, they disliked town-
meeting politics and preferred to spend as little time in town as possible, 
moving to their suburban imitations of English country houses and socialising 
among themselves, instead of staying in contact with the common folk. 54 In 
consequence, they deluded themselves into thinking that they were entitled 
to hold office through noblesse oblige; they did not perceive it as a reward 
bestowed on them for their competent administration of the war in spite of 
their profiteering and aloofness. Once the war ended the sole basis of their 
support vanished. 
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The inability of the prerogative to put up a better fight can also be traced 
to the roots of its power. Believing that the correct role of the populace in 
government was passively to sanction the decisions of an administrative 
elite, they could not effectively use newspapers, harangue crowds, or cater 
to popular support through organisations such as the Boston Caucus. They 
had little experience in such matters, considered 'politics' as opposed to 
administration both a social evil and beneath their dignity, and were simply 
too set in their ways to adjust to a new world of politics as they approached 
in most cases the age of sixty. 55 
The prerogative's wartime strength was also translated into post-war 
weakness in another way. The opposition had been hampered throughout 
the war by weak or self-serving leaders; in the early 1760s, for example, 
Benjamin Pratt and John Tyng were respectively bought off with the Chief 
Justiceship of New York and an inferior court post in Middlesex County. 56 
As a result of the default or death of the old popular party's leaders, a new 
one arose to express general indignation. Composed primarily of much 
younger men without previous personal or familial ties to provincial politics, 
the new country faction drew its strength from journalistic skills, Boston 
machine politics, and the 'Boston mob'. It used extreme rhetoric which 
equated its enemies with the anti-Christ and predicted the total suppression 
of American liberty if the corrupt opposition were not totally destroyed. 
Coming from outside the legislature, the new politics had to employ more 
extreme means to resist British policy in Massachusetts than in other colonies 
simply because in no other province did the people have to be persuaded to 
purge the legislature of such a strong pro-British faction. 
One of the most potent arguments the revolutionaries advanced to resist 
British policy in Massachusetts was that it was both unfair and unnecessary 
because the province had indeed borne more than its share of the war. In 
Massachusetts requisitions had most certainly worked. For instance, when 
James Otis protested against the Stamp Act with his 'Rights of the British 
Colonies Asserted and Proved', he not only appealed to natural rights, but 
also to past experience: 57 
We have spent all we could raise, and more; for notwithstanding the 
parliamentary reimbursements of part, we still remain much in debt. 
The province of the Massachusetts I believe, has expended more men 
and money in war since the year 1620, when a few families first landed 
at Plymouth, in proportion to their ability, than the three Kingdoms 
together. The same, I believe, may be truly affirmed of many of the 
other colonies, though the Massachusetts has undoubtedly had the 
heaviest burden. 
Otis's argument was taken up by other colonials. In 1764 the New York 
assembly protested against British taxation because 'in many wars we have 
suffered an immense loss of both blood and treasure, to repel the foe, and 
maintain a valuable dependency on the British crown'. And when Benjamin 
Franklin appeared before the House of Commons in February 1766 to make 
his famous false distinction between the colonies' objection to internal taxes 
and their willingness to acquiesce in external, he was right on the mark when 
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he argued that 'the colonies raised, clothed, and paid, during the last war, 
near 25,000 men, and spent many millions'. 58 
Even leading Massachusetts Tories agreed with this analysis although not 
with the deduction that resistance and revolution were the only correct 
responses. Thomas Hutchinson argued forcefully though privately that the 
Stamp Act was unjust because the colonies had contributed more men to the 
'Great War for Empire' in proportion to their population than the mother 
country. Secondly, the colonies had defended themselves for the century 
before 1754 without much British assistance, and through their own 
exertions had increased the strength and prosperity of the empire. Third, 
whatever contribution the colonies had made as a whole, Massachusetts' 
efforts deserved special mention: 'No other government has been at any 
expense to set against this', with the result that during the war 'the public 
debt increased annually thirty or forty thousand pounds lawful money.' 
Finally, Canada was of no economic value to the colonies and would greatly 
depreciate existing colonial land values. 59 Loyalist Isaac Royall, a wealthy 
West India planter who had lived in Charlestown and Medford since 1737, 
similarly remonstrated with Lord Dartmouth in 1774 that 'this province Sir 
has always been foremost even beyond its ability and notwithstanding the 
present unhappy disputes would perhaps be so again if there should be the 
like occasion for it in promoting the Honour of their King and Nation. 
Witness their twice saving Nova Scotia from falling into French hands, the 
reduction of Louisbourg ... and many other expensive and heroic expedi-
tions against the common enemy'. 60 
Yet the loyalists also insisted that whatever the colonists' own exertions, 
British aid had still been necessary. Even if taxation were unfair or onerous, 
the indisputable fact remained that without Britain Canada could not 
have been taken. In his History of Massachusetts, Hutchinson argued the 
opposite position to that which he adopted in his letter on the Stamp Act. 
Without help, the colonies 'would have been extirpated by the French', and 
even at Louisbourg in 1745, the deciding factor was 'the superior naval 
power of Great Britain'. Hutchinson agreed with the patriots that the mother 
country had no altruistic motives for aiding the colonies-'fear of losing that 
advantageous trade' rather than 'paternal affections' was the true cause of 
intervention. But Britain had undeniably 'expended a far greater sum' 
rescuing the colonies during the final war 'than the whole property, real and 
personal, in all the colonies would amount to'. Therefore, 'in a moral view, 
a separation of the colonies which must still further enfeeble and distress 
the other parts of the empire, already enfeebled by exertions to save the 
colonies', was reprehensible. 61 Of course, the revolutionaries argued that 
Hutchinson and his fellow loyalists' real motive for defending British policy 
was that their own careers and pocketbooks had benefited greatly through 
their participation in the war, whereas many of their countrymen had lost 
sizeable portions of their estates or even their lives. 
A persuasive case can be made that serious popular resentment against 
British imperial policy-which had been loosely enforced during the age of 
'Salutary Neglect' between Queen Anne's and King George's Wars-
occurred because in two decades Massachusetts had launched a war effort 
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which to be effective required a major transformation of its political system. 
War greatly increased the role of government in Massachusetts society and 
transformed the nature of the General Court. Increased taxation, regulation 
of the economy in the form of food embargoes and requistion of needed 
supplies, and the drafting of perhaps a fifth of the male population into the 
army and navy characterised military policy in mid-eighteenth century 
Massachusetts. To manage King George's and the French and Indian Wars, 
the house's committee work involved a large majority rather than a small 
minority of representatives. War proved a centralising experience in that the 
legislature no longer spent most of its time reacting to petitions from the 
towns and inhabitants and then settling disputes. Beginning in the 1740s 
and 1750s, deputies from throughout the province, not just a few leading 
men from Boston and some of the larger towns, initiated and shaped 
government policy instead of merely voting on issues laid before them by 
the leadership. 
Perhaps even more importantly, as Lawrence Henry Gipson has noted, 
the American Revolution was an aftermath of the 'Great War for Empire'. 
Gipson stresses that Britain's effort to regulate the colonies originated in 
unsolved problems of the Anglo-American connection (frontier defence, 
trading with the enemy, effective inter-colonial coordination of forces) which 
seriously hampered the war effort. Had not Canada fallen to the British, 
the Americans would still have depended on the mother country for defence 
and could not have rebelled. 62 
But the revolution was also an aftermath of Massachusetts' war for 
empire. Since the 1740s, the dominant faction in the province, led by men 
such as Hutchinson and Oliver, had staked its fortunes on whole-hearted 
American cooperation with British war measures. Functioning as full-time 
civil servants for years on end, they continued to support submission to 
post-war impositions even when the military necessity which had compelled 
such docility in the past had vanished. Convinced that the population as 
a whole lacked the knowledge and competence to govern itself, the future 
loyalists lacked any understanding that the successful careers and cordial 
relationships they had enjoyed with British officials during the war were not 
typical. They were not insensitive; they sought to alleviate impressment 
and imperial taxation. But if Britain proved adamant, they always counselled 
forbearance rather than resistance. Estranged from their suffering country-
men, they emerged in the revolutionary decade as a government without a 
country. 
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British Government Spending and the North 




One of the more intractable problems facing historians of the pre-industrial 
economy relates to the balance of payments. There is the usual problem 
of the absence of suitable statistics. There is, for instance, an abundance of 
data about commodity trade especially with foreign states, which include 
imports and exports as well as re-exports. But data on the other element in 
a nation's current account-invisible trade-were not collected by govern-
ments in most cases until the twentieth century. As a result, historians have 
tended to confine themselves to comments about the balance of trade, and 
to ignore the more important question of the balance of payments. Moreover, 
as in so many aspects of economics, the theory of the balance of payments 
is presently subjected to much discussion and some dispute. In general it 
was (and perhaps still is) assumed that a positive balance of payments is 
good, and an endemic adverse balance is bad, for an economy. Yet a deficit 
in the balance of payments is not necessarily bad nor a surplus good for a 
state. A deficit is a form of borrowing which could be employed to enhance 
domestic savings to boost investment to the benefit of future growth. By 
contrast if the deficit is occasioned by an excess of aggregate demand, an 
economy could be said to be heading for trouble, if the practice became 
chronic. A knowledge of aggregate demand then becomes crucial, for it 
largely determines the levels of production and employment, and thus 
becomes the critical measure of the relative health of an economy at given 
intervals. To estimate aggregate demand for pre-industrial economies, 
where governments collected none of the necessary statistics, is an almost 
hopeless task for economic historians. Marginally less difficult are estimates 
of invisible trade. 
The economy of British North America in the generation before the War 
of Independence is a case in point. Useful statistics of merchandise trade, 
except for a five-year interval from 1768 to 1772, 1 exist only for commerce 
between the colonies and the mother country. In general they show a large 
commodity trade deficit, for most colonies in most years, in favour of 
Great Britain. The traditional but erroneous explanation of how such 
deficits were met was found in American commodity trade to the West 
Indies. 2 Thus it was argued, again wrongly, that there was little need for 
movements of bullion in the North Atlantic commerce, as there was, for 
instance, in the trade to Russia, India and the East generally. 
Adequate discussion of invisible trade, and hence the balance of payments 
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in colonial America, dates only from research begun fifteen years ago. Such 
research found that the colonial deficit was met partly by trading favourably 
elsewhere, especially in Europe south of Cape Finisterre, partly by the 
income from services to overseas customers, and partly by capital inflows 
into America. For 1768-1772, by way of example, the annual average 
deficit on commodity trade was first estimated at £1,331,000. With £610,000 
earned annually from shipping services, £400,000 from defence spending in 
America by Britain and £220,000 from other invisible earnings, all but 
£99,0003 of this huge annual deficit was accounted for. From an accountant's 
viewpoint this was more or less a balanced budget. 
It will surprise no one, least of all the authors of this original research, 
that each of these figures needs correcting. Such is the fate of all worthy 
pioneering works! It is one of the certain indications of the importance 
of their work that it should have stimulated new attempts to analyse the 
colonial economy of the eighteenth century. Much of the revisionary work 
has been undertaken by Dr Price of the University of Michigan. It was he 
who first made available to historians the data for Scotland's trade with 
America. 4 When that is added to the trade of England and Wales, the 
American deficit was reduced for the years 1768-1772 by 14 per cent, or 
£189,000 annually. For certain colonies, such as the tobacco colonies of the 
Chesapeake, his Scottish data turned what had been regarded as colonial 
deficits into trade balances favouring the colonies. 5 More recently his 
analysis of the sale of American-built ships in Britain has added (at the very 
least) £40,000 annually to Shepherd's and Walton's estimates of invisible 
earnings by Americans. 6 
lI 
The first main purpose of this contribution is to refine the earlier estimates 
of defence spending by Britain in America. British spending in the colonies 
by the government, though largely for defence, was not confined to the army 
and navy and the Board of Ordinance. Estimates contained here include as 
well expenditures for Indian services, and payments administered by certain 
colonial governors and agents for such important frontier colonies as Nova 
Scotia and Georgia, Quebec (from 1760), and the Floridas, West and East 
after 1763. It also takes note of reimbursement by Parliament of certain 
colonial wartime expenditures, and finally some small payments made from 
the King's privy purse. 
The sources for this more refined data are available mostly in the Public 
Record Office at Kew. They include the audited accounts of the army and 
Board of Ordnance in Audit Office papers, and for the navy the Navy Board 
and Victualling Board bill books in the Admiralty Papers, as well as the 
in-letters of the Navy Board. In addition the papers of the Treasury Board 
were studied for this thirty-six year interval. Two important printed sources 
were also employed, the appropriate volumes of the Journals of the House of 
Commons, and a parliamentary session paper for 1868-69, Vol XXXV, 
which summarised year by year, public expenditure for the eighteenth 
century. All information relating to spending in America was recorded and 
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arranged annually under general headings: army, navy, ordnance, colonial 
administration, parliamentary reimbursements, privy purse. It was not found 
possible to distinguish precisely where the expenditure took place. This was 
especially the case for army expenditures, the largest single category. Clearly 
though, the bulk must have occurred in New York, the headquarters of the 
British Army in America from 1755 onwards, and on whose frontiers so 
much of the fighting occurred and where the bulk of the troops were stationed. 
Finally the data were totalled and arranged in intervals of war and peace: 
I 740-8, 1749-55, 1756-63, 1764-75. 
The period 1740-8 was one of war with Spain and (after 1744) France. As 
far as the American colonies were concerned the years until 1744 were 
characterised by rather low levels of British governmental expenditure. 
Thereafter, especially as a result of the successful siege of Louisbourg and 
the establishment of a North American naval squadron in 1745, spending 
rose rapidly to heights never before attained in North America. With the 
decision in 1745 to garrison Louisbourg with regular British regiments 
brought from Gibraltar, together with the preparations throughout 1746 
for an invasion of Canada, a project not abandoned until 1747, governmental 
spending remained at a high level until hostilities ended. 
Though the years 1749-55 were ostensibly ones of peace, British public 
spending in America continued well above pre-1740 levels. This arose 
partly from the decision to compensate the colonies for their 1745-7 wartime 
expenditures, and partly from the decision to garrison Nova Scotia, after 
Louisbourg was restored to the French. The cost of maintaining regulars 
in Nova Scotia together with the expenditures incurred in building the 
new town of Halifax ensured that costs would rise when compared with 
the period 1740-8. 
The return of war between 1756 and 1763 necessitated outlays in America 
on a scale that dwarfed the war effort between 1744 and 1748. They represen-
ted the greatest imperial expenditure at any time before the War of 
Independence. With unprecedentedly large bodies of troops stationed in 
America and large squadrons of warships, demands for funds from Parlia-
ment seemed endless. The policy of reimbursing colonies for at least a 
significant part of their own costs also added to the overall expenditure. 
The peak was reached in 1759-1760. Yet even afterwards, owing to the need 
to maintain an army of occupation in Canada, and on the western frontier, 
spending levels remained higher than had been experienced before 1755. 
The years 1764-75 were ones generally of retrenchment, at first somewhat 
delayed by the need to contain the Indian threat led by Pontiac, and later 
by the decision to maintain a standing army in America, not on the frontier 
but in the cities and against the Americans. There was an abrupt reversal 
of policy from rebates to the colonies out of taxes collected by Parliament 
in Britain to a demand that part of the cost of this standing army in America 
be borne by the colonists themselves. Average spending in this period was 
swollen by the build-up of forces in Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775. In all, 
this kept spending levels substantially above those of the earlier periods 
1740-48 and 1749-55. The details for the entire period 1740-1775 are 
summarised below in Table I. 
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TABLE I 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN AMERICA, 1740-75 
(OOO's of £s) 
Totals % 
1740-48 1749-55 1756-63 1764-75 1740-75 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Army 756 660 5,489 3,369 10,274 63.5 
Navy 274 220 966 672 2,132 13.2 
Parliamentary 
Reimbursements 467 1,078 1,545 9.5 
Colonial 
Administration 210 316 261 391 1,178 7.3 
Ordnance Board 82 182 160 552 976 6.0 
Privy Purse 9 31 30 18 88 0.5 
Totals 1,331 1,876 7,984 5,002 16,193 100.0 
Yearly Averages 148 268 998 417 450 
% of Total 8.2 11.6 49.3 30.9 100.0 
What can be learned from these figures? The importance of spending on 
the Seven Years' War is clear. Almost half the total spending for the thirty-
six years of this study occurred during that brief period 1756-3. Annual 
expenditure reached an average of almost £1 million, when the overall 
1740-75 average was only £450,000. Wartime spending between 1756 and 
1763 was almost six times as large as spending during the earlier war of the 
Austrian Succession 1740-8. Furthermore, while annual spending for 
1764-75 dropped to about 40 per cent of the annual wartime totals, never-
theless it continued at a level almost 65 per cent higher than for the pre-war 
years of 1749 to 1755. 7 Thus the change of British policy in America, if the 
serious spending of money by Parliament is a reasonable guide, can be said 
to date not from 1756-63, as is traditionally recorded, but from 1745-6 with 
the Louisbourg expedition and the planned invasion of Canada. From that 
moment onwards spending levels acquired an altogether new momentum, 
from which the British government did not free itself for the rest of the 
eighteenth century, even after 1783, owing to the need to defend Canada. 
Moreover, the data show that it was the expense of the army, with its 
ancillary arms of the artillery and engineers under the Board of Ordnance, 
which constituted the bulk of the cost, a shade under 70 per cent, or more 
than five times the expenditure on the navy in America. Of the £ 1.2 million 
spent in America for colonial administration, the bulk went on Nova Scotia, 
some £618,000, or about 53 per cent. By contrast Georgia received about 
£252,000 and Quebec £125,000, or about 21 and 11 per cent respectively 
of that item of expenditure. A great deal of the Nova Scotia expenditure was 
for goods and services supplied by New Englanders, chiefly from Massa-
chusetts, and those of Georgia by South Carolina merchants. 
Though there have been estimates of defence spending made by other 
historians, perhaps the most interesting by John Shy, 8 it is naval spending 
that most confused earlier attempts to come to some sort of reasonable 
conclusion. It might therefore be useful to provide a few more details 
concerning naval spending in America. The first thing to notice is that the 
total naval expenditure in America were but a relatively small fraction of 
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the estimated total cost of maintaining the navy in American waters. 9 The 
cost of shipbuilding was a benefit to English shipbuilders, while Americans 
were given the crumbs when ships on the North American station needed 
repairs. The pay of seamen was largely effected in England and was thus of 
no benefit to Americans. Usually the first six months' victuals were taken 
on board warships leaving England for America. It was only after these 
rations needed replenishing that American suppliers were called upon. Still 
the principal expenditures by the navy in America were for provisions, 
administered by the Victualling Board under the Navy Board by contract 
with suppliers in various specified American ports, and for repairs to naval 
vessels, administered by the Navy Board, and carried out at the request of 
naval captains on the spot and without benefit of fixed price contracts. Of 
less significance were the annual expenditures for sick and wounded seamen, 
who recuperated ashore, or for Americans who acted as pilots on entering 
and leaving American ports, in the St Lawrence river and along the entire 
American coast. Other significant expenditures in America focused from 
1759 on the building of a naval base at Halifax, and on the hiring of transport 
vessels from American owners to move both troops as well as their equipment 
and provisions. In addition the Navy Board ordered yearly payments to 
American suppliers of naval stores, either shipped directly to England or to 
the West Indies squadron, based at Jamaica or Antigua. Such stores included 
masts and bowsprits, pitch, tar and turpentine, and, increasingly from 
mid-century, American iron. The Admiralty also paid bounties to American 
captors either of enemy warships or privateers, based on the complement 
of the captured enemy vessel. In this way American privateers, especially 
from New York, earned occasional sums, quite independent of prize money. 
Details are found in Table n below. 
TABLE 11 
BRITISH NAVAL SPENDING IN AMERICA, 1740--1775. 
Totals 
1740-48 1749-55 1756---63 1764-75 1740-74 % 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Navy Board 162,150 139,169 627,110 421,266 349,665 63.3 
Victualling Board 112,032 80,967 339,093 250,569 782,661 36.7 
Totals 274,182 220,136 996,203 671,835 2,132,356 100.0 
Yearly Average 30,465 31,448 124,525 55,986 59,232 
A word of explanation is perhaps needed for seamen's pay. For the purpose 
of these estimates it has been assumed that the few seamen, privileged with 
shore leave while serving off North America, managed to steal as much as 
they spent from the minute sums they were allowed before their ships were 
paid off in England. 10 In this way the economic impact on America of naval 
pay was neutral. This is in marked contrast to soldiers and sappers, whose 
pay was given them more or less regularly in America and who disposed of 
it locally to the great benefit of the colonists. Naval officers, by cash or 
through credit, obviously spent some of their income ashore in America. 
It has been assumed here that, as with puhlic servants everywhere, they 
charged most of their expenses to their government, which left their private 
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spending at such a low level that it can safely be ignored. If a guess was 
required, an additional amount of perhaps £2,500 a year ( or £90,000 for the 
entire thirty-six year interval) might be added, a sum which would add about 
4 per cent to overall naval expenditure in America. 
Another little considered but important aspect of American invisible 
earnings were the reimbursements to the colonies for part of their military 
costs, rebated to them by Parliament, as so-called 'free gifts'. In 1749-1750 
Parliament voted some £467,000 to compensate the colonies for their costs 
relating to the defence of Nova Scotia in 1744, when Annapolis Royal was 
under attack, the attack and garrisoning of Louisbourg in 1745-1746, and 
the planned, but abortive, assault on Canada in 1746-7. Details of these and 
later grants are noted in Table III below. 
TABLE III 
GROSS PARLIAMENTARY REIMBURSEMENTS TO THE COLONIES, 1749-1763. 
£ £ 
1749 237,749 1759 200,000 
1750 231,296 1760 200,000 
1756 120,000 1761 200,000 
1757 50,000 1762 133,333 
1758 41,118 1763 133,134 
Total: £1,544,830 
Sources: P.R.O. A0l/67/86, 73/96, 74/97, 75/98, 458/1; Tl/408, 415, 423, T64/44; 
Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 21 Geo II c. 23, xxi; 23 Geo II c. 21, xvii; 
29 Geo II c. 29, xiii; 30 Geo II c. 26, xiv; 31 Geo II c. 29, xv; 32 Geo II c. 36, 
xv; 33 Geo II c. 18, xvii; 1 Geo III c. 19, xvii; 2 Geo III c. 34, xv; 3 Geo III 
c. 17, xv. 
The first point to note is that these are gross figures, and thus somewhat 
overstate the amounts actually sent to colonial treasurers. It is known, for 
instance, that of the £183,649 granted to Massachusetts in 1749, some £179,260 
or 97.6 per cent of the gross sum actually reached the province, the balance 
going in fees and commissions. 11 Again, of the £120,000 voted by Parliament 
in 1756 for the colonies, about £114,659, or 95.5 per cent actually reached 
the shores of America. 12 If these figures are an accurate guide then perhaps 
it can he assumed that not less than 2.5 per cent of the gross grants made by 
Parliament remained in the hands of English agents and officials, and Royal 
Navy officers by way of fees, commissions and freight money, for a total of 
£38,621, thus reducing the reimbursements to £1,506,209 net. The lion's 
share naturally went to those provinces most deeply involved in the war 
efforts. Massachusetts received over £624,000 gross, with Connecticut and 
New York trailing far behind both with less than £250,000 each. The least 
active, of course, were the southern colonies, far removed from the principal 
theatres of war. It might also be suggested that later complaints in the 1760s 
over Parliament's attempts to tax Americans directly to support the cost of 
maintaining a squadron off the continent and an army ashore were in direct 
proportion to the degree of largesse they had enjoyed from that same 
Parliament for precisely the same purpose. Such a drastic change in policy 
between 1764 and the year earlier, carried out without consultation with the 
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colonial assemblies, could only have been pursued by ministers insensitive 
to American experiences. 
It remains to be seen how British spending in America was conducted. 
There were two principal methods: by drawing bills of exchange on various 
government offices in England, and by shipping specie to America. As to the 
first method, a number of colonial governors regularly drew sterling bills to 
meet local government needs. Such, for instance, was the case of Georgia 
throughout its colonial history, where there is no evidence that any specie 
shipments were ever officially forwarded. The same practice was followed 
when Louisbourg was occupied between 1745 and 1749, though part of the 
demand for specie was offset by the ready availability in 1745 of Spanish 
dollars seized from prize vessels condemned there. Later, when the govern-
ment of Nova Scotia established itself at Halifax, expenditure was carried 
on in large measure by drawing sterling bills, though again some specie 
circulated-indeed the first governor brought out a small quantity with him. 
All the colonies involved in the abortive Canada expedition in 1746-7 paid 
for their costs by drawing such sterling bills. Later, after the conquest of 
Canada in 1759-1760 and the session of the Floridas in 1763, the practice 
spread as by far the more convenient and secure method of making inter-
national payments. All the commanders-in-chief in America, from Braddock 
in 1754 to Gage in 1775, adopted this practice, which incidentally both 
ordnance and Royal Naval officers in America had traditionally followed. 
Whatever the office named in the bill of exchange, whether the Paymaster 
General, the Navy Board, the Victualling Board, the Transport Board, the 
Sick and Hurt Board, the Board of Ordnance, ultimately all bills drawn in 
America had either to be accepted or rejected (for lack of adequate vouchers) 
by the Treasury Board, and balances struck, all of which accounts were then 
eventually approved by the officers of the Audit Office. 
The proportion of British spending in America met by shipping specie to 
the colonies is somewhat difficult to determine. In general, contractors to 
the Treasury for the supply of pay, subsistence or victuals in America were 
reluctant to send coin across the Atlantic, even when they were able to 
charge their costs of freight, handling and insurance to the government. 
Normally, through their agents in America, they drew bills which were sold 
to American merchants or British officers in America either for cash or for 
goods or services rendered. From time to time, when the specie situation 
became difficult in America, whether at Quebec or Montreal, Louisbourg or 
Halifax, Boston, New York or Albany, early notice was given and shipments 
were dispatched from England carrying Spanish milled silver and Portuguese 
(Brazilian) gold coin. Such shipments amounting to at least £1,885,426 or 
£52,373 for each of the thirty-six years under analysis here, can be verified. 
This amounted to roughly 12 per cent of overall British spending in America. 
The bulk of such payments occurred during the Seven Years' War, though 
the first significant shipment of this kind had been made in 1749, when 
Massachusetts received more than £179,000 in specie by way of parliamentary 
rebate for the cost of taking and garrisoning Louisb9urg. It ended, as far as 
this study is concerned, with the rapid build-up of troops in the colonies late 
in 1775, and by the shipment of large additional amounts of specie to meet 
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the requirements of army pay and subsistence. 1775 was in many ways, from 
the administrator's and contractor's view, a repetition of 1755, except this 
time it was unclear how eager the merchant communities of the port towns 
would be to feed at the trough provided by tb.e Treasury Board, as it carried 
out the orders of Parliament. It quickly transpired, of course, that at all 
times American and Canadian merchants were eager to do business with the 
Crown's agents, who together represented the most considerable merchant 
banking business on the continent. 
III 
The data on overall British government spending in America could be 
analysed at much greater length, but their more important significance will 
be illustrated rather when that expenditure is related to the overall current 
account of the American colonies. The £16.2 million spent between 1740 
and 1775 by Britain to administer and defend her colonies went a very long 
way to balance the continent's deficit in commodity trade with the mother 
country. In a word, much of the government's spending in America was 
employed to pay for imports from Britain. The aggregate adverse balance of 
trade is detailed in Table IV below. Data is arranged as in Table I, in the 
same intervals of war and peace. The total deficit, amounting to more than 
£20 million, developed principally from 1756 onwards. Of this huge sum 
fully 89 per cent was generated by the Thirteen Colonies, about 5 per cent by 
Nova Scotia and 3.5 per cent by Quebec. Historians are generally wary of 
these official values for trade; and it is my considered opinion that in general 
they seriously underestimate the value of American goods imported into 
Britain. Nevertheless they remain the best available data. 13 If they bear any 
relation to the flow of commodity trade, then the Thirteen Colonies per 
TABLE IV 
ADVERSE BALANCE OF AMERICAN COMMODITY TRADE WITH BRITAIN, 1740-1775. 
(Official values in OOO's of £s) 
Totals 
1740-48 1749-55 1756-63 1764-75 1740-75 
£ £ £ £ £ 
The Thirteen 665 2,085 7,287 7,709 17,746 
Quebec 120 580 700 
Nova Scotia 9 145 462 378 994 
Newfoundland (45) 58 46 341 400 
Florida 10 324 334 
Hudson Bay (64) (33) (71) (51) (219) 
Total 565 2,255 7,854 9,281 19,955 
Yearly Average 63 322 982 773 554 
% 2.8 11.3 39.4 46.5 100.0 
Sources: C.R. Mowat, East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1943), 153. BT/185, fol. 106-117v.; House of Lords R.O., Main 
Series, 20 Nov. 1775; Jacob M. Price, 'New Time Series for Scotland's and 
Britain's Trade with the Thirteen Colonies and States, 1740 to 1791', William 
and Mary Quarterly, XXXII (1975), 322-5. Quebec estimates prepared from 
Customs 16/1 (1768-72) by Paul Mccann, University of Ottawa. 
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capita had a far lower trade deficit than had Quebec, Nova Scotia or 
Newfoundland. 
However, of far more importance than any prolonged discussion of the 
distribution of that deficit, is the relation it bears to the overall balance of 
payments. So let us now compare these net deficits in the colonial trade with 
Britain (an economic outflow) with net spending by Britain in America to 
administer and defend the empire (an inflow of invisibles). The comparative 
data, in simplified form, is presented in Table V. From the Table it is clear, 
TABLE V 
BRITISH SPENDING IN AMERICA AS A PORTION OF AMERICAN TRADE DEFICIT WITH BRITAIN, 
1740--1775. 
(in OOO's of £s; trade figures in official values) 
Inflow Outftow Balance 
1. Spending 2. (Deficit) 1-2. Surplus (Deficit) 
Total Yearly Total Yearly Total Yearly 
Average Average Average 
£ £ £ £ £ £ 
1740-48 1,331 148 (565) (63) 766 85 
1749-55 1,876 268 (2,255) (322) (379) (54) 
1756-63 7,984 998 (7,854) (982) (130) (16) 
1764-75 5,002 417 (9,281) (773) (4,279) (357) 
Totals 16,193 450 (19,955) (554) (3,762) (105) 
if the trade figures have any approximate relationship to the real value of 
the goods in transit, 13 that at least until 1763, except for the period 1748-55, 
inflows into the North American economy of British government funds to 
pay for defence and administration more than made up the deficit of American 
colonial trade with the mother country. Between 1740 and 1763 overall 
British spending in America was an estimated £11,191,000 while the estimated 
deficit in American trade with Britain was £10,674,000 for a surplus of 
£517,000, or about £22,000 annually. 
The shift in the North American balance came with the restoration of 
peace after 1764, when a relatively sluggish export trade from America was 
overtaken by a high aggregate demand for imports from Britain. Thus it was 
in the dozen years before the outbreak of the War of Independence that 
British government expenditures in America, for the first time, failed to act 
as the crucial element in reducing America's historic trade deficit with 
Britain. Though North American imports continued to outstrip exports to 
Britain, the annual gap between 1764 and 1775 was actually lower than it had 
been during the Seven Years' War: £773,000 compared with £982,000. At the 
same time British spending after 1764, though at £417,000 yearly still far 
above the pre-1756 annual level of £268,000, fell by 42 per cent below the war 
years, 1756-63. For the period 1764-75 this meant that, though more than 
£5 millions were spent in America, the trade deficit still surpassed this huge 
amount by £4,279,000, or £375,000 annually. Such a figure, though large in 
comparison with earlier years, was hardly ruinous, and when calculated on 
a per capita basis, in view of the greatly enlarged colonial population by the 
1770s, was actually rather small. Moreover, it is clear from the research of 
Shepherd, Walton and Price, among others, that on the whole the North 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND THE COLONIES 83 
American colonies, as a result of their commodity trade to southern Europe 
and their invisible earnings in the West Indies, probably experienced with 
great regularity in the 1760s and 1770s a generally favourable balance of 
payments. Thus the trade deficit with Britain, however important, was no 
longer crucial to overall economic growth in the colonies. 
In all of this the role of British government spending in America, a matter 
largely misunderstood and inaccurately estimated, became an important 
element. It was more than a temporary windfall, more than a passing economic 
feature, but, from 1740 until 1763 a decisive factor in maintaining a balance 
of payments favourable to the colonies. Thereafter during the 1760s and 
1770s in the context of a rapidly maturing colonial economy, the importance 
of British government spending as an aspect of American invisible trade 
declined both absolutely and relatively. Yet its diminished role in no way 
weakened that economy, as merchants redirected their products to alternative 
markets, with assets greatly expanded by the Seven Years' War, and with a 
confidence given clear expression in the numerous enlarged new houses that 
they built themselves in the growing colonial cities. 14 This underscores 
perhaps the general success, despite political uncertainty, which North 
American merchants experienced in international commerce in the dozen 
years before the outbreak of the American War of Independence. 
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The Seven Years' War and the American 
Revolution: The Causal Relationship 
Reconsidered 
by 
Jack P. Greene 
I 
That there was a causal connection between the Seven Years' War and the 
American Revolution has been so widely assumed as to become a scholarly 
orthodoxy. The close temporal relationship between the formal conclusion 
of the war in 1763 and the Stamp Act crisis in 1764-6, the first dramatic 
episode in the chain of events that would, a decade later, lead to separation, 
immediately raises the question of whether either the experience or the 
outcome of the war affected the events of the mid-l 760s and beyond. For 
purposes of analysis, this question must be broken down into two parts. 
First, in what ways did the war contribute to those metropolitan actions that 
touched off the conflict? Second, how did the war affect the colonial response 
to those actions? Much scholarly energy has been devoted to both of these 
questions, albeit much of that energy has been animated by a desire to fix 
responsibility for inaugurating the dispute on one side of the Atlantic or the 
other. But no one has yet produced the comprehensive, systematic, and 
dispassionate analysis necessary to enable us to specify fully and persuasively 
the precise causal relationship between the Seven Years' War and the 
American RevoJution. 1 What follows is a brief and preliminary effort 
towards that objective. 
11 
Perhaps the single most important result of the war in terms of the metro -
politan-colonial relationship was the vivid enhancement of awareness on 
both sides of the Atlantic of the crucial significance of the colonies to Britain 
both economically and strategically. Such an awareness was scarcely new 
and had indeed been powerfully manifest in the heightened concern with 
the colonies exhibited by metropolitan officials after 1748. 2 But the decision 
to undertake a major national effort to protect British interests in America 
and the long and expensive war that followed inevitably contributed to 
inteasify both metropolitan and colonial sensitivities to the importance of 
America for Britain. Thereafter, no one who was 'the least acquainted' with 
either the colonies 'or the concerns of the nation in them' could possibly 
doubt that they 'must absolutely be of the utmost conciquence to the defence, 
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wellfare & hapiness of These Kindoms'. 'To be convinced of their importance 
at first sight', one had only to look at the 'sum total of the yearly produce 
of our plantations'. That sum, 'upon a moderate computation', amounted 
to between five and six million pounds sterling per annum, in addition to 
which the colonists employed between forty and fifty thousand seamen and 
nearly two thousand ships each year. To be sure, the colonial trade amounted 
to no more than 'one third Part' of Britain's foreign commerce, but the mere 
fact that all other branches of foreign trade could be obstructed while the 
colonial trade 'must still continue soley our Own' made it 'of greater 
advantage to us than all other Foreign Trades we are in possession of'. 3 
The truth of this proposition seemed to be evident in both the growing 
wealth and international status of Britain and the obvious envy of its colonial 
possessions by its European rivals. 'Every body knows', said the New York 
lawyer William Smith, Jr., after the war, that the population, wealth, and 
power of Britain had been 'vastly inhanced since the Discovery of the New 
World'. Simple comparisons 'of the number and force of our present fleets, 
with our fleet in Queen Elizabeth's time before we had colonies', of 'the 
antient with the present state of our towns and ports on our western coast, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Kendal, Lancaster, Glasgow, and the countries round 
them, that trade with and manufacture for our colonies, not to mention 
Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield and Birmingham', or of the difference 'in the 
numbers of people, buildings, rents and the value of land' within living 
memory, wrote Benjamin Franklin, were sufficient to indicate that to a very 
significant degree it had been the colonies that had made 'this nation both 
prosperous at home, and considerable abroad'. To what else other than its 
colonies could be attributed Britain's extraordinary rise from 'the third or 
fourth Place in the Scale of European Powers' to 'a Level with the most 
Mighty in Europe'? Why else would Britain's 'most daingerous Rivalls in 
Trade, and most implacable Enemies the French' make 'every effort in their 
power to wrest this inestimable Fountain of wealth & strength out of our 
hands'?4 
More and more during the war, commentators asserted that the American 
colonies had obviously 'become a great source of that wealth, by which this 
nation maintains itself, and is respected by others'. If they were indeed 'the 
great support, not only of the trade and commerce, but even of the safety 
and defence of Britain itself', then it followed that without them 'the people 
in Britain would make but a poor figure, if they could even subsist as an 
independent nation'. 'Every body is agreed', said one observer, that 'our 
existence as a ... commercial and independent Nation' as well as 'a free and 
happy people' depended upon America: 'by trade we do, and must, if at all, 
subsist; without it we can have no wealth; and without wealth we can have 
no power; as without power we can have no liberty'. The chain of logic was 
inexorable: trade was the very essence of both British greatness and British 
liberty, and the great extent to which that trade depended upon 'our dominions 
in America' necessarily meant that for Britain America was 'an object of 
such magnitude as' could never 'be forgot[ten] or neglected'. 5 
If the war stimulated the emergence of a heightened realisation of the 
'Infinite Advantage our American Collonys are of to these Kingdoms', it 
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also focused attention more directly than ever before upon a welter of 
problems that seemed to point to both the structural weakness of the empire 
and the fragility of metropolitan authority in the colonies. As Josiah Tucker 
had predicted at the very beginning of hostililities, the war turned out to be 
a rich 'Harvest for Complaints'. 6 Foremost among the problems revealed by 
the war was the difficulty of mobilising the military potential of the colonies. 
At best, the system of royal requisitions to individual colonies that was used 
throughout the war to supplement the men and supplies sent from Britain in 
ever larger numbers beginning in 1756 seemed to yield but spotty returns. 
Many colonies voted less than requested or encumbered appropriations 
with annoying restrictions, while a few failed to give any assistance at all 
and even refused quarters to metropolitan troops. To British commanders 
in the colonies, such behaviour was extraordinarily vexatious, and in their 
strident reports to London authorities they made few distinctions between 
those colonies that had and those that had not cooperated with them. 
'The delays we meet with, in carrying on the Service, from every parts of 
this Country, are immense', the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Loudoun, 
complained to his superior, Cumberland, in August 1756. 'In Place of 
Aid to the Service every impediment, that it is possible to invent', he wrote 
to Halifax, head of the Board of Trade, a few months later, 'is thrown in the 
Way'. Colonial legislators 'assumed to themselves, what they call Rights 
and Priviledges, totaly unknown in the Mother Country ... for no purpose', 
it seemed to Loudoun, 'but to screen them, from giving any Aid, of any 
sort, for carrying on, the Service, and refusing us Quarters'. Reports of 
such self-interested behaviour reached London with sufficient frequency 
as to become commonplace even outside official government circles. 7 
The great extent to which colonial legislators had already managed to 
undermine metropolitan authority by their assumption of such extravagant 
rights and privileges was a second and, from a long-range point of view, 
potentially even more worrying problem underscored for London authorities 
by the experience of the war. It was a rare governor who, like Charles 
Pinfold of Barbados, could at any time during the war write home that 
'Every thing proposed to me in England has been carried into Execution 
and with an Unanimity that exceeded the Example of former times'. Indeed, 
the common report was precisely the opposite. 'At present I have His 
Majesties Commission and Instructions for my Government, and direction, 
in all public Concerns', lamented Benning Wentworth from New Hampshire, 
'but from the incroachments Made by the Assembly, both are in a manner 
Rendered useless'. 'Such is the defective State of the Governments', echoed 
Thomas Pownall of Massachusetts, 'that there can not on the Continent 
be produced an instance of the Governors being able to carry his Majesty's 
Instructions into Execution where the People have disputed them'. Even 
in the new and more closely supervised colonies of Georgia and Nova 
Scotia, the legislatures were 'industriously attempting to usurp the same 
power[s]' as those already exercised with such 'great Licence' by their 
counterparts in the older colonies. Everywhere in the colonies, the 'leading 
People' appeared to raise disputes with metropolitan representatives merely 
'to have a merit with the others, by defending their Liberties, as they call 
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them'. So long had the colonists thus been 'suffered to riot in privileges' 
that royal governors had become little more than 'Cyphers', 'Pompous 
Titled Nothing[s]' of very little use "to those who employ[ed]" them, while 
metropolitan authority had obviously been by far 'already too much 
weakened'. 8 
The same conclusion could be drawn from mounting evidence of colonial 
disregard for metropolitan economic regulations. For several decades prior 
to the war, complaints had filtered into London of a growing 'illicit trade 
which all the colonies have run more or less into.' In New York and New 
England and particularly in Rhode Island, it was charged, there was 'scarce 
a man in all that country who' was 'not concerned in the smuggling trade' 
in Dutch, French, and French Caribbean goods, a trade, moreover, that 
had long since been 'sanctified with the name of naturalising foreign goods'. 
What had seemed so patently 'destructive of the national interests~ of Britain 
in peacetime came to appear totally pernicious-and self-serving-during 
the war, which brought a marked increase in reports of colonial violations 
of the navigation acts. Military and naval commanders, royal governors, 
metropolitan customs officials: all described a brisk trade throughout the 
war not only with the neutral Dutch but with the enemy French in the West 
Indies, either indirectly by way of neutral ports or directly under the guise 
of flags of truce to exchange prisoners of war. The result was that the French 
islands were 'provided with a Sufficient Stock of provisions' and everything 
else they needed 'in spite of all the Regulations'. Metropolitan efforts to 
curtail this trade were largely ineffective, and at the end of the war, one 
customs official estimated that smuggled molasses from the French West 
Indies into the northern colonies had increased 500 per cent during the war, 
while another observer asserted that nearly 90 per cent of the tea consumed 
in the colonies was being smuggled from the Netherlands. In the face of 
such reports few in Britain could any longer doubt by 1763 that 'a spirit 
of Illicit trade' prevailed 'more or less throughout the Continent[al]' colonies, 
in America and that there was 'almost a universal desire in the People [there] 
to carry on a trade with foreigners not only in America but in Europe'. 9 
But these were only the most flagrant examples by which the colonists 
acted 'wholly in conformity to their own selfish or rapacious views', and 
obstinately refused to do what was 'necessary for the good of the whole' 
during the war. Unscrupulous traders and land developers cheated Indians 
in utter disregard for either fairness or the safety of the older settlements 
and thus created a highly unfavourable disposition among the Indians to 
the 'British Interest'. Colonial assemblies used metropolitan needs for 
military assistance to extract still further privileges from Crown officials and, 
in many cases, financed their war contributions by issuing massive amounts 
of paper currency, at least some of which was so inadequately secured as 
to depreciate rapidly and thereby to exacerbate fears among metropolitan 
mercantile interests that the colonists would seek to pay their debts in 
depreciated currency. In one area after another during the war, the colonists 
thus behaved in ways that seemed to make it perfectly obvious that they 
had but slight regard for either the interests or the authority of the 
metropolis. 10 
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At least since the beginning of the century, metropolitan officials and 
traders had exhibited what seemed to Americans an 'unnatural Suspicion' 
that the colonies would 'one Time or other' rebel and throw 'off their 
dependence on Britain'. Increasingly evident in the decade just prior to 
the war, such fears, Americans insisted, were both 'groundless and chimeri-
cal'. But colonial behaviour during the war with its many manifestations of 
a 'general disposition to independence' only seemed to belie their protesta-
tions and to provide growing evidence that they would seek 'a Dissolution' 
of the empire at the earliest opportunity. 11 Not just the experience but the 
result of the war operated to heighten metropolitan fears of colonial 
independence. For it had been frequently argued by students of colonial 
affairs both before and during the war that only 'their apprehensions of the 
French' and their dependence upon Britain for protection kept the colonists 
'in awe' and prevented their 'connection ... with their mother country 
from being quite broken off'. To 'drive the French out of all N. America', 
Josiah Tucker had declared in 1755, 'would be the most fatal Step We 
could take'. By eliminating the one certain 'guarantee for the[ir] good 
behaviour' towards and 'dependence on their mother country', such a move, 
it was widely suggested, would both further 'their love of independence' 
and place 'them [entirely] above controul' by Britain, which they would 
subsequently ignore, rival, and perhaps even destroy. 12 
Fear of such an eventuality was obviously not deep enough to cause 
metropolitan officials to return Canada to the French at the conclusion of 
the war, though many later observers from John Lind in 1775 until Lawrence 
H. Gipson in the twentieth century have argued that it was precisely the 
'great change ... in the strength and situation of the colonies' brought about 
by the removal of the French from North America in 1763 that was primarily 
responsible for the American decision for independence thirteen years 
later. 13 Whether, given the rising awareness of the strategic and economic 
importance of the colonies to Britain, the many predictions of colonial 
independence actually filled metropolitan officials 'with Terror,' as William 
Smith, Jr., charged, the evidence, piled up during the war, that both stimulated 
and sustained such predictions, certainly contributed to further the disposi-
tion, already 'pretty general in the nation' prior to the war, 'to enquire 
into the affairs of the plantations' and to make sure that 'at a proper 
oppertunity'-that is, at the conclusion of hostilities-'the settlement of 
America', that 'greatest and most necessary of all schemes', would become 
a serious 'Object ... of Attention' in London. 14 
Nor was the 'settlement of America' perceived only or even primarily in 
terms of solving the immediate problems arising out of the need to secure, 
organise, and administer the new territories; to finance the large American 
military establishment; and to begin to pay off the vast debt accumulated by 
Britain during the war, as historians have been wont to emphasise. 15 Of 
far 'more fundamental importance' was metropolitan dissatisfaction with 
the state of British authority in the colonies. For the war had removed all 
doubt that in America, 'a Country long neglected' by the metropolis, 'many 
Disorders' had 'crept in, in some Instances dangerous and detrimental to 
the Colonies, and their British Creditors, ... derogative of the just Rights, 
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and many Prerogatives of the Crown', and totally subversive of that 
'dependance which the Colonies ought to be kept in to the Government of 
the Mother Country'. In both the internal civil and external commercial 
spheres, the Board of Trade repeatedly asserted during and after the war in 
reiterating, with growing conviction, a conclusion it had already reached 
over the previous decade, that the authority of Britain 'and the Sovereignty 
of the Crown' stood 'upon a very precarious foot' and was 'in great Danger 
of being totally set aside'. Indeed, by the late 1750s and early 1760s, it 
seemed to be a valid question as to whether the colonists had not to a 
considerable degree already 'arrived at an Independency from the Govern-
ment of the Mother Country', and the sense of urgency implicit in such 
remarks pervaded metropolitan counsels following the expulsion of the 
French from Canada in 1759. What the Treasury argued in October 1763 on 
behalf of proposals to tighten the trade laws was being said over and over 
about colonial civil administration: 'some effectual Remedy' was an 
'immediate Necessity, lest the continuance and extent of ... dangerous 
Evils' might 'render all Attempts to remedy them hereafter infinitely more 
difficult, if not utterly impracticable'. If remedial steps were not taken soon, 
Britain might eventually lose 'every inch of property in America!' 16 
By the concluding years of the war, the question was no longer whether 
imperial administration would be reformed at the conclusion of the war 
but how. Many advocates of reform counselled a mild approach. Arguing 
that measures specifically calculated to 'cement friendships on both sides' 
would 'be of more lasting benefit to both countries, than all the armies that 
Britain can send thither', they contended that the most effective way to 
secure the dependence of the colonies was 'by. promoting ... their welfare 
... , instead of checking their growth, or laying them under any other 
inconvenience', and warned against all 'violent innovations'.17 But the tide 
of metropolitan sentiment was running powerfully in a contrary direction. 
There was no desire either to oppress or stifle the colonies. 'The increase 
in our Colonies', said Secretary of the Treasury Charles Jenkinson in early 
1765, 'is certainly what we wish', and most people seem to have recognised 
with Thomas Whateley that the 'Mother Country would suffer, if she 
tyrannized over her Colonies'. Yet, it was widely agreed, as Bute reportedly 
observed immediately after the Treaty of Paris in 1763, both that it was 
essential 'to bring our Old Colonies into order' and that the best way to 
accomplish that end was through the imposition of stricter controls. Thence-
forth, in Jenkinson's words, the colonies were to be administered 'in such a 
manner as will keep them useful to the Mother Country' .18 
Thus, as Bernhard Knollenberg has shown, virtually every metropolitan 
measure undertaken in reference to the colonies not simply from 1763 but 
from the defeat of the French in Canada in 1759 was calculated to restrict 
their scope for economic and political activity. 19 In even more detail, Thomas 
C. Barrow has demonstrated to what a great extent the new trade regulations 
of 1763-4, including the use of the navy and royal vice-admiralty courts 
as agencies of enforcement, an increase in the size of the customs establish-
ment, and the introduction of a residence requirement for customs officials, 
were designed not only to produce a revenue but to destroy 'the long-
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continued commercial independence of the American colonies' by eliminating 
all except certain specifically permitted commerce between them and Europe 
and making it more expensive to trade with foreign islands in the Caribbean. 20 
Similarly, the decision to exercise caution in the authorisation of settlement 
to the west of the Appalachians was intended not simply to prevent clashes 
between Europeans and Indians or to establish a foundation for better 
relations with the Indians but also, as former Georgia governor Henry Ellis 
remarked, to prevent settlers from 'planting themselves in the Heart of 
America, out of the reach of Government, and where, from the great 
Difficulty of procuring European Commodities, they would be compelled 
to commence Manufacturs to the infinite prejudice of Britain', a possibility 
that had worried observers since before the war. 21 
In the civil sphere, metropolitan officials were less systematic and more 
tentative. They revealed no disposition to try to do away with representative 
institutions in the colonies. They were willing to entertain a variety of 
proposals for the extensive 'amendment of Government' in the colonies by 
act of Parliament, including the establishment of a single governor general 
for the colonies together with an annual congress of deputies from each 
colony, the resumption by the Crown of the charters of Connecticut and 
Rhode Island, and the creation of a permanent revenue to put royal 
governors 'upon a more respectable and independent Footing'. But, although 
the Board of Trade favoured the last two of these proposals, metropolitan 
officials did not immediately act upon any of them. Perhaps because of the 
complexity of the problem, they eschewed, for the time being at least, any 
effort to undertake the comprehensive alteration of the colonial constitutions 
recommended by many. 22 But in dealing with the separate colonies after 
1759 they rarely failed to act upon the conclusions, first reached by the 
Board of Trade between 1748 and 1756 and further reinforced by the 
experience of the war, that the colonies were 'not sufficiently obedient' and, 
as Granville told Franklin in 1759, had 'too many and too great Privileges; 
and that it' was 'not only the Interest of the Crown but of the Nation to 
reduce them'. To that end, metropolitan officials sought to correct as many 
as possible of the 'many Errors and unconstitutional Regulations & practices' 
that had 'taken place and prevailed' in all the old colonies by 'Clipping the 
Wings of the Assemblies in their Claims of all the Privileges of a House of 
Commons' and holding them to an 'absolute Subjection to Orders sent from' 
London 'in the Shape of Instructions', objectives they sought to accomplish 
primarily by strictly requiring suspending clauses in all colonial legislation 
of unusual character and disallowing all laws that appeared in any way to 
be 'injurious to the prerogative', detrimental to metropolitan authority, 
or conducive to the establishment in the colonies of 'a greater measure of 
Liberty than is enjoyed by the People of England'. 23 
If the Seven Years' War intensified metropolitan appreciation of both the 
value of the colonies and the weakness of metropolitan authority over them, 
it also contributed to three structural changes that would have an important 
bearing upon metropolitan calculations concerning the colonies after the 
war. First, the war brought Parliament more directly and intimately into 
contact with the colonies than at any time since the late seventeenth century. 
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The huge expenditures required for American defence as well as the smaller 
annual appropriations for the new royal colonies of Georgia and Nova 
Scotia helped to fix Parliamentary attention upon the colonies more fully 
than ever before and contributed to an increasingly widely held assumption 
that Parliament should be directly involved in reconstructing the imperial 
system after the war. Such an assumption was scarcely novel insofar as it 
applied to the commercial relationship between Britain and the colonies: 
since the 1650s Parliament had taken responsibility for regulating trade and 
other aspects of the economic life of the colonies. Prior to the war, however, 
administration had involved Parliament in the internal affairs of the colonies 
only in very exceptional circumstances. 24 Yet, with their growing frustration 
over their inability to enforce colonial compliance with their directives 
during their reform attempts between 1748 and 1756 metropolitan authorities 
had been more and more driven to threaten Parliamentary intervention to 
force the colonies into line, and in 1757 the House of Commons, in an 
important precedent, intervened in the purely domestic affairs of a colony 
for the first time since 1733 when it censured the Jamaica Assembly for 
making extravagant constitutional claims while resisting instructions from 
London. By carefully informing all the colonies of the Commons' action in 
this case, metropolitan authorities made it clear that they were no longer 
reluctant to support similar actions against other colonies whenever 
necessary. 25 
During the war, moreover, a chorus of proposals from both inside and 
outside the government called for 'the legislative power of Great Britain to 
make a strict and speedy inquiry ... to remedy disorders ... and to put 
the government and trade of all our colonies into' a 'good and sound 
... state'. Not just the commerce but the internal civil affairs, it came to 
be very widely assumed, required Parliamentary attention. 'Nothing', 
declared Thomas Pownall, could 'restore the Authority of the Crown & 
settle the Rights of the People according to the true Spirit of the British 
Constitution but an Act of Parliament' because, William Knox added in 
spelling out the lessons of the war and immediately pre-war period, 'no 
other Authority than that of the British Parliament will be regarded by 
the Colonys, or be able to awe them into acquiescence.' Such sentiments 
revealed a well-developed conviction that in 'the perpetual struggle in 
every Colony between Privilege and Prerogative' the metropolitan govern-
ment would thenceforth no longer hesitate to turn to Parliament to achieve 
what it would be unable to accomplish through executive action alone. 
As Isaac Norris, speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly appreciated in 
trying to understand the new Grenville measures of 1764-65, the idea of 
resorting to the 'Power of Parliament to make general Colony Laws' and 
otherwise intervene in the internal affairs of the colonies was 'no new 
Scheme'. It had been often suggested during the decade prior to the war. 
But as Norris understood, it was 'the War in America' that had 'brought 
it to the Issue we now see and are like to feel both now and hereafter'. 26 
Though some thought that the colonists would not resist any Parliamentary 
effort to 'new model the Government' and trade of the colonies, metro-
politan officials were . not blind to the possibility that even the august 
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authority of Parliament might be contested in America. 'From their partial 
Interests and Connection', the colonists could in fact be expected to 'give 
all the Opposition on their power to ... any ... matter ... for the General 
Good'. During the war, metropolitan civil and military representatives 
had taken note of the 'slight [regard] people of this Country affect to Treat 
Acts of Parliament with', and Lord Loudoun had reported that it was 
'very common' for colonists to say, defiantly, that 'they would be glad to 
see any Man durst Offer to put an English Act of Parliament in Force in 
this Country'. 27 But a second structural change brought about by the war 
gave London authorities confidence that any opposition to Parliamentary 
measures could be easily overcome. The idea of using royal troops in a 
coercive way against the colonies had been considered during the late 
1740s and early 1750s, but no significant body of troops was readily 
available. Only with the rapid buildup of an American army beginning in 
1756 did the metropolis have, for the first time in the history of the North 
American empire, significant coercive resources in the colonies. During the 
war, several governors, including Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania, 
had argued that it was 'next to impossible without a standing force to carry 
the Laws [of Parliament] into Execution' and, like Thomas Pownall and 
Henry Ellis of Georgia, he had urged the necessity of using the military to 
reinforce civil authority. 'A military force is certainly necessary to render 
Government respectable, & the Laws efficacious', wrote Ellis in June 1757, 
'& perhaps not more so in any country upon earth than this, which 
abounds with ungovernable and refractory people'. Pownall agreed: 'tis 
necessary', he wrote to Halifax less than a month later,' that the Military 
should carry into effect those matters which the Civil thro it's weakness 
cannot'. 28 Others wrote in a similar vein. Thus, in urging the quick adoption 
of a plan to reduce the colonies to a 'state of subordination and improvement' 
near the end of the war, customs comptroller Nathaniel Ware warned that 'if 
an effectual reformation be not introduced before those troops are withdrawn 
which could have been thrown in [to the colonies] upon no less occasion 
[than the war] without giving a general alarm, one may venture to pronounce 
it impossible afterwards'. With the colonies 'now surrounded by an army, 
a navy, and ... hostile tribes of Indians', Maurice Morgann, adviser to 
Shelburne, agreed, there would be no better 'time (not to oppress or injure 
them in any shape) but to exact a due deference to the just and equitable 
demands of a British Parliament'. 
The decision to keep a large contingent of troops in America following 
the war was almost certainly not the result of the sort of calculated deception 
suggested by Captain Walter Rutherford, a British officer in the colonies, 
who proposed in 1759 that troops be retained in the colonies 'apparently 
for their defence, but also to keep them in proper subjection to the Mother 
Country'. But neither, as some later historians have contended, were 
security of the new conquests against their former possessors nor the 
desirability of distributing troops 'amongst the several Members' of the 
'Empire, in proportion to their ability to support them' the only considera-
tions behind this decision. As William Knox explained in a long memorandum 
in 1763, 'one great purpose of stationing a large Body of Troops in America' 
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was 'to secure the Dependence of the Colonys on Great Britain' by, another 
observer remarked, 'guarding against any Disobedience or Disaffection 
amongst the Inhabitants ... , who already begin to entertain some extravagent 
Opinions, concerning their Relations and Dependence on their Mother 
Country'. With such a large military force in the colonies,-7,500 troops 
in all-metropolitan officials at the end of the Seven Years' War could now 
proceed with the business of imperial reconstruction with reasonable 
confidence that they had the resources near at hand to suppress any potential 
colonial opposition. 29 
But there seemed to be little reason to fear extended colonial resistance. 
For, people in Britain believed, the war had shown Americans to have 
little stomach for a fight. Not only had they proved to be 'execrable 
Troops', they had also shown themselves unwilling to stand up to military 
power. As Loudoun concluded from his successful use of the threat of force 
to overcome colonial opposition to providing quarters for troops in 1756-7, 
the colonists 'wou'd invade every Right of the Crown, if permitted, but 
... if the Servants of the Crown wou'd do their Duty, and stood firm, they 
wou'd always Submit'. 30 Even if they were braver than they appeared 
during the war, however, the 'mutual jealousies amongst the several Colonies 
would always', Lord Morton observed, prevent a united resistance and thus 
'keep them in a state of dependence'. With fourteen separate colonies in 
the continent in 1763, all with 'different forms of government, different laws, 
different interests, and some of them different religious persuasions and 
different manners', it was no wonder that they were 'all jealous of each other. 
Indeed, as Benjamin Franklin reported, their 'jealousy of each other was 
so great that' they would never be 'able to effect ... an union among 
themselves' and there was therefore absolutely no possibility that they could 
ever become 'dangerous' to Britain. 31 
But perhaps the most important structural change produced by the war 
was not the increasing involvement of Parliament in American affairs or 
even the introduction of an army into the colonies but the elimination of 
France and Spain from eastern North America. Following contemporaries, 
historians have emphasised the importance of this development as a 
precondition for colonial resistance after 1763. Of far greater importance, 
in all probability, was its effect upon the mentality of those in power in the 
metropolis. For the destruction of French power not only made the colonies 
less dependent upon Britain for protection; it also left Britain with a much 
freer hand to proceed with its programme of colonial reform by removing 
the necessity that had operated so strongly during the first half of the war 
for conciliatory behaviour towards the colonies to encourage them to 
cooperate against a common enemy. Colonial leaders appreciated this 
point quite fully in the wake of the Grenville programme. Many people, 
found an anonymous Frenchman visiting the colonies in 1765, were saying 
that if the 'french ... were [still] in Canada the British parlem't would as 
soon be D[ea]d as to offer to do what they do now'. John Dickinson agreed. 
The colonists, he declared in 1765, 'never would have been treated as they 
are if Canada still continued in the hands of the French'. 32 
If the structural changes produced by the war-the intrusion of Parliament 
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into colonial matters, the presence of a metropolitan army, and the removal 
of international pressures for conciliating the colonies-provided metro-
politan officials with favourable conditions for undertaking a sweeping 
reformation of the imperial system, while their heightened awareness of both 
the value of the colonies and the fragility of their authority over them 
served as a motive, they were pushed even more strongly in this direction 
by their own interpretation of the purposes of the war and the relative 
contributions of Britain and the colonies. For the belief was widespread 
in London that the war had been undertaken not on behalf of any specifically 
metropolitan objectives but for the protection of the colonies. As Shelburne 
put it in a speech in the House of Lords in December 1766, the 'security of 
the British Colonies in N. America was the first cause of the War'. Britain's 
generosity, in fact, seemed to contrast sharply with the colonies' parsimony. 
Britain, wrote Thomas Whateley, had certainly 'engaged in the Defence of 
her most distant Dominions, with more alacrity than the Provinces them-
selves that were immediately attacked', while the colonists had repeatedly 
refused 'to sacrifice their own partial Advantages to the general good' and 
brazenly taken 'advantage of their Countrys distresses' to cram 'their modes 
down the throat[s] of the Governor[s]' in shortsighted and selfish disputes 
over privileges. In return for such generous treatment, metropolitan leaders 
expected the colonists to show both a deep appreciation and a strong sense 
of the great 'obligation they owe[d] her'. Instead, they received nothing but 
ingratitude, the sting of which was made all the more painful by the fact 
that Britain had accumulated a huge debt of between £100,000,000 and 
£150,000,000 and a high annual rate of taxation as a result of the war and 
had even reimbursed the colonies for their own military appropriations by 
nearly £1,100,000. Nor was such recompense made any less galling by the 
colonists' vaunted prosperity. While the parent society wallowed in debt and 
groaned under high taxes, its 'vigorous Offspring' in America seemed to be 
enjoying low taxes and a flourishing economy that enabled them to riot in 
opulence and luxury. 33 
III 
The colonial response to the war could scarcely have been more different. 
Scholars have traditionally emphasised the extent to which the war con-
tributed to colonial discontent with British rule. Thus, Alan Rogers has 
recently argued that their experiences during the war made the colonists 
rebellious and filled them with anxieties about the power of the metropolis. 
'While the struggle to drive France from the North American continent 
was being waged', he contends, 'Americans from every social class experienced 
firsthand, or had some cause to fear the use of arbitrary [metropolitan] 
power'. Some of their discontent derived from Crown attempts to centralise 
Indian administration and still more from the overt condescension of British 
regulars towards American provincials and a discriminatory military 
structure that assigned American officers and soldiers to subordinate roles. 
Most, however, arose from the insistence by British military commanders 
that military necessity overrode all other considerations. 'Granted sweeping 
96 THE BRITISH ATLANTIC EMPIRE 
powers by the Crown', they 'imposed embargoes on shipping, ordered press 
gangs into the street and countryside to seize men and property, forced 
citizens to quarter soldiers in their homes, and insisted that the authority 
of colonial political agencies was subordinate to their own military power'. 34 
Well before the war, of course, the colonists had learned to be wary 
of metropolitan power and intentions. 'From some hard usage, received in 
former times', principally from 'the governors and other officers sent among 
them', they had long 'entertained an opinion that Britain was resolved to 
keep them low, and [was] regardless of their welfare', and their rejection of 
the Albany Plan of Union in l 754 on the eve of the war can be interpreted 
at least in part as an expression of this wariness. That the many examples of 
objectionable behaviour by the metropolis and its representatives cited by 
Rogers exacerbated these longstanding colonial fears is clear. Thus, Thomas 
Pownall reported in December 1757 that Loudoun's high-handed tactics in 
his efforts to quarter British troops in Massachusetts had created 'Mischevious 
Suspicions & Suggestions' that Pownall was 'in league with the Army to 
turn the Constitution of this Province into a Military Government'. Against 
the background of the new aggressiveness towards the colonies exhibited 
by London authorities during the decade preceding the war, moreover, 
metropolitan behaviour during the war appeared even more ominous, and 
some colonists, like William Smith, Jr., worried that the 'long hand of the 
Prerogative' would 'be stretched over to us, more than ever, upon the 
conclusion of the next general peace'. Nor did the colonists respond entirely 
favourably to the rising chorus of suggestions both immediately before and 
throughout the war for Parliamentary intervention in the internal affairs of 
the colonies, and at least one colonial leader, Stephen Hopkins, the elected 
governor of Rhode Island, reportedly declared in 1757 'that the King & 
Parliament had no more Right to make Laws for us than the Mohawks' 
and that whatever might be said 'concerning the Arbitrary Despotic Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of France, yet nothing could be more tyrannical, 
than our being Obliged by Acts of Parliament To which we were not parties 
to the making; and in which we were not Represented'. 35 
Similarly, as Knollenberg has shown, the many restrictive policies 
implemented by the metropolis during the later stages of the war following 
the conquest of Canada in 1759 elicited considerable colonial discontent. 
Colonial legislators resented the demonstrable increase in metropolitan 
limitations upon the supervision of their law-making powers. By effectively 
'strip[ping] us ofall the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects', complained 
Colonel Richard Bland, the Virginia lawyer and antiquarian, such limitations 
threatened to undermine the customary constitutions of the colonies and 'to 
put us under' a 'despotic Power' of the sort usually associated with 'a French 
or Turkish Gevernment'. At least in the northern colonies, colonial merchants 
were equally unhappy with metropolitan efforts to enforce the trade laws 
more systematically and especially with their attempts to suppress colonial 
trade with enemy islands. Far from being 'pernicious and prejudicial' to 
either Britain or the war effort, such trade, they argued, was 'of the greatest 
benefit to the kingdom, and the mein sourse from whence we have been 
enabled to support the extraordinary demands for cash, that have been 
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made upon us in order to enable his majesty to carry on the present just 
and necessary, but most expensive war.' Even to interfere with, much less 
to suppress, a trade that was ultimately responsible for bringing the British 
nation annual profits of over 600 per cent and cash in the amount of 
£1,500,000 seemed to colonial traders incomprehensible. Because there had 
never been a total prohibition of trade between the home islands and France 
at any time during the war, moreover, it also seemed to be patently dis-
criminatory against colonial merchants, who professed to find it explicable 
only in terms of the 'undue influence of the [British] West-Indians' and 
metropolitan partiality for their interests over that of the continental 
colonists. In addition, some colonists were sceptical about metropolitan 
intentions to keep a standing army in the colonies after the war. They 
wondered with Cortlandt Skinner of New Jersey why, 'when a few indepen-
dent Companies' had been 'sufficient for the continent' for over a century 
when the French were in possession of Canada, Britain suddenly required a 
permanent garrison of 'so many regiments when every [European] enemy 
is removed at least a thousand miles from our borders' and worried that 
the army was really intended 'to check us'. 36 
In the final analysis, however, the anxieties with which the colonists 
emerged from the war appear far less important than the high levels of 
expectations. For on balance the war seems to have been for the colonists 
a highly positive experience. For one thing, the war had brought large 
sums of specie into the colonies through military and naval spending and 
successful privateering and had been highly profitable for many people, 
especially in the northern colonies where most of the troops were stationed. 37 
But the psychological benefits the colonists derived from the war would 
seem to have been far more significant than these material ones. That so 
much of the war had been fought on colonial soil and that the metropolitan 
government had made such an enormous effort and gone to such a great 
expense to defend them were extraordinarily reinforcive of colonial self-
esteem and gave rise to an expanded sense of colonial self-importance. 
Moreover, the colonists took great pride in the fact that they had themselves 
made an important contribution to the war. Historians have often taken at 
face value contemporary metropolitan opinion that, with a few notable 
exceptions, the colonies had not exerted themselves in voting men and 
money for the war, and that the requisition system through which the 
administration had sought to mobilise colonial contributions to the war was, 
in the judgment of George Louis Beer, 'largely a failure'. Yet, as John M. 
Murrin has recently pointed out, the subsidy policy adopted by the metro-
politan government beginning in 1756 by which it reimbursed the colonies 
with specie voted by Parliament according to the amounts they actually 
expended for the war worked with 'reasonable efficiency'. 'By offering 
valuable rewards to specie-poor colonies, it actually stimulated competition 
among them in support of imperial goals', he argues: 'At an annual expense 
to Britain of £200,000 (later reduced to £133,000), the colonies raised about 
twenty thousand provincials per year through 1762, paying about half the 
cost themselves'. 38 
The following table not only reinforces Murrin's point but shows that 
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the colonial contribution to the war was both more evenly distributed and 
far more substantial than historians have appreciated. Massachusetts and 
Virginia, the two colonies that subsequently took the lead in the resistance 
movement after 1763, were together responsible for half of total net expen-
ditures, but Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and, in 
terms of taxes per adult white male, even South Carolina all expended 
respectable sums. Besides the new colony of Georgia, only New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Maryland and, to a lesser extent, Rhode Island did not 
vote substantial amounts and thereby place their inhabitants under 
significantly higher tax burdens than they had been used to before the 
war. 
COWNIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR39 
A. Expenditures 
Colony Expenditures % Reimbursed % Net % 
Total by Reimbursed Expenditures Total 
Parliament 
£ £ £ 
Massachusetts 818,000 31.8 351,994 43.0 466,006 31.1 
Virginia 385,319 15.0 99,177 25.7 286,142 19.1 
Pennsylvania 313,043 12.2 75,311 24.1 237,732 15.9 
New Jersey 204,411 8.0 51,321 25.1 153,090 10.2 
New York 291,156 11.3 139,468 47.9 151,688 10.1 
South Carolina 90,656 3.5 10,226 11.3 80,430 5.4 
Maryland 39,000 1.5 0 0.0 39,000 2.6 
Rhode Island 80,981 3.2 51,480 63.6 29,501 1.9 
Connecticut 259,875 10.1 231,752 89.2 28,123 1.9 
North Carolina 30,776 1.2 11,010 35.8 19,766 1.3 
New Hampshire 53,211 2.1 47,030 88.4 6,181 0.4 
Georgia 1,820 0.1 0 0.0 1,820 0.1 
Totals 2,568,248 100.0 1,068,769 41.6 1,499,479 100.0 
B. Tax Per Adult White Male 
Colony Tax Colony Tax Colony Tax 
£ £ £ 
South Carolina 10.94 Virginia 7.20 North Carolina 1.28 
Massachusetts 10.70 Pennsylvania 6.62 Georgia 1.51 
New Jersey 8.77 Rhode Island 3.51 Connecticut 1.01 
New York 7.52 Maryland 1.91 New Hampshire 0.84 
For the colonists, the knowledge that they had, for the first time in their 
histories, made such an important contribution to such a great and glorious 
national cause increased the immediacy and strength of their ties with 
Britain and produced a surge of British patriotism. They had long had, in 
Thomas Pownall's words, a 'natural, almost mechanical affection to Great 
Britain', an affection that was deeply rooted in ties of blood and interest, 
satisfaction with their existing prosperous condition, and pride in being 
linked to a great metropolitan tradition that, they believed, guaranteed 
them the same 'privileges and equal protection', the same 'liberty and free 
constitution of government', that were the joyous boast of Britons every-
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wkere and the jealous envy of the rest of the civilised world. The extraordinary 
British achievements in the Seven Years' War could only intensify this deep 
affection.for and pride in being British, which came pouring out during the 
later stages of the war in a veritable orgy of celebrations, first, of the great 
British victories in Canada, the West Indies, and Europe; then of the 
accession of a vigorous, young, British-born king, George Ill, in 1760; and, 
finally, of the glorious Treaty of Paris in 1763, a treaty that made the British 
Empire the most extensive and powerful in the Western world since Rome. 
British national feeling among the colonists had probably never been 
stronger than it was in the early 1760s. 40 
The feeling of having been a partner in such a splendid 'national' under-
taking, even if only a junior partner, not only intensified the pride of the 
colonists in their attachment to Britain, it also heightened their expectations 
for a larger-and more equivalent-role within the Empire, a role that 
would finally raise them out of a dependent status to one in which they were 
more nearly on a par with Britons at home. It also stimulated visfons of 
future grandeur-within the British Empire. 'Now commences the Aera 
of our quiet Enjoyment of those Liberties, which our Fathers purchased 
with the Toil of their whole Lives, their Treasure, their Blood', ecstatically 
declared Reverend Thomas Barnard of Salem, Massachusetts, in one of 
many similar sermons celebrating the conclusion of the Seven Years' War: 
'Safe from the Enemy of the Wilderness, safe from the griping Hand of 
arbitrary Sway and cruel Superstition; Here shall be the late founded Seat 
of Peace and Freedom. Here shall our indulgent Mother, who has most 
generously rescued and protected us, be served and honoure.l by growing 
Numbers, with all Duty, Love and Gratitude, till Time shall be no more'. 
The expulsion of the French had at once both rendered the colonies safe 
and opened up half a continent for their continued expansion. Now that 
this vast and rich area had finally been 'secured to the British Government', 
the colonists confidently expected that as a matter of course liberty would 
'be granted to his Majestys Subjects in' the 'Colonies to Settle the Lands on 
Ohio' and elsewhere in the west. Once these lands had been settled, prospects 
for Britain, and America, colonists predicted with assurance, would be 
almost without limits. 'The State, Nature, Climate, and prodigious Extent 
of the American Continent' obviously provided 'high Prospects in favor 
of the Power, to which it belongs'. With all of eastern North America for 
its granary, Britain could become one extended town of manufacturers, 
and this powerful Anglo-American partnership would enable the British 
Empire to 'maintain and exalt her Supremacy, until Heaven blots out all 
the Empires of the World.' Given their crucial role in these developments, 
the colonists had no doubt, as an anonymous pamphleteer had phrased it 
early in the war, that they would 'not be thought presumptuous, if they 
consider[ed] themselves upon an equal footing with' Englishmen at home 
or be 'treated the worse, because they will be Englishmen'. Conscious of the 
strenuous and critical character of their exertions during the war, they now 
thought that they had every 'reason to expect that their interest should be 
considered and attended to, that their rights ... should be preserved to 
them'. 'Glowing with every sentiment of duty and affection towards their 
100 THE BRITISH ATLANTIC EMPIRE 
mother country', they looked forward at war's end to 'some mark of tender-
ness in return'. As soon as the metropolitan government recognised their 
great 'services and suffereings' during the war, they felt sure, it would be 
compelled even 'to enlarge' their Priviledges'.U 
IV 
The experience of the Seven Years' War thus sent the postwar expectations 
of men on opposite sides of the Atlantic veering off in opposite directions. 
More aware than ever of the value of the colonies, increasingly anxious 
about the fragility of metropolitan authority over them, and appalled by 
their truculent and self-serving behaviour during the war, the metropolitan 
government was determined to bring them under tighter regulations at the 
end of the war and willing to use the authority of Parliament to do so. By 
contrast, the colonists, basking in a warm afterglow of British patriotism, 
minimised evidence accumulated before and during the war that metro-
politans had other, less exalted plans for them, and looked forward 
expansively to a more equal and secure future in the Empire. At the same 
time, the removal of the Franco-Spanish menace from the eastern half of 
North America had both made the colonists somewhat less dependent upon 
Britain for protection and left subsequent British governments much freer 
to go ahead with a broad programme of reform, while the presence of a large 
number of royal troops in the colonies gave them confidence that they could 
suppress potential colonial resistance and seemed to make the caution and 
conciliation they had traditionally observed towards the colonies less 
necessary. In combination, these psychological consequences and structural 
changes produced by the war made the relationship between Britain and the 
colonies far more volatile than it had ever been before. 
Given this situation, it was highly predictable that British officials in the 
1760s would take some action, probably by bringing Parliamentary authority 
to bear upon the colonials in new, unaccustomed, and hence, for the 
colonists, illegitimate ways and that such action, so completely at variance 
with the colonists' hopes and expectations, would be interpreted by the 
colonists as both a betrayal and a violation of the customary relationship 
between them and Great Britain. For the colonists, it was not only the new 
taxes and restrictive measures in themselves that so deeply offended them 
in the mid-1760s but the injustice, ingratitude, and reproach those measures 
seemed to imply. When they discovered through these measures that their 
obedience during the war would be rewarded not by the extension but the 
'loss of their freedom', that, as the Massachusetts lawyer Oxenbridge 
Thacher exclaimed, they had been 'lavish of their blood and treasure in the 
late war only to bind the shackles of slavery on themselves and their children' 
and that Britain intended to treat all the colonies, regardless of whether 
they had contributed heavily to the war or not, without distinction, with 
'the rude hand of a ravisher', they felt a deep sense of disappointment, 
even betrayal, as if, in the words of Richard Henry Lee, they had 'hitherto 
been suffered to drink from the cup of Liberty' only that they might 'be 
more sensibly punished by its being withdrawn, and the• bitter dregs of 
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Servility forced on us in its place'. 42 Perhaps more than any other single 
factor, the sense of betrayal, the deep bitterness arising out of the profound 
disjunction between how, on the basis of their performance during the Seven 
Years' War, they thought they deserved to be dealt with by the metropolis 
and the treatment actually accorded them, supplied the energy behind their 
intense reaction to the Grenville programme in 1765-6. For metropolitans, 
on the other hand, the colonists' powerful resistance to the Grenville 
measures only operated to confirm ancient fears that the atlegiance of 
these valuable colonies to Britain was highly tenuous, that their authority 
in the colonies was dangerously weak, and that the ungrateful colonists were 
bent upon escaping from their control and establishing their independence. 
By contributing so heavily to the creation of the intellectual and psycho-
logical climate and a structural situation that produced these actions and 
reactions, the Seven Years' War thus had a profound, if complex, bearing 
upon the emerging confrontation between Britain and its North American 
colonies and served as an important component in the causal pattern of the 
American Revolution. 
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The view that the debate about British policy towards the thirteen colonies 
in the years preceding the American Revolution can be seen simply as an 
expression of the ancient rivalry of Whig and Tory has long since ceased to 
hold attractions for historians. No doubt a thorough reappraisal of the 
activities of George III and Bute and consequent reassessment of the posture 
of the Newcastle and Rockingham Whigs has done much to assist this 
development. 1 In recent years it has even been denied that the measures of 
the 1760s and 1770s, the policies which raised up so formidable an opposition 
outside Parliament, represented a significant departure from the practices of 
earlier Whig governments, so that the idea of a 'new Toryism' has come to 
seem as implausible as a revived old one. 2 Most significantly perhaps, the 
sophistication of modern political analysis has transformed our under-
standing of party politics in the period, banishing the idea of a simple and 
enduring two party structure, and replacing it with a complex and constantly 
changing pattern, dominated now by old fashioned court and country 
groupings, now by the jockeying of aristocratic factions, now by the 
machinations of the various interest groups. 3 Out of this confusion, it is 
recognised that there gradually appeared, first in the form of the Rockingham 
Whigs and their articulated philosophy of party, 4 then, in the 1790s, in the 
emergence of a new conservative consensus, the essential basis for the 
nineteenth-century two party system. But how these developments related 
to the events of the early years of George III's reign, and more particularly 
to the American Revolution, is a matter for debate. What follows is an 
attempt to show how two important preconditions for the establishment 
of the party system, the weakening of the old Whig tradition, and the forming 
of a new authoritarian viewpoint, were affected by the conflict with America. 
Contemporaries would not have needed enlightening as to the fluidity 
of party politics in the 1760s and 1770s. The effective dissolution of the two 
historic parties in the middle years of the century was a matter of frequent 
comment, not least, for example, by those eminent authorities on whom 
later historians were to rely, but whose remarks on this point have 
sometimes been neglected. 5 For many political purposes, some would argue 
for most, it became practicable to act more or less without regard to Whig 
and Tory distinctions. Admittedly, at a local level, particularly in the larger 
constituencies, and where great landed interests could trace back a continuous 
tradition of loyalty to one of the great parties, the old slogans continued 
to be used at election time, though without much reference to the actual 
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conduct at Westminster of those elected. Moreover, in America the party 
labels quickly acquired in this period a revived significance, readily applied 
in a rapidly polarising situation. But to many in the mother country the 
distinction was merely baffling, and one visiting Englishwoman, for example, 
was genuinely puzzled to find in New England, that 'those who are well 
disposed towards Government ... are termd Tories'. 6 
Despite the growing irrelevance of the old party terminology to the new 
political realities, the terms themselves continued to play a part in public life. 
The first two decades of George III's reign were not short of major issues of 
principle, and it was natural enough that the political protagonists should 
endeavour to relate them to old and well-remembered ideologies. Party 
slogans retained a pronounced emotional appeal, particularly out of doors. 
In an age deeply conservative in such matters, they also opened promising 
avenues, depending on the standpoint, to political respectability on the one 
hand or political disrepute on the other. Naturally it was among opponents 
of government, faced with the constant need to justify their conduct to 
themselves and to the public, that the effort to revive old rallying cries was 
most marked. The most . powerful political figure of the period, the elder 
Pitt, himself made effective use of such tactics, in a cynical or at any rate 
suspiciously convenient manner, whenever he found himself in opposition. 
Typical was his allegation in 1763, that 'this Government ... was not 
founded on true Revolution principles; that it was a Tory Administration'. 7 
When in office himself, as in 1766, he talked more of the need to do away 
with party differences than to establish the new Whig Jerusalem, but in 
opposition again he quickly returned to the old language, discerning, he 
claimed, a 'distinction between right and wrong,-between Whig and Tory'. 8 
Such opportunism was perhaps as transparent at the time as in historical 
retrospect. However, a more consistent, more considered Whig critique of 
supposed court Toryism came from the Rockingham Whigs, who indeed 
sometimes made themselves unpopular by appearing to claim a monopoly 
of Whig principles, and by portraying themselves as the only true 'friends to 
the Revolution System of Government'. 9 Their most effective spokesman, 
Burke, was too subtle to stoop to the crudities of Pitt, and he always refrained 
from associating the policies of George III's ministers with the tainted Tory 
party of his predecessor's reign. But he took pride in the Whig antecedents of 
Rockingham and the Cavendishes, and appealed consciously to their 
standing as the 'great Whig families', the 'great Whig connexions' .1° Finally, 
beyond the parliamentary parties, among the many radical groups, and in 
the popular press, there was a marked concern with the promulgation of a 
revived Whiggism in the fact of alleged Toryism, even Jacobitism. 
The polemical importance of the search for clear Whig and Tory identities 
was strongly felt by contemporaries. It stimulated varying responses from 
the critically minded. One natural reaction was the clear analysis of the 
political realist, incidentally according with the verdict of historians. Thus 
one newspaper correspondent protested at the over simplifications of the 
party situation current at the onset of the American War. 'Our correspondent 
N. seems to mistake the matter quite. The distinction of Whig and Tory 
no longer exists in England. He must look for it only in America. It it now 
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the Butean party, the Bedford party, the Chatham party, the Rockingham 
party, the Shelburne party, etc. etc. among whom the present contest is 
for power' .11 Equally strong was the demand for precise formulations of a 
party creed rather than vague appeals to outdated party principles. Since 
most of the polemic was designed to renew the vitality of Whig ideals against 
a supposed recrudescence of royalist Toryism, much of this criticism centred 
on the relevance of the Whiggism of Shaftesbury, the. Junto, or even 
Newcastle, to the political problems of George III's reign. The Crisis, the 
most intemperate of all the radical journals being published at the outbreak 
of the war with America, made strenuous attempts to specify the beliefs of 
real Whigs, and lambasted those who merely referred in appropriately 
pious but vague terms to the Bill of Rights and the Glorious Revolution. 
•so many Years are now elapsed since the Revolution, that its Principles are 
almost forgot. They are showy in Theory, but obsolete in Practice'. 12 Such 
remarks were addressed primarily to the moderate Whigs of the Rockingham 
party, whose much vaunted loyalty to the Revolution of 1688 begged major 
questions. Lord Mahon, one of those eccentrically radical aristocrats who 
sought to revive the popular appeal of the old Whiggism, laid special 
emphasis on the necessity for precision in this respect. 'Saying he would 
act on Revolutionary Principles was saying nothing, unless he would declare 
what he meant thereby.' 13 
In the process of defining Revolution principles, and for that matter 
other elements in the old party philosophies, special attention was naturally 
devoted to the conflict with America, a conflict which occupied the best part 
of two decades in British political life, and eventually came to dominate it 
almost to the exclusion of all other questions. The debate on the American 
Revolution was of its very nature a debate about fundamentals. At its 
narrowest the constitutional argument turned on differing interpretations 
of the venerable maxim that taxation could only be laid with the consent of 
those taxed. At its widest it was a dispute about the nature of sovereignty 
and political authority, and involved the clash of two diametrically opposed 
philosophies. Between lay a great range of legal, constitutional, political, 
even religious issues which led readily to the posing of basic ideological 
questions. In America itself, and indeed through much of continental 
Europe the results were profoundly important for the development of 
political thought. Within England the significance of this intellectual ferment 
is the subject of continuing controversy. But if nothing else it made English-
men look harder than ever at the evolution of their own political ideas. 
Both for government and for opposition, in and out of Parliament, it provided 
a profound challenge, a test of the underlying principles to which they 
adhered. 
English allies of the American cause tended to assume that, in the context 
of 1776, Revolution principles were synonomous with American principles. 
Admittedly, the appeal made by the most intellectually adventurous 
Americans to natural rights theory involved an extension, perhaps a 
redirection of established Whig ideas. But the narrower, and equally 
influential reliance on traditional English notions of liberty, particularly 
in relation to representation and chartered rights, together with the constant 
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stress on America's debt both to the real Whig tradition and to Lockeian 
political theory created a natural connection between English and American 
Whiggism. Certainly it was the deliberate intention of the Anglo-American 
radical lobby in London to establish and exploit this connection. Conscious 
manipulators of opinion like Arthur Lee not only appealed directly to the 
old Whiggism of Revolution days, but unashamedly glorified the oligarchical 
era of Walpole and the Pelhams, picturing George II, for instance, as 'a 
Whig king' with a 'Whig Minister, speaking to a Whig people' .14 As for the 
men in power under George III, it followed 'that they are Tories, that they. 
have been bred Tories, and consequently that they must have imbibed such 
principles as are diametrically opposite to those on which the Revolution 
was established.' 15 
The clamour of the radicals makes it easy to forget that America's claims 
were rejected as well as supported on solid Whig grounds. Governments 
were naturally less given than were their opponents to detailed expositions. 
of their underlying ideology, but in Parliament there was much emphasis on, 
the Whiggish propriety of the successive measures of taxation and coercion 
which led up to the American Revolution. At election time ministerial 
candidates were not afraid to stand on the platform of 'the Constitution 
upon Revolution Principles' to the slight surprise of at least one visiting 
American. 16 In one case, that of George Grenville, we even have a coherent 
and plausible defence of taxation without representation on the basis of 
Locke's Second Treatise. Grenville, who was treated by radicals like Sylas 
Neville as an 'arch-Tory' 17 was in fact a thoroughly conventional Whig, who 
consciously saw his policies and principles in a Revolution framework. His 
interpretation of Locke's famous statement of the invalidity of taxation 
raised without consent was arguably attentive both to the real intention 
of Locke's remarks and to their historical context. As he pointed out, 
Locke had been concerned to destroy the basis of Filmerian theory, not to 
establish the case for a representative democracy. Grenville leaned heavily 
on the central if at times obscure Lockeian concept of trust in explaining the 
relationship between both the executive and legislature on the one hand 
and the people on the other: 
Upon this Principle it is true that no man can be tax'd without his own 
Consent or the Consent of those whom the Society has empower'd to 
act for the whole and not by the will of anyone claiming a Right from 
Heaven deriv'd through the Patriarchs to govern the People and tax 
them as he thinks proper. From the general Doctrine which is evidently 
true the Idea seems to have been taken that no man could be tax'd 
without having a distinct Representative which is evidently untrue both 
in Reason and in fact. 18 
Grenvillian theory tends to be seen in terms of virtual representatioq. 
and in some of his speeches Grenville seems to have employed this obvious 
line of attack. It would be fairer, however, to see his basic argument as one 
that representation was simply irrelevant to the legislative powers of Parlia,-
ment. But even when he went beyond matters adequately discussed in 
traditional political theory, and explained the existing relationship between 
the colonies and the metropolitan authorities, Grenville resorted to the 
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language of Whiggism. Relations with America he apparently saw in terms 
of the original contract, that familiar theme in Whig literature. 'My ideas 
for America have always been to give them good Laws and good Government 
on the one hand and to exact from them on the other Hand that just 
Obedience and Subordination which by the original Compact of all Society 
is the Return due for it' .19 This was arguably a simplistic use of contract 
theory, frequently in this period used against parliamentary taxation rather 
than for it. Radicals even argued that the King had actually violated his 
coronation oath in his treatment of the colonists, and thereby broken the 
original contract somewhat in the sense that James II had. 2° For Grenville 
it was the colonists who were the contract breakers, a view which he shared 
with many who accepted the 'fundamental Principle of Civil Societys that 
Protection and Allegiance are reciprocal.' 21 Staunch Whigs found it hard to 
see the justice of 'newfangled and desperate Doctrines' denying the authority 
of a legislature which in English eyes had long carried out and continued to 
carry out its fiduciary duties towards the colonies. 22 
Few politicians of Grenville's standing made the conscious effort to link 
their conduct to first principles. But most of them believed that in taxing 
Americans, or coercing them in the name of taxation, they had behind them 
the main body of Whig beliefs. In this they were largely sustained by their 
belief that the central issue in contention with the colonies was the sovereign 
authority of Parliament. Blackstone's complete and uncompromising 
assertion of the omnicompetence of the legislature was relatively recent, but 
the supremacy of Parliament, and logically of the King in Parliament, was 
after all an ancient axiom of Whig theory, and at any rate for less sophisticated 
subscribers, its essential feature. The value to ministerial Whigs of this 
reflection was also much enhanced by the growing realisation that a natural 
consequence of the position adopted by the colonies would be appreciably 
to enhance the power and influence of the monarchy, that is of the King 
distinct from the King in Parliament. 
This appreciation was neither sudden nor new. A major element in the 
debate about taxation during the Stamp Act crisis had been the conviction 
in Britain that if taxation was not within the imperial competence of Parlia-
ment, it would be difficult to establish clearly what form of legislative 
activity was. And some had seen that if America were effectively independent 
of Westminster, she must be all the more dependent on the crown. As 
Grenville himself put it, the thirteen colonies would come to be seen as 
'Independent Communities in alliance with us, and only govern'd by the 
same Prince as Hanover is'. 23 The Americans had been understandably slow 
to reach the same conclusions themselves. The early years of the controversy 
over taxation saw a remorseless treading and re-treading of the worn ground 
of representative theory and produced ever more elaborate arguments about 
the lines which might be drawn between legislation in a general sense, and 
taxation of particular kinds. By the early 1770s, however, Americans were 
well on the way to dispensing altogether with the idea of parliamentary 
supervision and coming to rely exclusively on their link with the crown and 
its subordinate organs of government, principally the Privy Council. 
Franklin, for example, found himself increasingly persuaded by the attrac-
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tions of a constitution which made the crown alone sovereign, and conferred 
the legislative role exclusively on a combination of the colonial assemblies 
and King-in-Council, thereby, providing a logically tenable line of defence 
against the unlimited claims made for Parliament. The argument was fully 
developed in James Wilson's Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the 
Legislative Authority of the British Parliament and finally emerged as a more 
or less accepted statement of the American position in the course of 1774 
and 1775. The Declaration of Colonial Rights and Grievances, issued by the 
first Continental Congress in October 1774, by implication came very close 
to such a statement, and 'cheerfully consented' to parliamentary legislation 
on commercial questions, only 'from the necessity of the case' and out of 
'a regard to the mutual interest of both countries'. Even this vestigial role 
for Westminster was finally whittled away in the reply made by the second 
Continental Congress in December 1775, to the King's Proclamation of 
Rebellion. In this manifesto, 'allegiance to Parliament' was specifically 
disavowed, 'allegiance to the Crown' specifically admitted. The Declaration 
of Independence in effect restated this final assertion of colonial allegiance 
to the crown, listing as it did in bizarre and colourful detail the alleged 
misdeeds of the King and referring to Parliament only as 'a jurisdiction 
foreign to our constitutions' involving 'Acts of pretended Legislation'. 24 
This important and fundamental change of stance in America caused 
some astonishment in the mother country. An early hint of it drew a sarcastic 
reaction in print from Josiah Tucker: 'Good Heavens! What a sudden 
Alteration is this! An American pleading for the Extension of the Prerogative 
of the Crown?' 25 To most Englishmen iRdeed the notion seemed inhep,ently 
absurd, and smacked of the antiquated royalism voiced most recently by the 
pamphleteer Timothy Brecknock in 1764. 26 Brecknock's offending work 
was ritually condemned by the House of Lords and publicly burned. 27 To 
most contemporaries his doctrines seemed laughable rather than dangerous. 
But the readiness of the colonists to occupy similar ground proved a godsend 
to anti-Americans in Britain, for it instantly made it possible to picture 
their opponents as friends of the royal prerogative. At precisely the moment 
ia 1775 when Americans were demanding from England the definitive 
assertion of the Whig case, the form in which they put their demands made 
government appear impeccably Whiggish. 
The opportunity was seized upon. In the Commons, at the beginning of 
the decisive session of 1775-6, Fox, bitterly denouncing the cabinet as 
'enemies to freedom' and 'Tories', was devastatingly answered by North: 
His lordship ... said, that if he understood the meaning of the words 
Whig and Tory, which the last speaker had mentioned, he conceived 
that it was the characteristic of Whiggism to gain as much for the people 
as possible, while the aim of Toryism was to increase the prerogative. 
That in the present case, administration contended for the right of 
parliament. while the Americans talked of their belonging to the crown. 
Their language therefore was that of Toryism, although, through the 
artful designs of the real enemies of freedom, the good sense of the 
people of England was endeavoured to be misled, and false opinions 
were industriously inculcated throughout the kingdom. 28 
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This line was naturally taken up elsewhere, and produced an amused 
response in the press. 'The Tories, by the acknowledging the supreme power 
of the British parliament over the whole British empire, appeared to be turned 
Whigs - And the Whigs, in attempting to extend the power of the King's 
prerogative beyond the control of his parliament, shew themselves to be 
Tories'. 29 The ultimate irony perhaps occurred with the loyal addresses to 
the crown, which in the summer and autumn of 1775 reflected widespread 
endorsement of the government's policies, and profoundly dismayed those 
who looked for a demonstration of public opinion in opposition to North's 
policies. Some of these addresses made considerable play with the apparent 
inconsistency of the Whig position. That from Oxford, for example, expressed 
'heart-felt Pleasure, that your Majesty has not been tempted to endanger the 
Constitution of Great Britain, by accepting the alluring offers of an uncon-
stitutional Increase of your Prerogative'. 30 Maidenhead declared loftily 'we 
cannot but protest against the Principles of those Men, who by asserting the 
Dependence of America on the Crown, exclusively of the Parliament of 
Great Britain, endeavour to point out a Distinction, that in future Times 
may be productive of the most fatal Consequences to both.' 31 
For those in opposition, whose principal aim in politics generally was to 
criticise the supposed aggrandisement of the crown, nothing could have been 
more embarrassing than the direction taken by the Anglo-American debate 
at this critical moment. It was doubly so, because one of their great hopes 
had long been the possibility that their general concern with the influence 
of the crown might plausibly be connected with the grievances of the colonies. 
This possibility had emerged most strongly between the break-up of the 
Chatham Ministry and the partial repeal of the Townshend duties, when 
Hillsborough as Secretary for the Colonies seemed genuinely to be consider-
ing the employment of prerogative rather than parliamentary powers in 
America. It was reported: 'the language of the ministry is that they will 
restrain the Americans by the Powers and the authority of the crown without 
the Intervention of Parliament, or in other words they will make them 
subject to the King though not to the Legislative of Great Britain. This 
special Tory doctrine will certainly fail in its Effect as it ought to do'. 32 The 
parliamentary opposition made the best of this half-opening. When, in 1769, 
Hillsborough formally held out to the colonial governors the possibility 
that the hated Townshend duties would be repealed the following session. 
Burke and his colleagues were able, somewhat to the bewilderment of their 
American friends, to attack him on the grounds that he had violated 
parliamentary privilege, undertaking on behalf of the executive what actually 
pertained to the legislature. 33 The revival of the statute of treasons of Henry 
VIII, though carried through Parliament, could also be seen as an attempt 
to employ odious executive and judicial powers not in accord with the spirit 
of English law. Unfortunately for parliamentary opponents of the ministry, 
this approach to the Anglo-American question turned out to be a blind alley. 
What blocked it was not merely the instinctive preference of successive 
governments for working entirely through Parliament, notwithstanding 
Hillsborough's short-lived campaign to the contrary, but the unwavering, 
almost pedantic constitutionalism of the King himself. His later statement 
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that he was fighting the battle of the legislature is well known, and accurately 
reflected his conduct over the years. George III personally disliked Hills-
borough's schemes for unorthodox new policies in the colonies, 34 and like 
most of his ministers insisted on treating Parliament's unlimited supremacy 
over the colonies as the first and only line of defence. When the next crisis 
came, in 1774-6, the government's policy was taken step by step through 
Parliament, and at every point dealt with in parliamentary terms. Even the 
highly controversial Massachusetts Government Act, which was primarily 
designed to strengthen royal authority in New England, was seen essentially 
as part of the campaign to have the principle and application of Parliament's 
supremacy accepted. Thereafter occasional opportunities for reopening the 
question of the prerogative occurred. For example, in 1775, the King's 
action in sending Hanoverian troops to safeguard the strongholds of 
Gibraltar and Minorca, was portrayed by opposition as a deliberate violation 
of the Bill of Rights, and stimulated lively pictures of the importation of 
foreign mercenaries on a scale sufficient to threaten English liberty. 35 Fanned 
by the opposition this innocent, not to say prudent, measure flickered into 
life when some of the country gentlemen now supporting the crown remem-
bered their anti-Hanoverian prejudices. It was, however, quickly extinguished 
by the good humoured response of North himself. In the end, the old Whigs 
went into the American War all too aware that it was a war not for the 
prerogative of the crown but for that parliamentary sovereignty which they 
were themselves supposed to venerate. 
For some, indeed for most of those who carried the banner of moderate, 
mainstream Whiggism, particularly the Rockinghams, it was not only the 
direction taken by the debate about the royal prerogative which hamstrung 
them in their efforts to develop a politically viable and ideologically pure 
line of argument. Equally restricting was the common ground which they 
shared with most of the leading ministers in the period, in their attachment 
to the unlimited power of Parliament over the colonies. In this respect they 
were clearly the victims of their own actions, for it was the Rockingham 
Ministry, which in 1766, had promoted the Declaratory Act, flatly asserting 
on the lines of the Irish Dependency Act of 1720, the legislative supremacy 
of Parliament in all cases. To many admirers of Rockingham this seemed 
a dreadful hindrance to the cause of Whiggism, and one which begged to be 
exploited by his enemies. Ministerial hacks in Parliament and in the press 
never tired of pointing out that the coercion of America was carried on in 
order to preserve the principle of Rockingham's Declaratory Act. American 
observers also saw the difficulty. Typical was the verdict of one colonial 
visitor, Jonathan Williams, whose expectations of Rockingham were sadly 
disappointed when he heard him speak in the Lords in 1775: 
Lord Rockingham got up, and seemed but partly in our favour.-That 
Declaratory Act of his, is a great stumbling block to his patriotism, for 
it is impossible to take the matter up to this day without entering into 
the question of rights, and the whole must now turn on that single 
point, whether Great Britain has or has not, a right to tax America if 
she has, in all cases whatsoever there can be no doubt but all her Laws, 
are on a good Foundation, and we as the most abject Slaves, in 
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acquiescence of that right, must obey; on the other hand, if she has 
not that right, the Americans must enjoy all the Liberties they claim. 36 
Jn theory it was possible to get over the stumbling block of the Declaratory 
Act. Even at the time of its enactment Americans had tended to play down 
its significance, encouraged no doubt by the widely reported speeches of the 
elder Pitt, who vociferously opposed it while supporting the ministry's 
repeal of the Stamp Act. Henry Laurens described the Declaratory Act as 
'the last feeble struggle of the Grenvillian party', 37 and many other Americans 
saw it simply as a meaningless piece of paper, • a kind of salvo for the 
authority of Parliament'. 38 Even in the Rockingham party itself, the more 
radical elements confessed to their leaders that they regarded it 'rather as 
necessary at the time, than strictly right'. 39 Jn due course Fox was able to 
pass this interpretation on to later Whigs as the more or less official version 
of the passing of the Declaratory Act. Unfortunately it simply does not 
correspond with the facts. The Declaratory Act was not only passed out of 
conviction by Rockingham and his leading friends, but maintained out of 
conviction; throughout the difficult years before the outbreak of war, the 
consistent position adopted by the party was that as a matter of right, in a 
debate which largely concerned right, Parliament's powers were unlimited. 
Jn asserting this they firmly believed that they were asserting the true 
principles of their party, consciously adhering to its ancient traditions. 40 
Whether they were right in this belief is a matter for debate. It is tempting 
to suggest that like most other politicians in the 1760s they were subtly 
reacting to the great growth in ihe power and prestige of Parliament which 
had marked the evolution of the eighteenth-century constitution. On this 
reading there lay, in the not very distant past, a less logically demanding 
position, one which acknowledged the basic primacy of Parliament estab-
lished in 1688 and yet retained some semblance of self-government for the 
colonies. Support for the idea that there was such a middle position may 
be detected in the gulf between generations which seems to mark the views 
of the Whigs on this question. The evidence is necessarily thin, but it suggests 
that the immediate forbears of the Rockingham Whigs might have had 
some doubts about the sweeping character of the Declaratory Act. This 
seems to be true of the first Earl of Hardwicke, lifelong friend of Newcastle, 
and servant successively of the Walpole and Pelham regimes. His experience 
as Lord Chancellor and his political and legal standing made him as good 
a representative as any of the official Whig mind in the mid-eighteenth 
century. There seems no doubt that he disliked the idea of colonial taxation, 
which was beginning to be discussed in Parliament in 1764, the year of his 
death. According to an American agent's report, 'Mr. Grenvile was shewn 
Lord Hardwicke's Opinion relative to Taxing America (Inexpedient) before 
he bro't in the Act.' 41 This story gains credibility from the testimony of 
Hardwicke's son, the second Earl, who told Governor Hutchinson a similar 
story about his father's last months. 'When asked what he thought of Mr. 
Grenville's scheme of taxing America, said-They had not been used to 
taxes: told Archbishop Secker, when he proposed sending a Bishop, that 
the Americans left England to avoid Bishops'. 42 Still more interesting, since 
it suggests objections on grounds of impropriety as well as inexpediency, 
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is a letter written by the second Earl. This letter has additional value since 
it was plainly penned at the time that the Stamp Bill was being considered, 
early in 1765, before the great controversy of I 765-6 could influence his 
recollections. His father, he remarked, 'had doubts about the Right. I have 
no doubts but that the Colonys will be very restive'. 43 
There are other hints of old Whig attitudes, some of them of doubtful 
value. Stories about the superior wisdom of Walpole in the 1730s and Pitt 
in 1750s in refusing to have anything to do with American taxation are legion, 
but they all seem to reflect the benefit of hindsight. More interesting, perhaps, 
is the attitude of the survivors of the Hardwicke era. Newcastle did not 
think deeply about such matters, and was persuaded pragmatically to dwell 
on the repeal of the Stamp Act as the central achievement of the Rockingham 
Ministry. Nonetheless. he clearly had instinctive doubts about the Declaratory 
Act. 44 Pitt, though a good deal younger than either Hardwicke or Newcastle, 
was consciously atavistic in his political views, and his ringing denunciation 
of parliamentary taxation perhaps recalled an earlier tradition. Unfortunately 
Pitt's position, as so often in his political career, presents problems, not 
least about his basic consistency. The attack which he launched in 1766 on 
the internal taxation of the colonies savoured as much of characteristic 
opportunism and rhetoric as of deep political conviction. It also got him, 
whenever he attempted to define his position more precisely, into logical 
difficulties from which he never satisfactorily extricated himself. When 
challenged he tended to lapse into vague and meaningless pronouncements. 
Nor does his record in office in 1766 provide an easy answer. 45 
In any event Pitt's view is more significant as an exception than as a rule. 
Not the least interesting feature of the I 760s is the arrival in politics of a 
whole generation of young Whigs who quickly supplanted or succeeded 
their elders. Apart from Pitt, the old leaders of Whiggism disappeared from 
the scene in rapid succession; Granville in 1763, Hardwicke, Legge and 
Devonshire in 1764, Newcastle was of little importance in the years before 
his death in I 768, and Holland of less before his in I 774. On the American 
question the new leaders of mainstream Whiggism entertained none of 
Hardwicke's doubts or Pitt's objections. In the Rockingham party 
Rockingham's own clear view commanded wide acceptance. Ironically it 
was strongly supported by a powerful group of his connections, the Onslows, 
the Townshends, Grey Cooper and their like, who left him to join the court 
in 1766 and continued to share from an opposite political standpoint the 
same ideological stance. The same could even be said of the Chatham party, 
at least before Pitt's dramatic declaration against the internal taxation of the 
Colonies in January I 766. Shelburne, one of the more clear thinking of the 
party, was much embarrassed, for in December I 765 he had publicly adopted 
more or less independently, what was to become the Rockingham position, 
that the right existed but that, for the sake of Britain's commercial strength, 
it should not be exercised. Like the slightly more cautious Camden, he had 
some difficulty adjusting to his leader's view subsequently. 46 Among lawyers 
the unanimity was particularly striking. Hardwicke's second son, Charles 
Yorke, as Attorney-General in Rockingham's ministry, drafted the 
Declaratory Act and never questioned its validity. Even the Chatham 
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party's lawyer in the Commons, John Dunning, declined to accept Pitt's 
theory of taxation. In fact in this matter Dunning and Yorke both subscribed 
to the opinion of Mansfield, the legal luminary of the age and, in the eyes of 
American and English radicals, the eminence grise of North's imperial 
policy. 
Whether the survival into the later 1760s of the most influential of the old 
corps leaders would have opened the way for a more credible Whig critique 
of ministerial policy is a nice question. In one respect it might have actually 
created additional problems. For the views of ministerial Whigs of the 
Pelham era were associated with a way of thinking about the colonies which 
potentially carried the same danger of strengthening the royal prerogative 
as that so distressingly offered by the evolution of American thought. 
One pointer to this possibility is the conversation which Franklin recorded 
as having taken place in 1757 with Lord Granville. Granville was a Whig of 
great experience and seniority; moreover as Lord President of the Council 
he was likely to have considered in detail the constitutional relationship 
between mother country and colonies. The subject of his talk with Franklin 
was not, naturally, the extent of Parliament's authority, but rather the 
perennial problem of conflict between the colonial assemblies and royal 
governors, and in particular the standing of the latter as representatives of 
the Crown. 
You Americans have wrong ideas of the nature of your constitution; 
you contend that the King's instructions to his governors are not laws 
and think yourselves at liberty to regard or disregard them at your 
own discretion. But these instructions are not like the pocket instructions 
given to a minister going abroad for regulating his conduct in some 
trifling point of ceremony. They are first drawn up by judges learned 
in the laws; they are then considered, debated, and perhaps amended 
in Council, after which they are signed by the King. They are then so 
far as relates to you, the law of the land; for THE KING IS THE 
LEGISLATOR OF THE COLONIES. 
Franklin replied: 
I told His Lordship this was a new doctrine to me. I had always under-
stood from our charters that our laws were to be made by our Assemblies, 
to be presented, indeed, to the King for his royal assent, but that being 
once given, the King could not repeal or alter them. And as the 
Assemblies could not make permanent laws without his assent, so 
neither could he make a law for these without theirs. He assured me 
I was totally mistaken. I did not think so, however. And His Lordship's 
conversation having a little alarmed me as to what might be the senti-
ments of the court concerning us. I wrote it down as soon as I returned 
to my lodgings. I recollected that about twenty years before a clause 
in a bill brought into Parliament by the ministry had proposed to make 
the King's instructions laws in the Colonies; but the clause was thrown 
out by the Commons, for which we adored them as our friends and 
friends of liberty, till by their conduct towards us in 1765, it seemed 
that they bad refused that point of sovereignty to the King only that 
they might reserve it for themselves. 47 
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This exchange must obviously be treated with caution. Franklin wrote 
his autobiography in 1771, at a time when he was particularly interested in 
the constitutional relationship between crown and colonies. Granville, if 
he said precisely what he is represented as having said, was presumably 
anxious to stress to a not uninfluential American the concern of British 
ministers at the continuing war of attrition against the prerogatives and 
powers of the King's deputies in America. He can hardly have intended to 
cast doubt on the authority of Parliament. Even so his observations are 
expressive of the mentality of mid-eighteenth century Whigs. Typical of 
this mentality was the conviction that the colonies were peculiarly the 
concern of the executive, and except in matters of commercial regulation, 
outside the natural purview, if not the competence, of Parliament. Thus 
in 1754 Henry Fox objected to the introduction of parliamentary legislation 
to regulate American troops on lines similar to the Mutiny Act in Britain: 
'as our colonies are more particularly under the eye of the crown than any 
other part of the British dominions, it would in my opinion, be too great 
an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the crown, or at least it would 
be an intermeddling in the affair with which we have no call to have any 
concern'. 48 This certainly reflected the view of successive ministers, not 
least in the case of Walpole twenty years earlier. Egmont, for example, 
had found, in connection with the affairs of Georgia, that Sir Robert 'was 
not willing the Colonies should depend on Parliament for their settlements, 
but merely on the Crown. He objected that the king's prerogative would 
be subjected thereby to Parliament'. 49 
This jealous protection of the prerogative was maintained by the Pelhams. 
As Henry McCulloch observed 'it bath not been agreable to the wisdom of 
the Crown to have the Parliament interfere in any matter relating to the 
exercise of the regal power'. 50 However, McCulloch was one of many who 
had doubts about this wisdom, and the latter part of George JI's reign 
witnessed growing pressure from all levels of the imperial bureaucracy to 
resort to parliamentary weapons. The pressure was as old, strictly speaking, 
as the Board of Trade itself, but in the course of 1740s and l 750s it became 
almost insurmountable. Successive body blows to royal authority in individual 
colonies made the arguments for parliamentary intervention stronger 
than ever. Moreover the new interest in things American during the War 
of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War seemed to make both a 
strengthening of the machinery of government and more systematic exploita-
tion of colonial sources of financial and military power necessary. Right 
through the 1750s a succession of colonial officials and military leaders 
warned ministers at home of the growing insubordination of colonial 
institutions and the men who ran them, and appealed for the adoption 
of a grand strategy based on parliamentary action. These demands did much 
to create among the rising generation which was to provide leadership in 
the 1760s a climate of opinion requiring firm action, and especially firm 
parliamentary action, in the colonies. But on the men at the top at the 
time it made little impression, according to Franklin because they 'are 
afraid the Parliament would establish more Liberty in the Colonies than 
is proper or necessary, and therefore do not care that Parliament should 
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meddle at all with the Government of the Colonies; they rather chose to 
carry every Thing there by the Weight of Prerogative'. 51 
Whether this fear was justified is perhaps doubtful. On the rare occasions 
when Parliament did consider the internal state of the colonies, it did not 
seem very interested in the maintenance of colonial liberties. The Massachu-
setts Bay Assembly was rapped sharply over the knuckles for its activities 
against government in 1733; in the same year Rhode Island's opposition 
on the Molasses Bill produced an indignant reaction from MPs, one of 
whom expostulated 'as if this House had not a power to tax them, or to 
make any laws for the regulating of the affairs of their colony'. 62 A decade 
or so later with reports of opposition to royal government growing more 
frequent, one onlooker warned from London that 'Every endeavour to 
wrest the King's Authority out of the hands of his Governour may draw 
on the Resentment not only of the King but likewise of a British Parliament 
who allready seem to have become Jealous of the Dependancies of their 
Colonies'. 63 Such straws in the wind suggest that even before 1760 the 
Commons would have been disposed rather to chastise the colonial 
assemblies for aping the authority of the imperial legislature, than to support 
their struggle against weakening royal prerogative. In any event, by the time 
in the 1760s that Parliament was finally brought directly into Anglo-American 
relations, it is easy enough to see that the approach of the Pelhamite 
Whigs would have seemed to their successors anachronistic and even 
dangerous. 
If the principal representatives of the Whig tradition found themselves 
embarrassed by the dual need to combat the court and maintain their 
inherent conviction of the ultimate authority of Parliament, there remained 
only one means of escape from their dilemma, that offered by the radicals. 
There was, of course, no unified campaign on the radical front, although 
radicals on both sides of the Atlantic strenuously sought to make common 
cause. Between a sophisticated re-examination of fundamental libertarian 
beliefs, like Richard Price's Civil Liberty, and the wild ranting of the popular 
journals there lay a great range of viewpoints. 54 Nonetheless it is easy enough 
to identify elements of consistency in the wide variety of radical approaches 
adopted in this period. First among these was the basic assertion which 
made it possible for them all to oppose government, support America, and 
also appeal to traditional Whig values. This was the claim that whatever the 
rights and wrongs of the American issue, Parliament itself and the system 
of which it was a part no longer provided a valid expression of the will of 
the people or even, indeed, of the will of the propertied. Arguments for 
constitutional reform based on the absurdities of the existing structure of the 
parliamentary franchise and constituencies, and on the alleged corruption 
which sustained them, provided a basis for root and branch opposition to 
successive governments. This stance was intellectually more effective than 
the 'country' position of the Rockinghams who founded their case against 
government exclusively on the growing influence of the Crown. Radicals 
cheerfully absorbed the Burkeian case against influence and 'double cabinet', 
but also went much further, with a frontal attack on the representative 
credentials of a Parliament which deprived the Middlesex electors of their 
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liberty and simultaneously abused the rights of Americans. Such a posture 
could readily be made to correspond with the ancient canons of the Whig 
constitution, and, for instance, Locke's solemn warning about the inevitable 
decline of any representative system was frequently quoted. 55 
Unfortunately, this formula was not for practical purposes available 
to the Rockingham Whigs. A few of their allies on the radical fringe, like 
David Hartley, 56 were prepared to follow the reforming line to some extent. 
But the great body of Rockingham Whigs, at any rate before their leadership 
pllssed into the hands of Fox in 1782, feebly criticised the conduct of 
Parliament without ever demanding fundamental change. Powerful appeals 
from the radicals to the effect that the American war had created 'an actual 
dissolution of government' 57 merely frightened them further away from real 
reform, and the charge of critics such as Catherine Macaulay, that Rocking-
ham was happy to reduce the improper influence of the Crown, but bent 
on maintaining his own improper influence, made an obvious impact. 
None of this means that the Rockinghams failed to evolve a coherent 
position on America. On the contrary, over the years and thanks in large 
measure to Burke they put together a tenable position. Their claim for a 
right of taxation which it was impolitic to exercise proved much easier to 
defend than the Chathamite distinction between legislation and internal 
taxation. Burke's speeches provided a steady stream of statesmanlike common 
sense which might well, in power, have produced a more sensitive and 
realistic policy, or so it could be argued. The demand for a return to 'the 
ancient Standing Policy of this Empire' 58 and repeal of all offending legisla-
tion subsequent to 1763 could be made to coincide, on a superficial 
examination at least, with the wish of Congress to return to the status quo 
at the end of the Seven Years War. Rockingham, in speaking of this, resorted 
in yet another version of the contractual relationship with the colonies, 
to traditional Whig vocabulary; 
I don't love to claim a right on the foundation of the. supreme power 
of the legislature over all the dominions of the Crown of Great Britain; 
I wish to find a consent, and acquiesence in the governed, and I choose, 
therefore, to have recourse to what I think an original tacit compact, and 
which useage had confirmed until the late unhappy financing project 
interrupted the union and harmony which had so long prevailed, to the 
mutual advantage and happiness of this country and its colonies. 59 
Burke seems to have been more cautious about using contract language 
to describe the era of salutary neglect, but he relied on it in his crucial 
distinction between the formal framework of the constitution and the 
informal network of customs and traditions which governed its operation. 
No doubt in these concepts latent ideas of trust and tacit contract were 
implicit. Particularly in his Speech on Conciliation he was able, characteristic-
ally, to elevate this pragmatism into something resembling a general 
principle of federalism such as would attract the applause of later theorists 
of empire. 
The Rockingham position helped to keep a party of opposition in being, 
capable, unlike its brethren among the Chatham Whigs, of responding to the 
challenge of conceding American independence. But to many it seemed 
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inconsistent, over-ingenious, and above all lacking in that vigorous assertion 
of basic principles which was required of the Whig case. Burke's circumven-
tion of the ideological problems involved was sophisticated but perhaps 
too sophisticated. Bluff country gentlemen found his distinctions between 
theory and practice either baffling or objectionable, and in a rare humiliation 
for Burke on the floor of the Commons, in December 1774, one of them 
said so in a sensational scene. 
Burke was more flowery than ever; he addressed himself with a great 
deal of rhetorick to the young Members, cautioning them against the 
wiles of Administration; but was so facetious that he pleased the whole 
House. A short answer was given by a blunt Mr. Van. 'The Honourable 
Gentleman', says Van, 'has been strewing flowers to captivate children. 
I have no flowers Mr. Speaker to strew, all I have to say is, that I think 
the Americans are a rebellious and most ungrateful people, and I am 
for assuring the king that we will support him in such measures as will 
be effectual to reduce them'. The honesty of the man and his singular 
manner set the whole House into a halloo! and answered Burke better 
than Cicero could have done with all his eloquence. 60 
Even worse, the Rockinghams' posture could readily be portrayed as 
justifying almost any opinion. The allegations made against Burke by Henry 
Cruger, his fellow Bristol M.P., came from a malicious opponent, but they 
stirred matching feelings in others. 'Today, he will be the first great Promoter 
of a Declaratory Bill. Tomorrow he shall insinuate the Parliament have not 
a right to bind the Americans in aII cases-and yet, put him in power, and the 
third day you shall find him asserting the supremacy of this country with a 
vengeance'. 61 The plausibility of this charge was the price the Rockinghams 
had to pay for the manifold pressures on the evolution of political theory 
presented by the American Revolution. Their response to these pressures was 
defensible, in some measure convincing and at least preserved their self 
respect through a difficult period. But as the considered attempt of the 
main representatives of old Whiggism to apply Whig principles to the great 
ideological issue of the day, it was a complete failure. The young Fox, 
joining the party in the mid 1770s, sensed this weakness and urged his 
friends to make it 'a point of honour among us all to support the American 
pretensions in adversity as much as we did their prosperity, and that we 
shall never desert those who have acted unsuccessfully upon Whig principles, 
while we continue to profess our admiration of those who succeeded in the 
same principles in the year 1688'. 62 
The intellectual bankruptcy of the mainstream Whig tradition in the face 
of the American question would perhaps have been less demoralising for its 
friends if it had been matched by similar intellectual confusion and division 
among its enemies. Instead, the unity and coherence of the consensus which 
emerged in opposition to the claims of the colonies, was a constant source of 
problems. Only very occasionaily were there serious differences in the 
anti-American camp. In 1766 when the Rockingham Ministry was enjoying 
its brief year of office, those who opposed its policy of repeal were divided 
about the relative merits of enforcing the Stamp Act and modifying it, 
though it was also the case that the possibility of modification was a problem 
OLD WHIGS, OLD TORIES 121 
for the Rockingham ministers themselves. Again, nine years later there were 
serious divisions within the government between those who favoured North's 
conciliatory proposals and those who simply adhered to the policy of 
coercion. But with these relatively insignificant exceptions the opponents of 
America presented a remarkably united front. And on the central question of 
sovereignty, there was a striking measure of general agreement, which was 
to sustain the North Ministry in particular through years of expensive 
and demoralising war. Many of the leaders of the North regime were of 
sound Whiggish family for at least two generations, as in the case of North 
and Gower, or for a much longer period, as in the case of most of their 
colleagues. Doubtless it was a considerable source of comfort to these men, 
that it was possible to portray the struggle with America in terms which 
made the British government's position at least as solidly Whiggish as that 
of its enemies. No less significant, however, was the fact that they could 
simultaneously appeal to what was left of the old Tory tradition, thus 
having, as it were, the best of both worlds. 
That the Tory contribution to the policies which provoked the American 
Revolution is easily forgotten is largely the result of the superficially negligible 
strength of the old Tory party by this time. It is difficult, for example, 
to point to a single minister or a single measure capable of being described 
simply as Tory, without resorting to the deliberate falsification which 
radicals engaged in when they roundly condemned all the works of George 
III and Lord North as Tory and crypto-Jacobite. By the 1760s the old 
Tory Party was effectively reduced to a rump of country gentlemen, whose 
distinctive identity was rapidly dissolving. The parliamentary managers 
of George III's reign sometimes continued to describe them as Tories. 
Rockingham's list of November 1766 did so, as did Newcastle's of March 
1767. It was to be expected that two self-conscious exponents of old style 
Whiggism would describe their ancient enemies in this way. Charles 
Townshend, who also attempted to classify M.P.s in January 1767, referred 
more broadly to the 'country gentlemen', a category which matched very 
closely those described by Rockingham and Newcastle as Tories. Later 
on the term 'country gentlemen' grew universal and in time comprehended 
those who earlier might have described themselves as country Whigs and 
whose particular brand of independence was now indistinguishable for 
most purposes from that of their Tory compatriots. Some Tories escaped the 
category altogether by moving into one or other of the identifiable party 
groups. All the latter included one or two Tories, with the Rockinghams, 
for instance, attracting the support of William Dowdeswell and two of his 
West Country friends, Charles Barrow and Sir William Codrington. No less 
significant, very few of the men who carried their Toryism beyond the death 
of George II and into the reign of George III were of the first or even second 
rank in point of abilities. Rare exceptions were perhaps Dowdeswell himself, 
Sir Francis Dashwood, and at a lower level Norborne Berkeley. But none of 
them emerged as an important supporter of government in debate or in office 
before or during the American war. In debate indeed the old Tories were 
generally silent, though they bad a few representatives like Sir William 
Bagot, M.P. for Staffordshire, Sir Roger Newdigate, M.P. for Oxford 
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University, and Arthur Van among the younger generation who made 
rather a point of claiming to speak for the country gentlemen. 
Paradoxically, the role of the old Tories turned country gentlemen was 
almost more important in the politics of the 1770s than in those of George 
II's reign, when they had found themselves in unremitting opposition to 
the court. The largely unrecognised but none the less distinct reduction 
of the influence of the crown in Parliament, 63 together with the basic 
readiness of the Tories to vote for George Ill's ministers, .made the court 
increasingly dependent on this large but unreliable body of opinion. Charles 
Jenkinson, an influential junior minister in successive governments, was 
acutely aware of this important change in the pattern of parliamentary 
politics. As a convinced courtier, he described to Governor Hutchinson 
what he saw as a source of weakness for government. He: 
laments the state of affairs in England: speaks of the Minister as not 
having the influence of Sir Robert Walpole. And that he has no assurance 
of the success of any measure until it is tried: that a failure upon any 
question would have been fatal to Sir Robert Walpole because he 
governed by party, {which is little other than bribery and corruption), 
but Lord North may lose three or four questions in a Session, and not 
affect him. He says there are 150 Members, a sort of Flying Squadron, 
that you don't know where they will be in a new question. This may 
enfeeble the executive powers of Government from the uncertainty 
of support from the legislative power; but it may be questioned whether 
this state is not to be preferred to the former. 64 
The final qualification was perhaps a wise one. For if the antics of the 
country gentlemen could be irritating, their underlying support for Lord 
North was a source of great strength, more especially since the opinions 
of these men reflected with considerable fidelity the thinking of the landed 
classes at large. As one of Rockingham's friends remarked, 'Many members 
support the minister who are not supported by him. In his party, you will 
find most of the country members. This is the true barometer of the higher 
orders in England'. 65 
Admittedly, in the 1760s this element was sometimes responsible for the 
relative instability of politics. The issues of this period which caused most 
concern were often 'court and country' questions, and in response to them 
the old Tories would sometimes draw back from their new allegiance to 
George Ill and vote with opposition. Thus general warrants, the cider 
excise, the Middlesex Election, all brought independent members not indeed 
to a desire to bring government down, but at least to a readiness to vote 
against its measures. One of the most celebrated ministerial reverses of the 
period, supposedly the first such defeat for government since the Revolution, 
occurred on the land tax division of 1767, in which the country gentlemen 
voted as one. The unpredictable character of their vote was in this manner a 
constant source of anxiety to those like Jenkinson responsible for managing 
the court's supporters in the Commons. It also held out to the parliamentary 
opposition the constant prospect of seriously embarrassing government, 
if the appropriate issues presented themselves. 
Against this background, it was precisely the importance of the American 
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question that it dramatically demonstrated the readiness of the country 
gentlemen to give their support to government on a more enduring basis. 
North's appeal to them was manifold. His own temperament and family 
connections, not to say his financial ability and his oratory all had their 
effect. But more than anything North was sustained through twelve years 
of power and almost as many of crisis by the support of these men for his 
policy. That support was given freely in the great majority of cases because 
he was getting one issue, that of America, in their terms largely right. Not 
only could North not have fought the war without the natural heirs of the 
old Tories, but his readiness to fight it actually strengthened his following 
among them. And when after 1782 and the battle of Yorktown they had had 
enough, their change of front was equally decisive in bringing about his fall. 
Contemporaries were thoroughly aware of the importance of this element in 
North's parliamentary position. Hutchinson, an engrossed observer of the 
parliamentary scene in England was struck by the impact of the issues. On 
court versus country questions, he noted, opposition mustered sizeable 
votes: on American topics it was quite different, 'the independent country 
gentlemen being generally against the Americans'. 66 Burke, as one of the 
actors in this scene drew the correct but depressing lesson. 'He said it was 
almost in vain to contend, for the country gentlemen had abandoned their 
duty, and placed an implicit confidence in the minister'. 67 
How much this development owed to the Tory mentality of the old country 
families it is impossible to gauge precisely. Even the personnel are not 
easily identified. The very success of government in the 1770s rendered 
nugatory the publication of division lists on American questions, and where 
lists do exist they tend to be exclusively concerned with those in the minority. 
Nonetheless such evidence makes it clear that those who can plausibly be 
associated with the old Tory interest were as uncompromisingly hostile to 
America as contemporary comment suggests. In the crucial divisions of 
1775-6, marking the long descent into war, hardly any of the old Tories voted 
against government. For instance in the division of 26 October 1775, with 
the Commons preparing to go beyond the coercive legislation of 1774-5 and 
effectively to commit itself to war, only one of those regarded by contempor-
aries as Tories voted with opposition. This was Tom Foley, representative 
of an old Tory family from the West Midlands, but now a close friend and 
political ally of Charles James Fox. In fact the Tories as a group were nothing 
if not consistent in their views on America, for their opposition to the colonists 
went back at least to the Stamp Act crisis. The turnout of the Tory party 
against the repeal of the stamp tax was a marked feature of the divisions of 
February 1766. The names as they appear in the lists read like a roll call of 
the Tory families: Bagot, Bertie, Blackett, Burdett, Cotton, Curzon, Dash-
wood, Drake, Foley, Glynne, Grosvenor, Harley, Hpublon, Isham, Keck, 
Kemys Tynte, Knightley, Newdigate, Mordaunt, Pryse, Shuttleworth, 
Sibthorp, Bampfylde, Vansittart, Wodehouse-taking only the better known 
of them-these were the very backbone of the Tory squirearchy of George 
II's reign. 68 A decade later the same men or their successors were solidity 
behind North, supporting him steadily in the Commons, and, no less impor-
tant, whipping up a country campaign in favour of his policy. The loyal 
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addresses which in late 1775 finally made it clear that the verdict at least of the 
countryside and small towns was irreversibly behind coercion rather than 
conciliation in America owed much to such families, as the names of those 
M.P.s entrusted with the presentation of the addresses to the King reveal.69 
The support of the old Tories for the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy and their readiness to go to war in its defence provoked much 
interest at the time. Many contemporaries cynically attributed it to the 
enticing prospect of relief for Tory purses, severely over-burdened by the 
land tax. Possibly this had some plausibility in the early stages of the Anglo-
American dispute at the time of the Stamp Act and the Townshend Duties. 
But later, at the onset of the war, in the light of the heavy expenditure 
plainly involved even in a short armed struggle with America, and with 
opposition spokesmen bitterly reminding the country gentlemen that an 
increased land tax was the first fruit of their attitude, it carried less force. 
More interesting to many were the ideological implications. If it was curious 
for Whigs in America to be found supporting the royal prerogative it 
seemed no less odd for Tories to be seen supporting the sovereignty of the 
legislature. Their opponents characteristically attributed this to a major 
change at court rather than among the country gentlemen. 'Lucky has it 
been for many consistent Jacobites, who might otherwise have been reduced 
to the necessity of turning with the times, that the crown itself has taken a 
turn in their favour; by which means the morosest anti-courtiers of the last 
reign are become, without changing their political preferences, the civilist 
courtiers in this'. 71 
These calculations about the direction of Tory thinking were contrived 
and overstrained. For the deployment of traditional Tory emotions and 
beliefs in the service of parliamentary omnicompetence was carried out much 
more smoothly than the channelling of old Whig energies in a radical or 
reforming direction. Seventeenth-century concepts and ideas played a greater 
part in late eighteenth-century politics than is sometimes allowed for, but 
the changes in their use were as important as the fact that they were used 
at all. By the 1770s the surviving element in Tory thinking was not the divine 
right of the monarch, but rather the divine right of properly constituted 
authority, and the non-resistance which certainly lingered on in their political 
vocabulary was owed not to the King but to the King in Parliament. 
The speed and success with which Tories had adapted their traditional ideas 
in order to absorb the once traumatic impact of the Revolution of 1688 
is now much better understood, 72 and certainly by the reign of George III 
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was as commonplace among 
Tories as among their enemies. Moreover the distinctions which caused 
such agonies among conscientious Whigs were not at all embarrassing 
to the less pedantic Tory country gentlemen. For them it was sufficient to 
state that the power of taxation was implicit in the supreme authority 
necessarily found in every state. This secularised version of the ultimate 
omnipotence of paternal government figured strongly in Johnson's Taxation 
No Tyranny. 'There must in every society be some power or other for which 
there is no appeal, which admits no restrictions, which pervades the whole 
mass of the community, regulates and adjusts all subordination, enacts laws 
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or repeals them, erects or annuls judicatures; extends or contracts privileges, 
exempt itself from question or control, and bounded only by physical 
necessity'. 73 Johnson was not one of the country gentlemen but he shared 
their political standpoint and was, unlike most of them, capable of articulating 
it. One of the advantages of such a simple concept was that it made specula-
tion about the precise content of sovereignty pointless-it was in its nature 
all or nothing. It also permitted somewhat vague statements which jumbled 
together in a confused but satisfying mixture the supremacy of the nation, 
the crown, and the legislature. Franklin found this habitual lack of precision 
deeply irritating: 'Nothing is more common here than to talk of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament, and the Sovereignty of this Nation over the 
Colonies; a kind of Sovereignty the Idea of which is not so clear, nor does 
it clearly appear upon what Foundations it is established'. 74 Such looseness 
of definition incidentally permitted that sentimental expression of respect for 
the person of the King, which if it no longer implied doctrines of divine 
right, gave ample rein to Tory emotions. Most of the addresses of 1775 
specifically referred to the need to maintain the lawful authority of the 
legislature, but most also referred to the rights of the Crown, in one form or 
another. Expressions such as the 'legal Authority of the Crown', the Dignity 
of your Crown and Person', 'our Hearts glowing with Zeal for your Majesty's 
Person' occurred in profusion. 75 Some critics were consequently driven to 
enquire 'whether passive obedience and non-resistance in all cases what-
soever be the duty of British subject'. 76 
The accusation that the language of the landed interest in this period was 
the language of non-resistance was not absurdly wide of the mark, at any 
rate outside Parliament itself, where the debate was generally conducted 
between different brands of Whigs and among relatively sophisticated 
politicians. But in settings as diverse as the Common Council of London and 
the Berkshire county meeting held at Abingdon, there were lively debates 
about the legitimacy of resistance and the duty of passive obedience to 
constituted authority. 77 The language of the addresses themselves was in 
many cases savage in its denuciation of the colonists and smacked distinctly 
of the old abuse by the High Churchmen of commonwealthmen and 
dissenters. Americans were, for some addressers, 'Sons of Anarchy', and 
'Mob and Rabble led by mad Enthusiasts and desperate Republicans'; 
others referred to the 'base Innovations and black Ingratitude of rebellious 
Americans', and predicted the 'miseries of a democratical Tyranny'. 78 
Loyalist journalists encouraged the tendency to make a connection between 
American radicals and old bogeys of Tory mythology. 'It is impossible' one 
declared, 'to give you a better description of the bulk of the people on this 
Continent (and particularly in the province of Massachusetts Bay), than 
every English history gives of the principles of the Independents in Oliver's 
time. There their pictures are justly drawn'. 79 The implied hostility to 
religious dissenters was deeply significant. One pamphleteer referred to 
'these rebellious Republicans, these hairbrained fanatics, as mad and 
distracted as the Anabaptists of Munster'. 80 The American crisis came, by 
coincidence, at a sensitive moment for relations between the church and the 
non-comformists in England. The Feathers Tavern petition, in favour of 
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modifying the requirement of clerical subscription to the Thirty-Nine 
articles, and a renewed demand from dissenters for an extension of the 
Toleration Act, had both been firmly repressed in 1772-3. Against this 
backdrop, the religious convictions of New Englanders and the political 
sympathies of leading English dissenters, were closely noted, and in the 
minds of Anglicans connected. It would hardly have been possible to raise 
the cry of 'the church in danger' on this basis, but there was no doubt where 
the inclinations of the Anglican clergy lay, and they made no secret of their 
desire to stoke the fires of anti-Americanism. In many parts of the country 
the pulpit reinforced a national political campaign for the first time in many 
years, and visiting Americans like Samuel Curwen were startled by the 
recrudescence of the old high Toryism, reflected in virulent sermons. 81 The 
holding of a general fast unleased a flood of appeals for Anglican unity in the 
face of a revived dissenting threat, 82 while inflammatory addresses from the 
pulpit were matched by a powerful campaign in the newspapers: 'All true 
Churchman are desired to unite in an address to the throne on the present 
alarming times. It being evident that the Dissenters in general want to 
subvert the constitution'. 83 The taint of radicalism was also readily linked 
with these prejudices. The loudly expressed interest of Wilkites in the 
American cause was particularly damaging. Americans tended to believe 
that such interest enhanced their own prospects in Britain. In fact, with 
the propertied classes, it had the opposite effect. According to one experienced 
and friendly observer, Richard Champion, America would have found 
much more support among moderate Englishmen if the domestic challenges 
of radicalism in these years had never occurred. 84 
The defence of the British supremacy in the colonies could easily be 
portrayed as a defence of all those things which the old Tories most admired. 
In this respect the changes of George III's early years had utterly transformed 
their situation. They were now, as never under George I and George II, 
part of the natural and settled order of things. No longer engaged in the 
hopeless defence of an outdated creed against the Whig oligarchs, they once 
again felt fully a part of a unified ruling class. Tories rarely bothered to 
compete for government places at the higher levels, but their access to the 
patronage of the localities was once again as open as under Queen Anne. 
In particular their acknowledged place in the Commissions of the Peace and 
in the new-style militia gave them a stake in existing government which they 
had long lacked. In one of those deeply perceptive analyses of which he was 
capable, Shelburne saw distinctly the connections between a squirearchy 
fully restored to its leading role in local society, and the coercion of America. 
He commented on 'the alienation of all the landed Interest from the ancient 
Plan of Freedom: Every landed Man setting up a little Tyranny, and, armed 
with Magistracy, and. oppressive Laws, spreading a Waste of Spirit and 
creating an intellectual Darkness around him. Thus employed the country 
gentlemen were willing, instead of controlling the abuse of Power, to take 
their Choice with that Government under which their own peculiar Tyrannies 
were maintained'. 85 
This was a pejorative way of describing the growing confidence, complac-
ency, and cohesiveness, which marked the attitude of the old landed families 
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and which was reflected not least in their view of the American conflict. It 
also underrated their readiness temporarily to resume their independence 
when circumstances dictated. Within four years of the addresses of I 775, 
they mutinied over the failure of the war and the bleak economic climate at 
home, came near to overturning the government, and briefly aroused radical 
hopes of major constitutional change. Nonetheless, Shelburne's assessment 
was a shrewd one, for it caught perfectly the mindless authoritarianism 
which the country gentlemen displayed in the face of the American challenge. 
Put at its simplest they declined to feel for colonial propertyholders, those 
libertarian sentiments which quickly sprang to their minds when the 
traditional rights and customs of propertied Englishmen were at stake. 
Americans indeed were in this sense the victims of a revived Tory paternalism, 
and seen somewhat as monied men or religious dissenters had been seen at 
the beginning of the century. In their case, moreover, clearly subordinate 
status and an outlandish identity which placed them on a level little above 
foreigners reinforced the hierarchical and patriotic instincts of the John Bull 
Englishman. 86 The essential fact was that the English landed gentry 
altogether rejected, without even giving it serious consideration, the proposi-
tion which for Americans was of equally obvious validity-the proposition 
that the residents of the colonies were indistinguishable from Englishmen 
in respect of their rights and liberties. Contemporary usage commonly 
described the plantations in terms which suggested that they were no more 
than the property of the British, and their inhabitants literally a subject 
people. This dismayed weU-disposed Englishmen and shocked visiting 
Americans; ironicaUy it offended not least those loyalist Americans who 
gave up everything for their principles, settled in England and found them-
selves despised and even cursed with their rebellious compatriots. Richard 
Price objected strongly to such attitudes: 'The people of America are no more 
the subjects of the people of Britain, than the people of Yorkshire are the 
subjects of the people of Middlesex. They are your feUow-subjects'. His 
plea feU on deaf ears. 
The 1760s and 1770s saw the emergence of a clear consensus iu favour of 
the principle of British imperial supremacy. Whether this consensus is 
justly to be termed the 'new Toryism' is perhaps a matter of semantics. The 
country gentlemen and the broader body of provincial opinion which they 
undobtedly represented, did not embrace aU shades of opinion in favour of 
stern measures in the colonies. They did not themselves dictate or shape 
policy, and their leaders who did, appealed to their prejudices, but did not 
necessarily share them. On the other hand they provided the essential 
element of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary support without which an 
unprecedented war against colonists could not have been fought. Their 
alliance with the court of George III and its expression in the coercion 
of America also signified a growing identification of the governing class 
with the conservative values of the landed interest, and thereby prepared 
the way for the Church and King reaction of the 1790s. Perhaps significantly, 
the addresses demanding action against the colonies already provided 
glimpses of that obsession with the unchanging and unchangeable virtues 
of the constitution in church and state which was to be the ha11mark 
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of Toryism under Pitt and Liverpool. Americans were thus cast in the role 
which was finally to be allotted to reformers in the 1790s, that of the sacrile-
gious enemy of the purity of the English constitution. Ironically Burke, who 
was later to expound and articulate this standpoint with brilliant clarity 
and devastating force was, in the 1770s, searching conscientiously for a 
formula which would sidestep, if not supplant it. It is perhaps a measure of 
the importance of the American Revolution in British party politics that 
talents which were insufficient to revive the fortunes of the old Whiggism, 
were not even needed to reinvigorate the old Toryism. 
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